

POLITICAL TRANSITION OF THE MILITARY REGIME

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Abstract

This paper attempts an analysis of the Chilean political society from the perspective of the problem of transition from a authoritarian regime to civilian regime. It begins with some general reflections on the political transition of the authoritarian regime in Latin America. Also, analyze the role of political organizations under civilian regimes, distinguishing among various regime phases and types of organizations and mobilizations, and goes on to outline changing state/societal relations in Chile.

The paper presents some interpretative details about the paradoxical role of social crisis of civil society and their political organizations and mobilizations, their fundamental importance in reconstituting civil society and transforming authoritarian regimes, and their limits with respect to bringing about the restoration of full and real democracy.

This paper is several things: a record of an important historical process, a compendium of information and analysis about the political transition of the military regime, a source book of political debates conveniently tied to a concrete case, on the nature and strategy of the transition to democracy. And, one of the three “tracks paper” system: A draft theoretical paper for the Ph. D. degree qualifying examination.

Resumen

Este trabajo intenta un análisis de la sociedad política chilena desde la perspectiva del problema de la transición de un régimen autoritario al régimen civil. Se comienza con algunas reflexiones generales sobre la transición política del régimen autoritario en

América Latina. También, analizar el papel de las organizaciones políticas en virtud de los regímenes civiles, distinguiendo entre las diversas fases de régimen y los tipos de organizaciones y movilizaciones, y pasa a describir el cambio de estado / relaciones sociales en Chile.

El artículo presenta algunos detalles acerca de la interpretación paradójica de la función de la crisis social de la sociedad civil y sus organizaciones políticas y movilizaciones, su importancia fundamental en la reconstitución de la sociedad civil y la transformación de los regímenes autoritarios, y sus límites con respecto a lograr el restablecimiento de la plena y verdadera democracia .

El presente trabajo es varias cosas: un registro de un importante proceso histórico, un compendio de información y análisis acerca de la transición política del régimen militar, un libro de los debates políticos convenientemente vinculada a un caso concreto, de la naturaleza y la estrategia de la transición A la democracia. Y, uno de los tres "pistas de papel" del sistema: un proyecto de documento teórico para el doctorado grado de calificación de examen.

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INTRODUCTION

Political democracies in Latin America are characterized by recurrent crisis. During the Sixties and Seventies democratic solutions to the problems of inequality and underdevelopment in Latin America were replaced by military solutions. A wave of militarism swept the Region during the last two decades. Since 1962, there have been 12 military coups¹. In each case the armed forces ousted civilian governments. In all coups the armed forces explained their actions as necessary to save their respective nations from incompetent civilian governments and from the 'threat of communism' (Lieuwen, 1969). In sum, there is consensus that the military itself had few orienting ideological beliefs beyond a commitment to national security and anti-communism.

The 1970's were years of intense social and political upheaval: mass peasant movements, large-scale popular mobilizations and revitalized nationalism swept across Latin America. Political polarization, social tension, stagnant socioeconomic structures in crisis and the influence of external social, economical and political forces all had a significant effect on the military. The military did not merely gain the power to 'normalize' or 'pacify' the class struggle. They got to power with a plan to construct, a "new social order"², a plan not only military but also political and economical (Stein, 1982).

¹ See, Lieuwen, E., "The Latin American Military", Report, "Regímenes de Seguridad Nacional" Research Paper Series, 33, January 1982. Institute of Latin American Studies, Stockholm. Sanchez, J., "Hacia adonde va la Democracia?", Cuadernos de Joaquín Mortiz, 11 Ed, Joaquín Mortiz (Mexico, 1982).

² See, Díaz David M., "Control Militar-Corporativo en Brasil y en Chile. Función, Consecuencias y Perspectivas", Research Paper Series, 4, March, 1977, Institute of Latin American Studies, Stockholm. See also, Collier, "The New Authoritarianism in America Latina", Brunner, J., "La Cultura Política..." 211-227; see also, Stein, Nancy, "Latin American Militaries: Two Models, Many Problems", NACLAS's Report on Americas, vol., XVI, 5 (New York, 1982), 3 - 32

The military regimes implicitly or explicitly proposed a process of transformation in terms of two processes: In terms of capitalist internal reorganization, and of reincorporation (reintegration) into the world capitalist system (Garreton, 1980). But their late failure - as much in terms of their own objectives as of the solutions of the demands of the whole society - has resulted in the resurfacing of the democratic model during the last decade.

Generally speaking, democracy is proposed to the magical solution to the crisis which these military regimes are suffering, as if their inevitable end were a traditionalist political system³.

My general hypothesis is that much of this rhetoric of democracy is used to cover strategies which try to institutionalize an authoritarian mode which would insure the everlasting dominance of the traditional ruling class and its new allies: the armed forces. Hence the importance of the analysis of the theme of political transition of the military regimes. In the particular case of Chile, decision-making in authoritarian regime should be understood as attempts by military rulers to address two, often conflicting, overarching goals - economic stabilization and political restructuring. Importantly, while these twin goals were always central to military policymaking, their specific content evolved over time in response to external contingencies and past efforts to address them.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the current political situation of the military regime in Chile but more central to its purpose is the analysis of the political options that this

³ For more discusión about this issue, see: Jiménez, E., "La alternativa reformista..." 5 – 20; Gallo Viera, J., "Hegemonía Militar y Alternativa Democrática en América Latina"; Moulian, Thomas, "La crisis de la Izquierda", 310-316 Flisfish, A., "Una Nueva Ideología Democrática en América Latina", 129; Varas, A., "Visión del mundo en América Latina y Alternativas Ideológicas en el Cono Sur", 1- 64; Varas, A., Continuidad y Cambios en el Sistema Internacional. Esquema para un análisis de la Transición Política", 1- 21.



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regime offers in a period of crisis. It is hoped that this discussion will contribute to our understanding of political transition of military regimes.

Political Transition of the Military Regime

In recent times one of the main preoccupations of the analysts of military regimes in Latin America has centered on the theme of political transition of these regimes⁴. This is been so because the failure of their political model has become evident even though economically, latinoamerican capitalism was stabilized, and politically, new social actors, patterns of institutional organization, and a liberal legitimating ideology were produced that help to ensure the model's survival.

The appearance of opposition sectors could raise alternative to the regimes, or because of the recent discussions about the myth of the inevitable failure of these regimes and the automatic transition to a democratic system⁵.

In the beginning, analysts concentrated on the nature of the preceding crisis, the reasons for the defeat of political movements, and the breaking up of traditional democratic regimes⁶. The institutional break down of democracy in Latin America the rise of "new style" military regimes during the last two decades, has originated an abundant literature.

From a general perspective, it is possible to emphasize that substitution of democracies by

⁴ See Galeano, "Gobiernos Militares", 14 – 15; Jimenez, "La Alternativa democratica", 5 – 19; Garreton, "Transicion Politica...", 1 – 46; see also, Aguirre, 85 – 98; Dinges, J., "The Rise of The Opposition"; Almeyda, C., "La Lucha del Pueblo...", Tomic, R., "Un Gobierno de Emergencia..." 17-21; Murray, "October Elections...", 36-40; Palet, "Dificil...", 3- 5, Volk, "Chile beyond...", 2-14; Garreton, "Modelo y Proyecto...", 7-24; O'Donnell, "Reflections on The Pattern's..." about the recent discussion see De Riz, Liliana in "Partidos Politicos y Democratizacion en el Cono Sur", UNAM, Mimeo 1982.

⁵ A discussion of this point is in : Collier, "Democracia...", 17 – 23; Dinges, "The Rise of ...", 13 – 28; Henriquez, G., "Chile necesita una...", 11 – 13; Garreton, "Procesos Politicos en un ..."; Alvavay, "Chile y la ...", 1 – 18; Garreton, "El Proceso Politico..." 109 – 122:

⁶ See Palacio, "Chile: An attempt at..." Introduction. Chapter I – II; Loveman and Davies, "The Military...", 190-197; 257-269; Drake, "Political Parties and labor..."; Stein, "Latin American...", 3-32; Boye, "Iglesia y Regimen Militar", 15-16;

militaries regimes was due to a complex relationship of internal as well as external factors. Analyses of the complex internal factors that have influenced the military definition of the society agree that the main general factors have been: On the one hand, generalization of a crisis in the functioning of economy and the overflow of traditional systems of regulation of the political conflict. On other hand, political polarization, social tension and (fundamentally) the heightened polarization of the militaries through their emphasized role as guardian of internal security and economical order.

A second line of analysis attempted to characterize the military regimes within a more global context and the historical specificity which separates them from other traditional military dictatorships⁷. One should note, in this regard, the attempts to study the predominant agents of 'the regime; specifically, the armed forces'⁸.

Traditional analysis of the military roles in Latin America often assumed that the military was both isolated or separate from politics and amenable to civilian control (Lieuwen, 1969). Analysis of the resurgence of militarism during the last two decades has increasingly if tacitly assumed the unavailability of civilian hegemony and tended to downplay the democratic normative issue. The new scholarship has increased the precision and extended the range of our understanding.

⁷ Garreton, "Transición Política y Democracia, ` Los Nuevos Temas al Debate", Paper prepared for XIV Congreso Latinoamericano de Sociología. (San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1981), 1-46.

⁸ See, for example, Janowitz, M., "The Military in the Political Development of New Nation." Chicago: University of Chicago press. 1964, 43-4P, 55-56. Or, Johnson, John. The Military and Society in Latin America. Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1964, 101. Needier, Martin, "Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power." Latin American Research Review, X (fall), 1975, 63-79. Pye, Lucien, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization. In the Role of the Military in Underdeveloped countries". Ed. by John J. Johnson. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1962, 78-79. Stepan, Alfred, and The Military in politics: Changing patterns in Brazil." Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1974. Huntigton, S., "The Soldier and the State", Cambridge, "Fuerzas Armadas, Orden Interno y Derechos Humanos" in "Estado y Fuerzas Armadas", (Chile, 1982), 35-58.

The armed forces are conceptualized now as an integral component of the Latin American political system rather than as an isolated non-political institution. At the same time there has been a decline in reification as the focus of analysis is refined to include intramilitary: factional and even individual actors (Wolpin, 1980).

Analysis has also centered on the role of the opposition to military regimes. Their evolution, configurations and its perspectives in an eventual transition to democracy⁹.

Opposition movements have traditionally been analyzed in terms of their capacity to cause the overthrow or elimination of a regime. New analysis has extended the range of the role of opposition to military regimes. Opposition forces are valuable and successful not only in terms of their ability to accelerate a process of crisis. Of great value are previous activities such as creating a substitute space to the traditional political space, defending certain rights, people and institutions, developing a political alternative to the regime, socializing new political subjects, and organizing and activating the different most important of all is its creation, by whatever means, of conditions for frontal resistance to the progress of the historical project of those regimes.

At the same time there has been an attempt to analyze the opposition according to its activities in a concrete historic coyunture (survival and subsistence phases: struggles to overthrow the regime, emphasis on the elaboration of an alternative to the regime, efforts to redemocratize society and the political system which had been gradually militarized).

⁹ Miguel, Janine, "La Defensa de los Derechos y Libertades de los Trabajadores Chilenos y sus Organizaciones Sindicales ante Los Organismos Internacionales", Research Papers Series, 31, June 1981 Institute of Latin American Studies, Stockholm. By the same author, see, "La Nueva Institucionalidad Laboral de los Regimenes de Seguridad nacional: La Experiencia Chilena." Research Papers Series, 33, February 1982. Valenzuela and Valenzuela, "Partidos de Oposicion bajo el Regimen Autoritario Chileno". Revista Mexicana de Sociologia (Mexico, 1982), the full text of this article is reprinted in ", Chile 1973-198?" FLACSO (Chile, 1983), 251-300.

To summarize, although generally speaking one can speak about "the opposition", one has to acknowledge its political diversity, its internal contradictions, its strategies and power alternatives. Thus, the analysis of the role of the opposition to a particular regime could never be one-dimensional, even though one phase or another may be emphasized.

Finally, the official communiqué of transition to civilian government, the promulgation of new political constitutions, the attempts to open public-political space for political parties and "legitimate dissidents"¹⁰, and the establishment of fixed terms for the "transition" have converted the theme into the central object of discussion for the analysts of the historical project of these regimes¹¹. The analyses agree in showing these military regimes as carriers of their own historic project. It is noted that despite the diversity of particular situation each regime faces, this project could be characterized in terms of a process of internal capitalist reorganization and of reincorporation into the world's capitalist system,

The aim is to institutionalize a socio-political organization which is coherent with the development model. This requires of an adaptation of the sociopolitical organization model and the structural imperatives of the economic model.

This process seems to imply, as a consequence, the adoption of certain political restrictions: The establishment of a permanent authoritarian model. On the other hand these restrict other spheres of social life in order to make them functional to the

¹⁰ See Edwards, "The Iron Fist", 17-23; see also, Valenzuela, Arturo, "Partidos de...", 251-258.

¹¹ For more information about this discussion see, Garretón, M, "El Proceso Político Chileno", FLACSO, (Chile, 1983) 131-147. Drake, Paul, "Political Parties and Labor Movements under Authoritarian Regimes in the Southern Cone and Brazil, 1964-1983." Unpublished paper. Lechner, Norbert, "La Crisis del Estado en América Latina", Caracas: El CID Ed., 1977

accumulation, distribution and reproduction model. The educational system constitutes an illustrative example.

In summary, the analyses show that the main objective of these regimes is to institutionalize a political form of domination: *Authoritarianism*. The goal being to reorder on others bases, society as a whole. Therefore it is daring to assume that the political transition of these regimes ends in a democratic system.

Paradoxically, because of this, the theme of democracy becomes the topic of reflection, discussion and investigation in representative sectors of civil society, as if the inevitable end of a military regime were a democratic political system¹². But *transition* and *democracy* are very broad concepts which can different meanings, not only according to the national context being analysed, but also for the social protagonist about whom we speak.

The possible emergence of a democratic model of government raises a number of issues in southern cone american countries¹³ which have previously been or are currently under military rule. The desire for such models finds its roots in a new democratic ideology, which exhibits considerably anti-statist tendencies and a marked hostility towards contemporary expressions of statism, such as tecno-burocratic control and administration. It also embodies the notion of the democratization of the political sector as a necessary precondition for the socialization of power.

It is clear that these ideas lead to the challenging of traditional notions of democracy and

¹² See, Garreton, M., "Modelo y Proyecto Político del Régimen Militar Chileno", FLACSO, (Chile, 1983), 19-22; see, also, Aigner, Miguel. "Notes about the Role of the Opposition to Military Regimes: The Chile Case." Unpublished paper, (SUNY at Stony Brook, 1983), 15.

¹³ "Southern Cone" refers to the cone-shaped southern portion of South America, comprising Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.

political society. It is also important to bear in mind that the repeated call for the restitution of democracy in a continent with so little experience of such a system constitute a historical constant. Proof of this is fact that even current military regimes feel pressured to promise democracy as a principle of legitimacy and a means of political stabilization.

Clearly, these ideas lead to a debate concerning traditional concepts of democracy, concepts which have been widely accepted until *very* recently and which continue to be recognized in certain elite traditional systems of the right or the left.

Taking this a step further, one could say that structurally, democracy resembles judicial-format problem. Traditionally, democracy is expressed in constitutional state and governmental doctrines. Thus, the primary political problem is how to accede to the power of the state and, once having been established at that level, how to use it to implement a socio-economic program (subordinating political concerns to those of state and administrative control). In this notion of a centralist and centralizing democracy, the strategy needed to achieve material and ideology progress lies in the concentration of power in national government.

In the traditional view of democracy, the capitalistic economic order has precedence. Great emphasis is placed on the preservation of the private property and free market the priorities of the political order are secondary to those of preserving and maintaining the economical order. In short, In short, the requirements of a determined social and economic order translate into

restrictions on the character a given political system may assume¹⁴.

The rise of this new democratic ideology and the attempt to make it politically feasible stems from the rupture of democracy during the last two decades (Flishish, 1982). It is generally accepted that the failure of Latin American political democracies and their substitution by military regimes are attributable to the absence of political consensus at the level of civilian society, which reinforces the role of the state, especially its military sector which resolves its crisis in a traditional authoritative and repressive fashion.

Thus, the new democratic ideology appears as a reaction to the recurrent political crises of traditional democracies and the authoritarianism of military regimes. The first response is a demand for the restoration of basic individual freedoms which are respected in a traditional democracy. The basic criticism of repressive military orders is that they undermine universal rights, for example by violating human rights¹⁵. The new democratic ideology stresses the ethical foundations of the political process. The political order is primarily an instrument of a state and national government pursuing its own goals of development; it is only called on to resolve problems relating to the safety and freedom of its citizenry.

This brings to the forefront the issue of the socialization of power. The notion of the socialization of power implies a search for methods to decentralize political organizations,

¹⁴ A discussion on the concept of democracy and the historical characteristics it has assumed in Latin America are beyond the scope of this paper. For a general discussion of these issues, America," (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), Lechner, Norbert, "El Proyecto Neoconservador y la Democracia," Materiales de Discusion, No.10, FLACSO, 1981.

¹⁵ See, Dupre, "La Proposición...", 31-32; see also, Geiss, "Momento Político", 4-7; Henriquez, "Chile Necesita Democracia...", 11; Collier, "Democracia...", 17; CODEPU., "Por la Democracia y los Derechos del Pueblo", 1-4; Correa Piedad (Ed.) "Todos Contra Pinochet", Cambio 16. in El Mundo (Medellín, Septiembre 1983), Alternativa Reformista 5-20; Gallo Viera, J.

which would maximize opportunities for the self governing of the greatest possible majority. In the vision of the new democracy, the political order and political goals have priority. This implies the subordination of the economic order to these goals, and it also presupposes the rejection of any proposed economic model. Consequently, it seems logical to argue that the strengthening of civil society and political society as conceived by the new democratic ideology is a necessary step in the restoration of true democracy.

The notion of the inevitability of transition of military regimes into democratic regimes seems to have its origin in either an explicit or implicit assumption about the way military regimes evolve.

This assumption sees the military regime as a sine qua non condition of the attempt of reorganization, in a determined direction, of society as a whole. It is precisely this, which Garretón (1982:125) has referred to as the materialization of a historical project, understanding it as the configuration of an economic model, a political model, and a cultural model. The basic purpose of this project is the internal recomposition of the capitalist order and its reintegration to the international system¹⁶. In this context, military regimes are seen as a coherent political model of which the current political rule will remain unaltered until their historical project is concluded¹⁷.

Under these conditions, if there were any transition it could only be the result of a relative failure on the part of the military regime or a direct consequence of the work of the

¹⁶ Its necessary remember that by the end of Allende's time in office, Chilean society was undergoing a crisis which can be described in terms of a process of decomposition of the capitalist system. This was expressed both in a performance crisis on various spheres of everyday social life and in the coming apart of the state apparatus and its leadership capability.

¹⁷ See, Garretón, M. "El Proceso Político, 131-147. 16. See, Garretón, Manuel, "Evolución Política, 1 - 22 See, Garretón, M., "Modelo y Proyecto Político del Régimen Militar Chileno", FLACSO, (Chile, 1983), 19-22 see, also Aigner, Miguel. "Notes about the Role of the Opposition to Military Regimes: The Chile Case." Unpublished paper, (SUNY at Stony Brook, 1983), 15-25.

opposition sectors, and the consequence seems to be none other than that of a democratic regime¹⁸.

But recent developments in these military regimes seem to demonstrate that a political model which combines features of the military regime with certain mechanisms of exclusive political participation is being favored by the Latin American dominant sectors. This political model combines ideological elements of the ideology national security"¹⁹ with elements of the economic theory of neo-liberalism (Flisfish, 1982). Rather than a transition to democracy, as some of these regimes claim, what *they propose is a transition to new forms of authoritarianism*²⁰, the ultimate goal of which is the control of the military over civilian society²¹.

The transition appears to be less dependent on a radical change in the regime than on a specific form of institutionalization in which the goal is not democracy (in any real sense of the term), but merely a democratic facade in which authoritarianism and exclusivism are combined with restricted political spaces. In such case the possibility of any real political change is definitively non-existent.

From this point of view, democracy does not appear to be the inevitable end of such transition, nor is it necessarily the type of regime which begins after the military regime ends. Democracy is rather identified with a long-term process and a series of struggles which work to undermine the authoritarian project.

¹⁸ See, Garreton, M. "El Proceso Político", 131 - 147

¹⁹ About the issue of national security doctrines see, Comblin, "Dos Ensayos sobre *Seguridad Nacional*" and Ruz, Mauricio "Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional en América Latina".

²⁰ See, O'Donnell, "Reflection on the Patterns of..." see also Edwards, J., "The Iron Fist" and Garreton, "Procesos Políticos en un Régimen Autoritario".

²¹ For more specifically political aspects of authoritarian regimes, see, Linz, J., "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," cited Handbook of Political Science, Reading, Mass, Addison-Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism," (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973), Maltby, J., Editor, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism," (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, Collier Collier, D., "The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, (Princeton University Press, 1979).

In some respects, it is the degree of success of the model of development which allows a military regime to transform itself into a new politically authoritarian model. This presupposes the formation of a hegemonious nucleus within the ruling block which would insure the political and economics control of the model of development by means of the state and civil society²²

The failure of this model of reorganization of society and subsequent glide towards a regime of mere administration of crisis will force the military to turn over its power once have established institutional guarantees to safeguard the existence of its protagonists and maintain the power of veto or arbiter among civilian contestants for political power²³. An example of this situation can be see in the political development in Brazil²⁴.

The current strategy favoring, far more than in past, greater attention to distribution and the return to a more open political system has produced the discussion about the "socialization of power."

It is precisely at this point that some of the built-in political constraints begin to appear. Most of them have been touched on already, namely a broken labor movement, a ruined party system, and a degree of political bitterness, caused by fierceness of repression and violence, which cannot be appeased merely by government fiat or by appeal to "national

²² For a discussion of the differing patterns of development followed by bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes and of the differing patterns of economic and political "logic" see O'Donnel, G., "Reflecciones Sobre las Tendencias Generales de Cambio en el Estado Burocratico-Autoritario". (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, 1975).

²³ See, Lieuwen, "The Latin American", 91 - 121 Murray, "October Election", 36 - 41 LaFaber, "Inevitable Revolution", 280 - 284. Burk, "Insurgency in America Latina" and Wolpin, "The Military Radicalism", 1 - 2, 7-13.

²⁴ About this point Paul Drake in his paper entitled "Political Parties and Labor Movements under Authoritarian Regimes in the Southern Cone and Brazil, 1964-1983", has an interesting viewpoint. See, also Stepan, "Authoritarian Brazil...", or Jimenez, E., "La Alternativa Reformista", Newspapers articles written by Luc Banderet, Luc. Sao Paulo, 1987

reconciliation” In the present situation, it seems that everyone wants the return to full democracy as soon as possible. But the so-called imperatives of the economic model and, the military government, mindful of the generals and admirals who have been out on trial in neighboring Argentina, wants to keep control when its successor is chosen in January, 1985. Most Brazilians do not want to wait for electoral power. The military and its supporters have tried to coot the issue, talking of a compromise of direct elections in 1988 or 1999, when memories of the military's abuse of power presumably would be less potent.

In the following pages I will discuss some of these problems using as a specific example the military regime of Chile, with the purpose of contributing to the discussion about political transition in military regimes.

The Process of Political Institutionalization of the Chilean Military Regime

In the early 1970's, Chile was well known throughout the world for its attempt to establish a democratic process of transition to socialism, called "via Chilena at socialismo" (The Chilean road to socialism).

During a thousand days, the Allende's Government, supported by popular sectors and the Popular Unity coalition of Marxist and left-of-center political and economic changes in the Chilean society ("Peaceful Road to Socialism, Johnson, Dale, 1973).

On September 11, 1973, however, a military coup put an end to that peculiar experiment of transition to socialism. What the military regime has done in Chile is widely known and condemned throughout the world. Also generally known are the economic and political interests - national as well as international which formed a coalition in order to overthrow the Allende Government²⁵.

In this context, the military did not merely gain the power to "normalize" or "pacify" the class struggle. They got to power with a plan to construct a new kind of state, a plan not only military but also political and economical (Varas, 1982). An analysis of the complex internal or external factors that have influenced the military definition of the Chilean society is beyond the scope of this work. I will try to restrict it to the analysis of the process of the institutionalization of the military regime and of an eventual transition to democracy.

According to Marcus J. Kurtz²⁶: "The two general issues that would dominate the national

²⁵ Hearings before The Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, held in 1975 under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church, provided the principal source of information about United States Government intervention in Chile. The finding of what came to known as the "Church Committee" appeared in the committee staff report "Cover Action in Chile, 1963 - 1973."

²⁶ Chile's Neo-Liberal Revolution: Incremental Decisions and Structural Transformation, 1973-1989*

political agenda throughout the period of military rule initially crystallised out of the conditions facing the military at the time it seized power. Stabilising capitalist economic relations and restarting growth was imperative in the wake of the mass nationalisations, land and factory seizures, and price controls of the Allende period²⁷". Shortages were rampant, inflation surged to triple digits, and private investment had nearly ceased." At the same time, Chilean society became extremely polarised, with direct mobilization becoming a central aspect of political competition." In this context the military seized power and publicly justified its intervention in light of the breakdown of social peace and economic crisis. While the need for economic stabilisation and political restructuring was clear to the junta, the characteristics of the military as an institution, the process of coup-plotting, and the structure of the coup coalition did not suggest a clear consensus on the directions of policy. But the range of alternatives was not unlimited".

The two years following the violent right-wing military coup in Chile, correspond mainly to the repressive stage of the military regime, and the so called "economic normalization"²⁸. This repressive stage was one of widespread, vicious retaliation against the Allende's government, its leaders, supporters, symbols, culture and ideology. According to Steven Volk (19-3:4), "it was a war with no sense of direction and no goal other than the destruction of what came before." The military coup opened with a dramatic episode of state terror, but the military soon moved to couple repression with efforts to establish a more durable form of authority. The generals declared their intention to remain in power until political and economic institutions could be rebuilt along different lines, defined at

Marcus J. Kurtz. *Latin American Studies*. 31, 399-427 Printed in the United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press 399

²⁷ By 1973 the Chilean state controlled the financial system as well as at least 444 of the largest industrial firms and virtually all large farms. See Daniel Wisevarver, 'Regulación y Deregulación en Chile : Septiembre 1973 a Septiembre 1983', *Documento de Trabajo*, (Santiago, 1986), p. 7; M. Aigner, 'Agrarian Reforms in Chile', GERA, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bs. As, 1975, A. Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes : Chile* (Baltimore, 1978), pp. 77-80. Junta Militar de Gobierno, *Bando*, Reproduced in *El Mercurio* (Santiago, 26 September 1973), p. 22.

²⁸ See, Vergara, "Las Transformaciones del Estado", 68-89.

this point in corporatist terms. According a Kurtz J. M. “This was in keeping with Chile's already highly-developed set of interventionist state institutions, and was backed by some of the most powerful and mobilised supporters of the coup - small business and the *gremios* (trade associations). Corporatist institutions created an organizational form that could fill the vacuum created by the repression of the parties and unions of the political left. Once state-sponsored organizations occupied this space they would serve as a barrier to penetration of civil society by the left. Finally, these institutions would mitigate the social and political tensions that corporatists saw as a characteristic feature of capitalist economies, and that they blamed for the rise of Allende”²⁹.

Critically important is understanding the differences of opinion within the military government and the institutional fragmentation of the different arenas of policy-making. Economic affairs at this point were under the purview of the Navy's representative, Admiral Toribio Merino. Social and Labour affairs were under the control of Air Force General Leigh, an declared opponent of neo-liberal economic policies. He believed they implied “an enormous cost in lives, low wages, and a cruel and discriminatory economic policy”³⁰.

The imperatives of the *internal war* and the "economic reorganization" stilt managed to obscure the real content of the political and economic project of the military regime. It was not government's ideological orientation was made: The Declaration of Principles³¹, which

²⁹ Gobierno de Chile, *Declaracion de Principios del Gobierno de Chile* (Santiago, 1974), p. 36. The junta declared itself opposed to Marxism as well as the materialism that in consumer societies spiritually slaves man (p. 10).

³⁰ To cope with these tensions major initiatives were planned in the areas of labour law, worker participation in factory management, and the reform of the pensions system. See Air Force General Leigh in a speech to the USEC, 20 November 1974. Cited in *Ercilla* (Santiago, 27 November 1974).

³¹ . "Declaracion de Principios de la Junta Militar de Chile". (Declaration of Principles of Military Junta of Chile). Was published in March 1974 by ASIMPRES (Chilean Printers Association).

was published by the Junta in March 1974. Like comparable ideological positions in the 1930's, it perceives Marxism as a mortal threat, but it also rejects the liberal, democratic and capitalist Western societies since their *materialist and debility caused Marxist penetration*.

The "new Chile", according to the Declaration of principles, could be based on "an eminently nationalist ideology" The government, it declares, will be "authoritarian, impersonal and not neutral toward Marxism". The Declaration also refers vaguely to a "*new institutionality*", based on a corporatist model of decentralization of power. Society is *to be* based on interest groups (entrepreneurial, professional and other intermediate organizations), with the State "harmonizing the reasonable aspirations of each sector with the national interest-, all adding up to a system which "will be organic, social and participatory". But the most important aspect of the Declaration was the assumption that the armed forces would remain in power for an indefinite period "because the task of reconstructing the country morally, institutionally, and materially requires a profound and prolonged action..." The desire to change the behavior of Chile's citizens also appears for the first time in this Declaration. The document textually says: "it is absolutely necessary to change the mentality of Chileans". Although the Declaration has not been fully applied the first two years of the military regime did not contradict that model.

Early in 1975, the second stage was launched to radically restructure Chile's economy, its political models and the social behavior of its people. Though it was presented strictly in terms of an economic model without outlining the explicit consequences of the political future of the regime, with the one exception of a growing centralization of power almost exclusively in the hands of General Pinochet, the true direction of the process of internal recombination and capitalistic reestablishment became apparent. This was supposed to be achieved by means of a plan for "economic recovery" commonly called *the shock treatment* (Vergara, 1982). To ensure the success of a one-man rule, Pinochet purged, transferred or

otherwise eliminated all potential rivals³².

Due in part to the eventual scope of what came to be known as the *Chilean model*, supporters, opponents, and academic analysts of Chilean military regime have tended to conclude that it was the product of synoptic decision-making. Hernan Buchi, an economist who was Treasury Minister under General Pinochet, has argued that the model represented a gigantic effort to provide an integrated, coherent, and coordinated response to the country's principal dilemmas³³. Kaufman refers to the implantation virtually without reservation of Friedmanite monetarist doctrine.³⁴

The economic leadership was entrusted to a team of technocrats which had been trained at The University of Chicago's Department of Economics, the bastion of the free market orientation and monetarism thought³⁵. Thomas G. Sanders, in a study of Chilean military government, comment that "just as the Armed Forces had no coherent ideology at the time of the coup, they also had no economic philosophy. In this area, too, they turned to advisers from the conservative, anti-Marxist side of the political spectrum. The advisers believed that private enterprise should provide the chief initiative in economic development and that foreign investment was indispensable. The Chicago economists were closest to the military ideology the upper level of Allende economists were totally expelled, and they moved into the vacuum finding an open field in which to apply their economic model.

Soon, this technocratic group became known as the "Chicago Boys". Their policies - sharply restricting money supply, ending price controls and freezing wages - form the

³² An Air Force General by name of Leigh, with closest links to centrist political sectors, was forced to resign from the Military Junta with 19 other Chilean Air Force Generals

³³ Buchi, Hernan, *La transformación Económica de Chile : Del Estatismo a la Libertad Económica* (Barcelona, 1993), p. 25

³⁴ Kaufman, R. *Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model*, in David Collier (ed.),

³⁵ The views of Chicago School of Economic are best presented in Friedmann's "Capitalism and Freedom" Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

backbone of the new Chilean economic model. A. Hirschman, in an analysis of Chilean post coup economy, says: "in a debate on inflation in 1975, Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger of the University of Chicago suggested the shock treatment. After some discussion of how harsh it should be, this approach was reducing public expenditures and monetary emissions. Later, Pinochet pointed out that the effect of shock treatment is a return of the Chilean standard of living to what our present economic capacity can realistically provide." (State of the Nation, September 11, 1975).

While the economic shock treatment' introduced in April of 1975 marked the rise to dominance of the neo-liberal economists within the planning bureaucracy, this is not the same as the attainment of consensus within the military as to the desirability of a generalised neo-liberal developmental `model'. What the military agreed to implement in 1975 was a set of severe fiscal and monetary restrictions, which intensified already adopted policy measures³⁶.

The hardships produced by the current economic model have been felt by practically all segments of society and have eroded the enthusiasm of the regime's civilian backers. According to The Vicariate of Solidarity of the Chilean Catholic Church: "the working class has suffered more than anyone from the shock treatment. In mid-July official figures estimated that unemployment in Chile was 19.6 percent. The Vicariate's sources estimated it at 28.8 percent. The same source argued that "the figures are too low and point to especially high rates in the lower class. In some working-class neighborhoods at least half the population is without work, and hunger and malnutrition are common. Now, as the economy declined everyone began to be hurt. Industrialists, farmers, and retailers were not doing well because the public had less money to spend.

³⁶ See, also O'Brien, Philip, "The New Leviathan: The Chicago School and The Chilean Regime, 1973 -1980," Occasional Papers, 38, 1982. Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow. U.K.

Various analysts began to recognize that those who clearly benefited most from the system of "free market," was a group of financiers, who had money to purchase former government-owned industries at cheap prices and who knew how to especulate in the volatile capital market. Aguirre (1976-12), referring to this issue says: "they are recasting Chile's economy and society in ways that may take decades to reverse".

By 1983, relations between business and the military government were strained. The financial conglomerates, which between 1975 and 1982 had been the fundamental support base of neo-liberal policy, collapsed along with the bulk of the banking system. Domestically oriented industrialists had been devastated by the over-valued peso. The government's most fervent supporters had gone bankrupt or were seriously weakened, and the surviving business elites were increasingly oppositional in their attitudes.

According to Kurtz J. M.³⁷ The military responded to this pressure and quietly began to modify some policies to favour domestic business, but still within the confines of a broad neo-liberal model. Privatisation of the remaining state-owned industries was, for example, a policy used to obtain support from the business sector. Indeed, the scope of this second round of privatization went well beyond that envisioned in the 1973-7 periods. Now several profitable and `strategic` sectors were sold, including chemicals, steel, electricity, and the national phone company. In a move that would further build support, the government sold substantial numbers of shares of these firms to employees and small investors at substantially below-market prices

The promulgation of the "Constitutional Acts"³⁸ in 1976 was an attempt to endow the military junta with a constitutional character. Again, the issue of building a democracy, any

³⁷ Kurtz, Marcus J. Ibid 399

³⁸ Pinochet's address. September 11, 1976. Published by El Mercurio a right-wing Chilean newspaper which fully supported the military regime.

type of democracy, was not precised³⁹. For the first time, the project of a definitive military regime seems to suggest itself. Nevertheless, the conflict between its various supporters, and the opposition, of the Catholic Church as well as international pressure (Carter Administration, European social democracy, international labor and political organizations) obliged regime once again to return to its original slogan of *restoration of institutionality and the foundation of a new type of democracy*.

The open discussion about the transition to democracy, as planned in the Constitutional Acts, makes adherents and opponents to the Pinochet regime raise the issue of different alternatives to it. This unusual debate is defined by General Pinochet, who outlawed the remaining political parties of any significance, the Christian Democrats Party⁴⁰ (29), and the right-wing National Party⁴¹, and announced in 1977 a long term political plan, called the *Plan Chacarilla*⁴². This political plan attempted to institutionalize the one-man rule and implement the notion of mocracy as "authoritarian, protected and technocratic"⁴³. With the July 1977 Chacarillas speech⁴⁴ General Pinochet for the first time offered a timetable for political transition. The beginning of the move to what he called a protected democracy in this period centred on the use of juridical barriers to the re-emergence of the left in the putative post-authoritarian order. The military's project was not yet about the creation of a new social order. Rather, it was about the creation of new institutions and the destruction of organisational forms considered dangerous. This focus on legal barriers and state controlled

³⁹ See, Garreton, "El Proceso Politico...", 152.

⁴⁰ Christian Democratic Party (PDC): formed in 1957, reached the presidency through Eduardo Frei Montalva in 1964-1970. The Party has important leaders on all sides of the political spectrum. Its conservative side won increasing control .

⁴¹ National Party (PN), a right-wing coalition established in 1966, it represented the most conservative political elements in Chile's traditional party system. This coalition fully supported the military coup in 1973, their most important leaders had served the military regime in important posts.

⁴² "Plan de Chacarillas Pinochet 's message addressed in village of Chacarillas (Chile), in July 10, 1977.

⁴³ Quoted from Pinochet's "Plan de Chacarillas". July 1977.

⁴⁴ Augusto Pinochet, 'Address on the Third Anniversary of the Military Coup' (Santiago, 1976), pp. 26-52.

organizations remained consonant with the corporatist idea of a state with substantial regulatory control over the workings of social organisations⁴⁵.

This plan defines the different stages of the regime and a timetable for the attainment of this particular notion of democracy.

The vagueness of the proposed political model shows that the "Plan Chacarillas" served no other purpose than to avoid the fragmentation of the regime's supporters⁴⁶, and to attenuate the international and national pressures. But the significance of the Plan is dual. On the one hand, it is the beginning of process of 'political institutionalization', that is, an attempt to 'legitimize' the government *de facto*, initiated in 1973 on the other hand, the vagueness of the military political model and its terms creates a severe crisis within the regime's supporters as well as a revitalization of the opposing sectors⁴⁷.

The key point is that for contingent political reasons the moderate vs. neo-liberal dialogue over economic management became more of a neo-liberal monologue. Corporatist ideas continued to dominate within the social and labour arenas, but were not brought into the economic policy debates in part because of their institutional separation. They were firmly established in the Labour Ministry under the authority of General Leigh, but had little access to the economic planning apparatus.

The discussion about the publication of a preliminary draft of a new political constitution⁴⁸,

⁴⁵ Speech given at Chacarillas to the Juventud de Unidad Nacional. Transcribed in *Anoche en Chacarillas*: "S. E. Indico grandes Líneas Institucionales", *El Mercurio*.

⁴⁶ According to John Dinges, 1977 was the year the opposition began its arduous road to recovery and unity. He also said that "by 1977, it was the unions that became the front line of public opposition to the government ... the target of union protests, were the Junta's draft versions of a total revision of Chile's labor laws. So the unions move more more to identifying the goal of their activity as political change and an end to military rule...".

⁴⁷ See, Garretón, "Procesos", 153.

⁴⁸ This preliminary draft was written by the so-called "Comisión Ortúzar" nominated by Pinochet.

intensified the discrepancies between those who wanted to postpone a constitutional political institutionalization favoring the indefinite standing of the military regime and those who, although they accepted prolonged standing of the regime, demanded for a new political institution which would introduce some democratic aspects solve the political and economic problems resulting from international isolation⁴⁹.

Meanwhile, in this phase, the Roman Catholic Church became the only political space in which some dissident sectors could act. Later on, when official repression reached the Christian Democratic Party⁵⁰ and the debate began about forming "Wide Fronts" (Frentes Amplios) or "Antifascist Fronts"⁵¹, and about the type of alternatives to the regime, it was the Church who defined the strategic debate and the problem of legitimacy of political subjects and the actors. It is important to know the role the Catholic Church has played in the double process of unity and differentiation of the opposition. Influential spokesmen of the Church have issued declarations not only criticizing the regime but also defining the strategic debate and the problem of legitimacy of the social subjects and the actors. An example of this is the editorial published in "Solidaridad," a biweekly magazine issued by the Vicariate of Solidarity. This editorial states that Chile is at a "difficult turning point," that there exists a "state of violence" generated not only by those who want to force themselves from dictatorship but also by those who want to maintain the "established order." To go beyond this difficult turning point "minimal conditions" for a dialogue must be created. These conditions include "non-exclusion of organizations and persons," "legitimacy of dissidents" and, the most important of all, "it is the political parties, the social and workers organizations and their acknowledged

Established in 1977, it represented the most conservative and fascist political elements in Chile's right wing political sectors.

⁴⁹ Idem 29

⁵⁰ Christian Democratic Party (PDC) The Party has important leaders on all sides of the political spectrum. Its conservative side openly supported the military coup.

⁵¹ See, Palacios, Chile: An Attempt at Historic Compromise", 17 – 24, 477 – 494; Marquez Garcia, Marquez Gabriel, Chile, los Gringos y el Golpe", Alternativa Ed. (Colombia, 1974).

leaders who are the Chilean people" (Solidaridad, magazine, 1983).

At the same time, the main advance of the opposition was the organizations such as "the Group of 24"⁵² and "PRODEN". The Group of 24 was officially known as the Constitutional Study group. The later, "PRODEN" (National Development Project) is an organization of right-wings leaders from the Christian Democratic Party and trade unions whose aim was to urge the military regime to speed up its timetable for elections,

It was an organization of conservative and moderate leaders and some academics, which was formed in 1978 to present an alternative political constitution. The latter, the National Development Project (PRODEN) is an organization of right-wing leaders from the Christian Democratic Party and trade unions whose aim was to urge the regime to speed up its timetable for elections.

The summons to a plebiscite in 1980⁵³, marks not only the culmination of the unifying and activating processes of adherents and opponents to the military regime but also the success of the regime at disarticulating the political system by the manipulation of public opinion, intimidation and conformism. At the same time the inability of The Opposition to create new forms of struggle appropriate to the new conditions was also evident.

In September 1980, Chileans were called on to vote in a plebiscite contrived by General Pinochet to approve a new political constitution that would keep him in the presidency until 1989, allows the Military Junta to appoint Pinochet's successor to serve until 1997, and legitimize the military junta's monopoly over executive and Legislative power. Sixty eight percent of the voters

⁵² The "Group of 24" was known as the "Constitutional Study Group". Known it is an organization of conservative and moderate political leaders and some intellectual, which was formed in 1978, to present alternative political constitution.

⁵³ The military Junta published the project of new political constitution and called for a general ptebicite for its ratification in September 1980.

approved it⁵⁴. Analyzing the approved political constitution, S. Volk, in his article "The Lessons and Legacy of a Dark Decade⁵⁵" said:

One can look at the constitution of 1980 as a farce or as the first clear example of the military's attempt to create a new institutional order in Chile. It is a farce because it can be unilaterally amended by the military until 1989; because it requires that any constitutional amendment which diminishes the power of the president be approved by the president; and because most of the freedoms it consecrates can be wiped out by applying vague, ideological catch-22s.

Article 8 of the Constitution, for example, outlaws any organization or person proposing doctrines which threaten "the family ...or a concept of society, the State or the legal order... based on the notion of class conflict." On the other hand, the constitution does provide a clear, if Shitting, glimpse of what Pinochet would like Chile to look like if his rule continues to the end of the century, as it theoretically could. In addition to establishing anti-communism as a quasi-state religion and placing "national security" above individual rights, the constitution breaks sharply with Chile's political tradition dating back to the 1890s: Namely, a strong congress with considerable leverage over the executive and a Level of popular participation in politics quite rare in the hemisphere.

The new political constitution gives the president the power to appoint one-third of the senate, alt judges on the Supreme Court and in appellate courts, and the intendants of all regions and the mayors of alt towns. Indirectly, the president will control the naming of all governors and the members of the Constitutional Tribunal as well as many new

⁵⁴ The military's official results were: 67.06 percent in favor, 30.17 percent against, 27.00 percent annulled votes, 93.00 percent of participation in the plebiscite.

⁵⁵ Quoted from Steven Volk, The Lesson and Legacy, NACLA's Report on Americas. Vol. XVII, 5, (N.Y., 1983).

advisory bodies.

The powers of congress, meanwhile, are drastically curtailed. To cite just one example, congress can vote to reduce expenditures as presented in the president's budget, it cannot raise them, nor can it impose taxes or raise revenues.

The constitution at so promises to remove "politics" from society and strip the notion of democracy to an unrecognizable, formalistic essence, Yes, Chileans will go to the polls in 1989 to elect a powerless Congress...

The plebiscite of 1980 led to open discussion about the overthrow of the regime among the opposition. This happened when the regime was at its political and economical height and the opposition was in crisis.

This crisis is manifested in the division and the later realignment of the Leftist opposition. At that moment the discussion was about two divergent strategies to overthrow the regime, One sector considered the results of the plebiscite (sixty eight percent of the voters approved Pinochet's political Constitution) a sign that no peaceful way could elaborate to get rid of the militaries. The strategy was to create a network of social organizations defended by popular forces trained to stand up to the dictatorship and prepare for mass insurrection"(quoted from Dinges, 1983)

The other opposition strategy called for to use "every Legal, opening to organize a mass popular movement and prepare to confront the military regime with determine, but non-violent civil disobedience on a massive scale." (Dinges, 1983).

The promulgation of the new political constitution in March 1981 was the culmination of this process of "political institutionalization". But, what exactly is being institutionalized?

What is institutionalized is a military regime ruled by one man who holds all power and for whom the possibility of larger participation and representation does not exist. Nevertheless, the regime does not present itself as undefined or lacking a mechanism of succession. Rather, it sees itself as "transition to a new political model"⁵⁶.

To understand this process of "political institutionalization" it is necessary to recall a parallel process: a social reorganization whose objective is to consolidate not only power of the state but also the various sectors of Chilean society. In 1978, Pinochet promised that the military would remain in power until a "profound change in the mentality of the social body"⁵⁷, was perceived.

This process strives to normatively formalize the structural transformations introduced by the new model of accumulation development and to redefine the new social relations. The basic pillars of this process support the principle of free market orientation, the elimination of the redistributive character of the state and the atomization of collective social demands, to this end the regime began to issue a series of social and political reforms. The so-called "process of modernization"⁵⁸ affected everything -from the total revision of Chile's labor to the educational system. These transformations unquestionably respond to a cultural model, to an image of society it wishes to create.

In sum, these transformations should not be interpreted merely as an attempt to fit Chilean society to a given economic model or "modernizations process," but as an attempt to reorganize the way Chileans behave in society, along completely

⁵⁶ . Ibid., 12.

⁵⁷ Quoted from Pinochet's address: The Seven Modernizations.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 2.

different times than was the case throughout the Twentieth Century. To crystallize this new social order would require a lengthy period of time, in which it would be necessary to eradicate a long tradition of political organization and participation, along with its actors, which comprise an entire generation. It is for this reason that the "new social order" requires, from the point of view of its supporting ideologues, a military regime. This may not be a definitive political model, but it is its necessary antecedent.

Paradoxically, within the ranks of the ruling coalition, from the onset of the institutionalization process, a conflict has emerged whose very essence helps to distinguish between those who desire a nationalist economic policy and a strictly authoritarian regime, and those who unreservedly support the current economic model and recovery, in the long run a regime with only restricted political representation and with armed forces invested with the power of veto over all political decisions. The former were called "duros" (hard-liners) the latter "blandos" or "aperturistas" (soft-liners)⁵⁹.

The "hard-Liners," whose positions resemble those of classic fascism, talk about "organic democracy," with no political parties, enforced by the existence of armed bodies that act as intermediaries between the government and the people. They think the regime must stay in power for an indefinite time, for this is the only way to avoid a return to politicking and "Marxist subversion." The "hard-Liners" are implacably critical of the economical model imposed by the "Chicago Boys." (To the "hard-liners," the frequently expounded position of the "soft-liners," that a Liberal economic policy will gradually lead to the restoration of political freedom, seems an aberration). "We have real freedom today in Chile," *they* will say, "under military rule, with the people quiet and the

⁵⁹ Vasquez Carrisoza, A., "Pinochet pierde la partida", EL Mundo, P. Correa, Ed. (Medellin, January 1983), 3; see, also Garretón, "Transición Política", 13.

Marxism defeated and exited. To return to 19th-century Liberalism would mean a return to weakness, disorder, to a system where popular representation was co-opted by special groups."

As was mentioned before, the goal of the institutionalization process is basically the political model implemented by Pinochet after the military coup. The model also included a decisive plan to employ repressive measures in the relationships between society and the state. These repressive measures are not only expressed normatively in the new political constitution, they also become a very powerful police apparatus, omnipresent and autonomous even with respect to the armed forces⁶⁰.

The second characteristic is the tendency towards political personalism in which the highest military hierarchy coincides with the highest authority of the state. This institutionalization with its particular leadership has its dangers, since any political or economic crisis would inflict damage on the military establishment, that is, it would affect the basis of the internal unity of the regime. This would result in the reduction of the regime's stability.

The armed forces were also visibly concerned about the economic model, and sharp questions were raised about who was benefiting. According to Senders (1475:28), "most of the officers have no sense of identification with upper-classes financiers and businessmen. Rather they are likely to react to an economic squeeze on the middle strata, where they have relatives and friends".

A third characteristic of the current political model is the absence of a formal system to process social demands⁶¹. In fact, there exists only a limited system of ties between the

⁶⁰ Ibid., 47

⁶¹ See, Aigner, "Notes about the Role", 10-11.

economic model, and sharp questions were raised about who was benefiting.

State team charged with economic orientation and planning and the dominant upper-class financiers and businessmen. The relationship between the two is expressed by means of an interchange and rotation of positions between the public sector groups. State officials and military hierarchy become presidents of banks or financiers, and vice versa. This gives these sectors an immense advantage as far as information, influence and access to political decisions.

Most of men had worked together since before the military coup, sometimes formally, but sharing a consensus, a community of political and economical interests. They possessed the economic and political power to shape the country's economic future in Pinochet's Regime. For example, in banking and industry, the Cruzat-Larrain group, could count among their executive their subordinates - five cabinet members in Pinochet's government⁶².

The remaining social sectors, without political space, representation or interlocutor to whom their demands could be directed, remain always contingent on the personal decisions of Pinochet. This is the case with the unionized sectors, and it is the same with nearly all social sectors of the country. No political space exists in which to present global demands which go beyond

⁶² The five ministers with past or present executive positions in Cruzat-Larrain Group are: J. Cauas, minister of finance and economics and former Chile's Ambassador in the White House, Fernando Leniz, minister of economics, Pablo Baraona, economics minister and Central Bank president, J. Pinera, minister of labor and, A. Marquez de la Plata, minister Pinochet's political deputy. According to the conglomerate created by Cruzat-Larrain, together with four other conglomerates controlled 101 of Chile's largest 250 companies, including most private banks and financial institutions. See F. Dahse, "Mapa de la Extrema Riqueza: Los Grupos Economicos y el Proceso de Concentracion de Capitales,"

economic concerns, In these conditions the dissident sectors remain isolated and reduced to a merely denunciatory role. Thus, it does not surprise us that the opposition should abandon traditional methods of political debate and experiment with new forms of agitation and struggle⁶³.

Finally, as opposed to the corporatist or fascist models, based on the politization of the masses along reactionary, nationalist lines, Pinochet's rule is based on political demobilization. Those who had argued for mobilizing a popular base of support for the military regime, have been ignored or displaced from the regime's spheres⁶⁴ Political model described above seems to be a necessary condition in the transformation of Chilean society. It is not to be considered definitive but rather only as a necessary antecedent, a transition to another regime.

The recent rise of opposition, the scandalous bankruptcies of various financial groups, the severe recession and escalation of repression have exposed the fragility of the regime's political and economic base. This naturally calls into question the regime's political viability.

We are obviously dealing with a contradictory process of institutionalization of a military regime which seeks to strengthen the basis of a future authoritarian regime through the use of exclusionary mechanisms and restrictions on political participation. The Regime's first dialogue with a sector of the opposition in a decade has started and the beginning of a transition to democracy has been offered. The problem is which kind of democracy is the one that the regime offers.

⁶³ See, Aignerren, "Notes about the Role", 10-11.

⁶⁴ See, Volk, "The Rise", 7

The political Model of the Future: Authoritarianism or Democracy

It is clear that the only point of consensus within the ruling coalition regards the necessity to maintain the military regime for an extended period of time, longer even than the officially designated period of 'transition', which, in accordance with the 1980 political constitution, should conclude in 1989⁶⁵.

This consensus tends to dissolve when a political model to succeed the military regime is discussed. Some sectors believe that it is necessary to maintain the military regime indefinite since their own positions of power and influence depend upon the *very* existence of the political-military model. Finally, the plan proposed by the *hegemonies block*, is a political system based upon an authoritarian regime with restricted political representation, a very strong mechanism for political exclusion, which would relegate to the armed forces the role of arbiters. This system is what has been designated here as "Authoritarian democracy"⁶⁶.

This political model, which is endeavoring to establish itself, combines a critical vision of the social and economic development of Chile in the last few decades with a theoretical concept in which political freedom entails private ownership of property. As far as the first concept is concerned, and in accord with the militaristic mentality, the Chilean political society of recent decades is regarded as predominantly "statist", a society characterized by a bitter polarization and partisan struggle which lead to the fragmentation of civil society, to chaos and stagnation.

The principal point of military criticism here is the rote of the state within the traditional

⁶⁵ Quoted from "Constitucion Politica de Republica de Chile". March 1981. Official Documents of the Chilean Junta. Edited by Gabriela Mistral G.O.P., 1981.

⁶⁶ Diaz David, "Control Militar-Corporativo", 2-5. "Transicion Politica y Democracia. Paper presented at XIV Congreso Latinoamericano de Sociologia (San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1981), 1-46.

democracy: interfering or obstructionist, inefficient and demagogical. Hand in hand with this *militaristic* view of civil society, in which the market seems to be its fundamental component, is the concept of the state whose role as economic agent and whose redistributive capacity and authoritative control of social life are fortified.

What is overly utopian about this project is that it proposes limit organized collective demands, political activity and social change. In order to do this it would be necessary to resort to military power and methods of exclusion borrowed from ideological and political systems which could be considered classic authoritarianism, against the former political order. Such methods, prescribed in the new political Constitution of 1980, assure a political arena and system of representation with limited powers only for those social actors and subjects considered *acceptable*.

The possibility of implementation of this political project depends upon the realization of several conditions, as well as the stability and duration of the military regime (Garretton, 1982) describes two of these conditions. The first refers to a global transformation of society based in term of principles on principles mercantile competition, the individual's initiative as the motivating force of society, limited government interference the economy and the atomization of social demand, that is, the ideological maturity of a new type of social relations⁶⁷. The second condition refers to the creation of a new political class to succeed the military regime.

The authoritarian political model, even though it differs the model of a military regime, is dependent upon it for its *very* existence. In this political model are harmonized or conjoined concepts like nationalism, anti-Marxism, traditionalism, authority, subsidiary, free market orientation and the contrasting concept of the ideology of national security (Comblin,

⁶⁷ Regarding the cultural model of the authoritarian model, see Brunner, J., "La Cultura Autoritaria en Chile," (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales –FLACSO–, Materiales de Discusion, 1979).

1977).

But, the most significant difference between this authoritarian model and the political regime operating in Chile until 1973 is that it does not base stability and legitimacy on a *consensus* arrived at in a partisan political system, but rather on the combination of a transformed civil society and an institutional system backed by the military. But it is clear that creation of a *new social order* and its expression in a political model present several problems. On the one hand, the extreme vulnerability of the country's economic base, illustrated by the current disastrous economic situation combined with mounting political unrest have all create pressure, uncertainty and repercussion with call into question of the proposed authoritarian model.

On the other hand, the changes in civil society were institutionally imposed by legal decrees, and a new political constitution, but they do not directly guarantee a change in the value system of the citizens. A complete generation would be needed, along with its absolute isolation, and even then the valorative adhesion to the new social order could not assured. The presence of an opposition, however repressed, provides the perception of a political alternative.

All these obstacles, schematically put forth here, are expressed in the success the military regime has had undermined the previous social and political order and its inability to create a new one.

Postscript

At the beginning of the essay I hypothesized that much of rhetoric of democracy used by the military regimes in Latin America is used to conceal strategies which try to institutionalize an authoritarian model in order to insure the everlasting dominance of the authoritarian political model over civilian society.

The purpose of this paper was to analyze the current political institutionalization of the military regime in Chile but more central to it was the analysis of the political options that regime offers: democracy or authoritarianism.

In the first place, I analyzed the process of institutionalization of the regime de facto. But what is institutionalized is a military regime that seems to be a necessary condition or antecedent of an authoritarian model.

In this context, the authoritarian regime, as a transitional institution, appears as a political model in which the goal is not democracy (in any real sense of the term), but merely a democratic facade in which authoritarianism and exclusivism are the real goals. From this viewpoint, democracy does not appear to be the inevitable end of such political transition.

In the current political situation of Chile (1989), the different meanings of democracy depend on which sector of society is being examined. In the case of Chile, from the point of view of the ruling coalition, political transition to democracy represents the passage from a strictly military regime to an authoritarian regime, with limited political arena and representative mechanisms guaranteed by the military. This is what democracy means for them, a system in which the possibility of social change is eliminated or excluded, and therefore, any group representing such alternatives for a change in society is eliminated

from the political space.

For the opposition, the theme of the political transition has a different meaning. For some sectors of *the opposition transition* should mean a passage from a military regime to a democratic political regime. In general terms, the goal continues to be the recovery of the past political regime, and the reconstruction of a civil society.

The problem is that this goal of *reestablishing* the former political system is being proposed for a society which is *profoundly transformed and divided not so much because of the implementation of the new social order* but rather because of *the dislocation of the former political regime*. The call for the return to democracy in a society which has undergone profound structural changes, a society in which the articulation of its social bases and its traditional organs of political representation have been disrupted and profound changes in the role of the state have occurred, make the social demand to return to traditional democracy seem unrealistic; although democracy as a global political order appears to be the only political alternative.

Therefore, what, politically speaking, is the alternative to a military regime and its authoritarian utopia? I believe it to be beyond the scope of this essay to create *a science fiction* regarding the political future of a society. However, if the only alternative to a military regime is democracy, in whatever guise it *may* take, I feel that whatever steps are needed to break the current system, which seems to be prolonging itself and solidating its power, should be taken. Further, the crisis of the military regimes in Latin America in terms of their political and economical goals has brought out the theme of the political transition of these regimes. Because of this, democracy becomes nonetheless a topic of discussion, in representatives sectors of civil society.

The recent political development in Brazil, Argentina and Chile⁶⁸ seem to be an example of the inevitable end of the military rule and the resurfacing of the democratic model. But democracy is a very broad concept which can have different meanings, only according to the national context being analyzed, but also for the social protagonist of whom we speak. I think that the crisis will force the authoritarians to turn over its power once they have established institutional guarantees to safeguard their model of society, safeguard the existence of its protagonists and maintain the power of veto or arbiter in the political developments of the civil society. Thus, the authoritarian model that we have analyzed in this work would be carried out.

⁶⁸ During 1989

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