Memory and perception, insights at the interface: editors’ introduction*

do: https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a01

**Abstract:** The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.

1. The relation between memory and perception: inviting a dialogue

Memory and perception have been fundamental topics since the beginning of philosophy. Indeed, one of the central principles of Western philosophy has been the notion of the primacy of perception. Perception is often thought to be the most basic cognitive act, the act from which many other cognitive capacities are thought to derive, or to derive their content, none more so than episodic memory (Casey, 1991/2004, p. 137). But what, precisely is the relation between memory and perception?

The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. There are signs that people are starting to take an interest in this area: in February 2021, the Centre for Philosophy of Memory organized a workshop, *Memory and perception: starting the conversation*, which focused precisely on the relation between memory and perception. Yet, there is also evidence that there is lots

---

* This work is supported by the French National Research Agency in the framework of the “Investissements d’avenir” program (ANR-15-IDEX-02). The editors wish to thank everyone involved in this project. We thank all the contributors to the special issue, as well as the reviewers for each paper. In particular, we’d like to thank Sarah Robins, Gerardo Viera, Steven James, and Jordi Fernández for their contributions to the book symposium. We also extend our thanks to André Sant’Anna for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper.
of work to be done: to highlight an important example, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory* (Bernecker & Michaelian, 2017), one of the key texts in the field, doesn’t include a chapter on memory and perception. The motivation for this special issue is precisely to encourage more work and continue the conversation about the relation between memory and perception.

The intersection between the philosophy of memory and the philosophy of perception is a potentially fruitful domain of research. There are many questions that can be raised about the interface of memory and perception, many connections or divergences discovered. The question of how the content of memory relates to the content of perception is a fundamental concern. Is episodic memory the preservation of past perceptual content? The causal theory of memory ensures a tight link between perceiving and remembering, positing that genuine memories are appropriately causally connected to events that were perceived in the past through a continuously stored memory trace (Martin & Deutscher, 1966; Robins, 2016).

Yet many of the representations of episodic memory typically diverge somewhat from one’s original experience. For example, one interesting phenomenon to consider is observer perspectives in episodic memory. Such memories are viewed from-the-outside, and one sees oneself in the remembered scene (Debus, 2007; Sutton, 2010). An interesting question is whether such memories cannot be said to authentically represent past perceptual experience. Many theorists think that there is something distorted about such memories (De Brigard, 2014; Fernández, 2015). Yet others think that, despite the detached point of view, observer perspectives can authentically represent past perceptual experience (McCarroll, 2018; Cf. Bernecker, 2015).

Thinking about observer perspectives, and other ways in which memory appears to be constructed rather than reproduced, is one of the interesting issues that arise when one considers the relationship between memory and perception. In fact, the evidence that episodic memory is an inherently creative and constructive process, which is tightly connected to imaginative processes (Addis, 2018), would seem to call into question the preservationist view of remembering. On a simulationist view of memory, remembering is a form of imagining (Michaelian, 2016; Cf. De Brigard, 2014; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). If remembering is a process more akin to imagining, indeed perhaps even just a form of imagining, does it still require a causal connection to the past perceptual experience? If remembering is an imaginative process, what is the relation between the content of perception and memory?

Another key question relates to the phenomenology of memory and perception. Do memory and perception share some phenomenal properties, or are they inherently distinct? Perception is often thought to involve a feeling of presence (Nanay, 2018). What you perceive is phenomenally present, it feels present both temporally and spatially. Yet

---

1 See also section 3 below on the distinction between truth and authenticity in episodic memory.
is the same true of remembering? Episodic memory is sometimes characterized as ‘re-experiencing’ or ‘re-living’ a past event. This would seem to imply a phenomenal similarity between memory and perception. But episodic memory is also typically characterized as involving a feeling of pastness (Dokic, 2014; Fernández, 2019; Perrin, Michaelian & Sant’Anna, 2020), a feeling that is not present in perception. What, then, is the precise relation between the phenomenal properties of perceiving and remembering?

These questions are among the many important philosophical issues sitting at the intersection between these two areas. The goal of this special issue is to invite a dialogue on the relation between memory and perception, to help shine a light on the relation between these cognitive capacities. The issue is also open to papers that explore the ways in which traditional philosophers have reflected on the relation between memory and perception. In addition, the special issue features a symposium on Jordi Fernández’ book Memory: A Self-Referential Account. Fernández’ monograph provides a functionalist account of memory, which emphasizes and delineates the rich ways in which memory and perception are related. Fernández’ book, and the critical engagement it engendered for the symposium, provides a further focal point for shining light on the relation between memory and perception.

2. Contents of the special issue

The papers in the special issue can be grouped into four themes: Guerrero Velázquez and Kirby explore interactions between memory and perception; Andonovski and Sant’Anna examine the vexed issue of whether a causal connection necessarily obtains between remembering and perception; Rosen & Barkasi and Trakas focus on aspects of the phenomenology of memory and how this relates to perception; Díaz Quiroz reflects on memory in the writings of a historical figure. In addition to these submitted papers, we include an invited symposium on Memory: A Self-Referential Account, with contributions by Viera, James, and Robins, as well as a response from the author, Fernández. Our symposium is completed with a book review of Fernández’ monograph by Álvarez. Here we summarize the contributions.²

2.1 Interactions between memory and perception

Memory is in some sense related to perception; the content of perception is somehow retained, restored, or reconstructed in memory, but they are usually considered to be separate and independent cognitive capacities. Two of the papers in the special issue question this complete separation, and look at interactions between memory and perception.

² The order we present the papers here focuses on thematic connections, which is different from the order in which the papers appear in the journal itself.
Carlos Alberto Guerrero Velázquez investigates the relation between memory and perception through the medium of autobiographical interviews. Recognizing the changes that can occur in the content of autobiographical remembering—memory’s so-called “creative character”—Guerrero Velázquez suggests that this creativity is related to the simulative nature of episodic memory. Episodic memory is an imaginative capacity for simulating scenarios, which can draw on various sources of information in the process of constructing simulations. This simulative character of episodic memory is revealed, Guerrero Velázquez argues, in autobiographical interviews, where interviewees draw on perceptual information to generate and modify their discourse to respond to a communicative purpose. Memory and perception are not entirely separate and independent capacities, but the processes of remembering can incorporate information from present perception when constructing simulations of the past. The content of memory in this sense is related not only to past perceptual content but also to present perceptual content.

As an artist using photographic techniques to explore philosophical ideas about memory and identity, Alun Kirby adopts a different perspective and explores the inverse interaction between memory and perception—how memory is involved in perceiving aspects of photographs. Drawing on Barthes’ notion of the punctum in photographs, Kirby shows that a key part of perceiving photographs, and feeling their affective force, is that we view them through the lens of our own autobiographical memories. The punctum of the photograph pierces our memories and releases its affective force. This typically unfolds in an associative way, and Kirby uses this notion of association in his artwork to embody an analogous process to memory. Kirby describes the metamorphogram: a non-traditional photograph, which fits his defined criteria for being analogous to memory. In particular, the metamorphogram, for Kirby, is analogous to a composite of the entirety of an individual’s episodic memories. Kirby then uses the insights gained from creating and contemplating metamorphograms, individually and in other artistic works, to consider a bi-directional relationship between individual autobiographical memory and shared cultural memory. Kirby’s artistic and philosophical journey into memory and identity leads him to propose a new form of memory, which is embodied in particular groups such as collectives of football fans. Kirby calls the form of memory he has identified sociobiographical memory.

### 2.2 Memory and perception: causal connections?

The question of whether an appropriate causal connection is necessary for remembering is one key issues in philosophy of memory.³ Indeed, it is sometimes thought that the debate about the relationship between memory and imagination is ultimately a question

---

³ For a nice summary, see Michaelian & Robins (2018).
of whether such a causal connection is necessary for successful remembering (Perrin & Michaelian, 2017). Two papers in the special issue broach this issue of causation in memory. Nikola Andonovski focuses in on Fernández’ (2019) account of episodic memory and how it speaks to the issue of causation (see also section 2.5 below). On Fernández’ functionalist theory of memory, a given state need not be caused by a past experience to qualify as a memory. Rather, in order to be classified as a memory, the state needs to play a particular functional role, the role that a memory state plays. On this functionalist account, memories tend to be caused by past perceptual experiences, but causation is not a necessary condition. According to Andonovski, this functionalist account does not progress the debate about memory causation. Andonovski argues that for a given mental state to count as realizing a particular functional role, it must be embedded in an appropriate kind of system. In the case of episodic memory, such a system, Andonovski suggests, is one that supports the kinds of interactions that map onto the relations specified by causal theories and denied by simulationist theories. The crux of the issue is that whether or not there exists the type of system that would support the functional characterization of a state as a memory is largely an empirical matter. This empirical question will not be settled by Fernández’ functionalist account, and so the theoretical gains of endorsing it would be, according to Andonovski, minimal.

André Sant’Anna also centers his discussion on causality and the (dis)continuism debate. According to discontinuists, memory is a different kind of state or process to imagining; according to continuists, in contrast, there is no fundamental difference in kind but merely differences in degree.4 This debate currently centers on the necessity of an appropriate causal connection between memory and past perceptual experience, with discontinuists (causalists) affirming, and continuists (simulationists) denying, the necessity of causation in remembering. Sant’Anna offers a new way of thinking about this debate. He develops an argument based on an analogy to perception, according to which representationalism about perception can accept that two states (veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences) differ in terms of a causal connection without this marking a difference in kind. Sant’Anna then proposes that, given the commitment by causalists and simulationists to a representationalist approach to mental states, it is spurious to frame the (dis)continuism debate in terms of the necessity of a causal connection. Instead, Sant’Anna proposes, the debate should be viewed as being about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining as opposed to their contents. If remembering and imagining involve different attitudes, then discontinuism prevails. If, on the other hand, it can be shown that remembering and imagining involve similar attitudes, then continuism is correct. Sant’Anna’s view hence offers a distinct perspective on the (dis)continuism debate.

---

4 See, for example, Michaelian et al. (2020) for a summary of the debate.
2.3 The phenomenology of memory and perception

What is the precise relation between the phenomenal properties of perceiving and remembering? Does the phenomenology of episodic memory depend on, or relate to, in some sense, past perceptual experience? These are the topics of focus for two papers in the special issue.

Melanie Rosen and Michael Barkasi describe similarities and differences in the phenomenology of memory and perception. They note that episodic memories typically involve a feeling of pastness, whereas perceptions typically involve a feeling of presence. Rosen and Barkasi show how these phenomenology feelings can come apart in some cases from memory and perception, and that the feelings themselves cannot be used to ontologically ground experiences as memories or perceptions. Despite this, they argue that the feeling of pastness and presence are genuine features of episodic memories and perceptions, respectively, and that they are important characteristic markers that help us categorize mental states first-personally. They provide an account of the feeling of pastness in episodic memory that is distinctly phenomenal, rather than doxastic, although as they show, our web of beliefs may also contribute to phenomenal experience. Indeed, according to Rosen & Barkasi, the feeling of pastness of episodic memory and the feeling of presence of perception are intimately connected. They outline several cognitive features that underlie both phenomenological feelings, including the feeling of (past) accessibility, ergonomic significance, immersion, objectivity, and mental strength. In this way they offer a novel account of what grounds the feeling of pastness in episodic memory and highlights its relation to the feeling of presence in perception.

Marina Trakas also focuses on an aspect of the phenomenology of episodic memory. Trakas’ starting question is: What does it take for a subject to experience a memory as being her own? She then critically examines Fernández’ (2019) answer to this question. According to Fernández’ endorsement account, this particular phenomenal quality of our memories can be explained in terms of the experience of mnemonic content. When the subject feels a memory as her own it is because the memory has been caused by her perception of a past veridical fact. The memory matches past perceptual experience, it is represented as veridical, and hence the memory is endorsed. It is this endorsement of the memory that Fernández thinks results in the feeling of mineness. Trakas thinks that the endorsement model does not have sufficient explanatory value to account for the sense of mineness of our memories. She outlines two major worries with the endorsement model. First, she suggests that the evidence Fernández uses to empirically ground his theoretical proposal is found wanting. Fernández bases his theoretical analysis of the sense of mineness in the linguistic analysis of some reports of the patient R. B. (Klein & Nichols, 2012), who is a person who, for some time after suffering an accident, claimed to have memories but not feel that these memories were his own. Trakas outlines worries about building an account of the sense of mineness
from R. B.’s reports of his memory experiences. Second, Trakas appeals to the empirical literature on non-believed memories (Mazzoni, Scoboria & Harvey, 2010) to suggest that the endorsement model fails to accommodate many non-pathological everyday memories that preserve their sense of mineness, but whose accuracy is explicitly denied, suspected or not automatically endorsed. In these cases, subjects know the memories are not veridical, and hence do not endorse them, but they are memories that seem to maintain a feeling of mineness. According to Trakas, these non-believed memories are counterexamples to the endorsement model of the sense of mineness.

2.4 Reflections on a historical figure

Adopting a historical perspective, Diego Díaz Quiroz looks at the notion of intellectual memory in Descartes. Díaz Quiroz notes that Descartes recognized both a bodily form of memory, which can be explained in physiological terms, and an intellectual or spiritual form of memory, which doesn’t reside in any bodily organ. Diaz Quiroz’s concern is with this latter form of memory, and whether it was used by Descartes for philosophical or theological reasons. Drawing on an analysis of written correspondences between Descartes and Burman, and Descartes and Arnauld, Díaz Quiroz details the ways in which Descartes explains the concept of intellectual memory. He argues that, for Descartes, corporeal memory can register the physical aspects of sense impressions, such as the sounds of words, but not their meaning. It is intellectual memory that helps the mind understand the meanings behind sense impressions. Indeed, Díaz Quiroz goes on to suggest that corporeal memory and intellectual memory operate together to produce processes of reminiscence in human beings. Hence, Descartes’ understanding of intellectual memory is primarily epistemic and semantic, and not, Díaz Quiroz concludes, theological.

2.5 Book Symposium – Memory: A Self-Referential Account

Jordi Fernández offers an engaging and sophisticated philosophical account of episodic memory. Fernández proposes that memories play a particular functional role in our cognitive economies, one which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past. Given the importance of the relation between memory and perception, on Fernández’ account, as part of this special issue we invited a series of commentaries on Fernández’ manuscript, as well as a response from Fernández to this critical engagement with his work.

Gerardo Viera focuses his discussion on time in memory. Episodic memories often come with a feeling of pastness. The events we remember feel to us as if they occurred in our pasts. This raises the immediate question: what accounts for this
feeling of pastness? Viera’s paper aims to provide an answer to this question. Viera first raises objections to Fernández’ account of this phenomenological aspect of episodic memory. According to Fernández, the feeling of pastness is not due to an explicit representation of the temporal location of the remembered event. Instead, for Fernández, the feeling of pastness is grounded in the self-referential causal content of memory. That is, memory represents its own causal origin, and it is this that grounds the feeling of pastness. Viera thinks that that this account falls short. He notes that causation and time are closely related but they are not identical. Drawing on empirical evidence showing that, in perception, experiences of causal and temporal order can come apart, Viera argues that the self-referential view fails to explain why a representation of cause would give rise to a feeling of pastness without introducing an explicit representation of time. According to Viera, the feeling of pastness is better explained by a special form of egocentric temporal representation, which he calls path-dependent representation.

Steven James’ point of engagement with Fernández lies in the nature of judgements based on episodic memory and whether they are immune to certain kinds of errors of misidentification. Immunity to errors of misidentification (IEM) refers to the idea that there are certain kinds of judgments in which it is impossible to be wrong about the identity of the person about whom one is making the judgment (Recanati, 2012). For example, I can be wrong about the person whom I judge is giving a talk that I am listening to, but I cannot be wrong that I am the person whose auditory experience is one of hearing a talk. First-personal judgements, based on information gained from the inside, seem to exhibit the property of IEM. According to Fernández, episodic memory is importantly immune to such errors of misidentification. James takes issue with this claim. He first outlines the view that, on the face of it, memory judgments can be prone to errors of identification. He then shows why, on Fernández’ view, these cases don’t count against the thesis that episodic memory judgments are IEM, and why this ultimately proves problematic. As James shows, crucially, for Fernández, a failure of IEM requires a misidentification on the basis that are completely and fully accurate. Because the IEM status of memory-based judgments is grounded in completely accurate memory content, James suggests, then there is a certain circularity to Fernández’ account of IEM. In other words, the worry is that Fernández’ understanding of episodic memory content ensures that judgments based on it are IEM. James then concludes that, while technically immune to error through misidentification, episodic memory judgments are not grounded in such a way that they have any interesting epistemological import for the subject in terms of self-consciousness. Rather, insights about our self-conception are directly derivable from the metaphysics of memory content alone.

Sarah Robins raises challenges for a particular aspect of Fernández’ account, as well as outlining a more general problem with his application of functionalism to episodic remembering. First, according to Robins, there are concerns about the
mnemonic role that Fernández designates for mental images. In characterizing the mnemonic role of episodic remembering, Robins argues, Fernández fails to make clear how the mental image type that plays this role should be identified. Robins outlines various options for how this identification may be approached, and illustrates specific challenges for each. Robins’ worry, in a nutshell, is that evaluating the mental image’s mnemonic role involves assessing two tendencies —what tends to cause the mental image and what the mental image tends to cause. The problem results from a tension in that the understanding of the image that is used to establish one side of its mnemonic role looks different to the understanding of the image that is used to establish the other. In order to play its backward role, the image needs to be generic, but in order for the image to play its forward role it needs to be specific. For Robins, there appears to be no stable conception of the mental image that can play both backwards and forwards roles. Robins then raises a more general worry for Fernández’ functionalist approach. Such an approach, she thinks, is ill-suited to the metaphysical question about episodic remembering that is of interest to the causal and narrative theorists with which Fernández engages. For Robins, functionalism characterizes mental state types and is suited to assessments of episodic remembering across individuals, whereas the concerns of causal and narrative theories involve token states of remembering and assessments within individuals. Functionalism, for Robins, fails to fit the explanatory demands of episodic remembering.

Jordi Fernández responds to the three comments on his book. He first notes that all three commentators are targeting fundamental assumptions in the account of memory he proposes. The criticisms, if on the mark, would entail proposing a radically different account of memory. For Fernández, such a radical move is not necessary, however. There are, he thinks, possible responses to the objections from all three commentators, which are available within the constraints of the account proposed in his book.

In dealing with James’ objection in relation to IEM, Fernández thinks that rather than trivializing the notion, we need the memory to be accurate precisely in order to rule out the possibility that an error occurs just because memory is fallible. For Fernández, it is trivially true that memory is prone to error and that judgments about the identity of objects (including oneself) may go wrong because of the fallibility of memory. The interesting thesis is precisely if memory is IEM or not when it is fully accurate. Moreover, this does not lead to an epistemologically weak thesis, according to Fernández. He does not deny that we may have other grounds for believing that memories have certain contents which involve the self, and which will enable us to obtain knowledge about our self-conception. Fernández accepts this point, but there is, he thinks, a considerable leap, from this point, to the point that the IEM phenomenon in fully accurate memory tells us nothing interesting about our self-conception.

In tackling Viera’s concerns about the feeling of pastness in memory, Fernández embraces the distinction raised by Viera (coming from Lewis, 1976) between personal time and external time, but thinks that rather than posing a problem for his account,
this distinction can actually be used to think about the feeling of pastness of memory in causally self-referential terms. The key question, for Fernández’ account, is whether the property of a remembered event of being at the causal origin of the relevant memory is the property of being in the past or not. Fernández thinks there may be two different answers to this question for the two aspects of the Lewisian temporal distinction. If we are talking about external time, the answer is no. Fernández then admits that his account becomes an error theory of pastness, albeit one that, he holds, is still explanatory. If we have personal time in mind, however, then the answer is yes. What our (personal) memories represent is not that those events have some position in external time, but the fact that those events are causally related to our memories. And the property of being causally related to our current states, such as our memories, is the property of being in our personal past. For Fernández, the notion of personal time meshes well with the commitments of the self-referential account.

In his reply to Robins, Fernández acknowledges the difference between types and token mental images. He thinks, however, that this does not pose a problem for his account. According to Fernández, if we want to know, for a token mental state, whether it counts as remembering that p, it is legitimate to ask whether the mental state is of a certain type, namely, remembering that p. The type of mental state will provide us with the conditions that the token mental state needs to satisfy. While Robins sees the functional and causal theories of memory as talking past each other, with the former focused on mental state types and the latter focused on mental state tokens, for Fernández both are concerned with token mental states. Fernández sees himself as answering the question of whether the token mental state is a state of remembering by considering whether it belongs to a certain type, a type which requires certain conditions to be satisfied. If the causal theorist sees causation not as primarily being about token memory causation, then they, like the functionalist, will also consider whether the token mental state under consideration belongs to a certain type. The conditions required by causal theories for belonging to that type will be different to those proposed by Fernández—involving, for example, probabilities. For Fernández, depending on the way causal theorists see causation, they may be engaged in the same kind of project as his functionalist theory: both theories will be trying to account for the backward-looking conditions that a token mental state needs to satisfy in order to be classed as an episodic memory.

To round off the book symposium, Juan Álvarez provides a review of Memory: A Self-Referential Account. Álvarez offers a thorough description of Fernández’ view. Álvarez notes that there are three main parts to Fernández’ monograph: the first deals with both the metaphysics and the intentionality of episodic memory; the second part investigates certain phenomenological aspects involved in episodic remembering; the third part centers on two important debates in the epistemology of memory. Álvarez notes two main contributions to the philosophy of memory that Fernández provides. First, he suggests that Fernández’ functionalist theory enriches
contemporary discussions on the metaphysics of memory, which are dominated by causal and simulation theories. Second, he suggests that Fernández’ focus on mnemonic content as a source of theoretical tools to clarify other philosophical issues has interesting explanatory potential. Álvarez finally draws on recent criticism of Fernández’ account to offer an illuminating and balanced review of *Memory: A Self-Referential Account*.

### 3. Concluding remarks

The goal of this special issue is to invite a dialogue on the relation between memory and perception, to help shine a light on the relation between these cognitive capacities. Part of this goal is to encourage additional research, providing further insights at the interface of memory and perception. Here we outline just a few of the myriad potential avenues of investigation.

A central debate in the philosophy of perception has pitted representationalists, who hold that perceiving is fundamentally a matter of representing an event, against relationalists, who hold that perceiving constitutively involves a relation to the perceived event. If representationalism is right, then successful perception is not different in kind from hallucination. If relationalism is right, in contrast, then successful perception is indeed different in kind from hallucination. Relationalism thus leads to disjunctivism. The analogous debate in the philosophy of memory has been less active but has recently been picking up steam (Aranyosi, 2020; Debus, 2008; Moran, forthcoming; Sant’Anna, 2020, forthcoming; Schwartz 2018). Is remembering fundamentally a matter of representing an event, or does it constitutively involve a relation to the remembered event? While the representationalism-relationalism debate about memory is to some extent analogous to the representationalism-relationalism debate about perception, it is unclear how a present memory might be constituted in part by an event located in the past, and disjunctivism about memory thus raises issues distinct from those raised by disjunctivism about perception.

Another ongoing debate concerns the relationship to perception that is required for accurate remembering. Bernecker (2010) distinguishes between two forms of accuracy in memory: a memory is *true* if it is accurate with respect to the remembered event, and it is *authentic* if it is accurate with respect to the subject’s original experience of the remembered event. A memory is authentic, in other words, if its content matches the content of the corresponding perceptual experience. Truth and authenticity can come apart, and there is, at present, no agreement on whether both forms of accuracy are required for successful remembering. Bernecker himself takes both truth and authenticity to be required, as does McCarroll (2018). These authors hold that successful memory must get things right both with respect to what happened and with respect to the subject’s perception of what happened. Michaelian (2020), meanwhile, has argued.
that only truth is necessary –i.e., that successful memory need only get things right with respect to what happened. An interesting view, the merits of which have so far not been considered in the literature, is that only authenticity is necessary –i.e., that successful memory need only get things right with respect to the subject’s perception of what happened. There is thus room for additional work on the relationship to perception that is required for accurate remembering.

Another, related, topic worthy of further attention is the generativity of episodic memory. There are two main senses in which memory may be generative: psychologically and epistemically. Psychological generativity is when new content that was not available during perception added to the memory representation. Given the empirical evidence on constructive memory, it seems clear that memory can be generative in this sense. It further interesting question relates to epistemic generativity. Can memory generate new knowledge or justification that wasn’t available in perception, or does the perceptual justification of beliefs transfer to memory? What, in other words, is the epistemological relation between perception and memory? Indeed, does psychological generativity entail epistemic generativity?

Other suggestions for further research would be to look at memories of traumatic events, especially those associated with posttraumatic stress disorder. Such (pathological) memories of trauma can often present a quite different phenomenology to everyday episodic memories. Trauma memories can sometimes feel as if they are happening in the present moment, rather than the past, and can be accompanied by the feeling of presence typically found in perceptual experience (Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004). As such there seems to be a shared phenomenology between memory and perception, which might help further illuminate or substantiate the connection between the two. Further, it might be interesting to explore how perceptual impairments can affect memory. For example, Oliver Sacks discusses the case of a painter who became colourblind after suffering an accident. Interestingly, the painter was not only impaired in his perception of colour but was also impaired in remembering colour. As Sacks explains:

> Color perception had been an essential part not only of Mr. I.’s visual sense, but his aesthetic sense, his sensibility, his creative identity, an essential part of the way he constructed his world—and now color was gone, not only in perception, but in imagination and memory as well (Sacks, 1995, p. 35).

The painter suffered an impairment of colour vision that impacted his memory. Yet, even in benign cases, it might be interesting to consider the way in which the colours of the visual world are the same or different in the remembered world. Coloured images may be more memorable (Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegenfurtner, 2002) but are all of our memories coloured like perceptions? Further research may help shed light on the relation between memory and perception in terms of more specific properties such as colour.
These are just some of the interesting issues at the intersection of memory and perception. We look forward to continuing the conversation about the relation between these two fundamental cognitive capacities.

Christopher Jude McCarroll
Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes, France

Kourken Michaelian
Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes, France

Santiago Arango-Muñoz
Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Antioquia

References


Praxis Filosófica

Educar contra la barbarie en perspectiva de Theodor W. Adorno
Arlex Berrío Peña

Protágoras contra Sócrates: valentía y conocimiento en Protágoras
José Edgar González Varela

Epistemología de la ética en sentido aristotélico: la ética como puesta en uso de la Racionalidad práctica
Raúl Cuadros Contreras

Atravesar la dialéctica del capital. El encuentro de Marx con el método en estado práctico
Julia Expósito

Las dos caras del relativismo: crítica al fundacionismo e imagen relativista de la ciencia
Luis Humberto Hernández

La Nueva Atlántida y el dominio social de la naturaleza en Francis Bacon
Rogelio Laguna

La interacción entre los sistemas vivos, psíquicos y sociales en la teoría sistémica de Niklas Luhmann
Alexander Ortiz Ocaña

Vivir en y con otras pasiones y sentimientos morales. Una conversación a propósito de Ricoeur y Guayasamín
Luz Gloria Cárdenas Mejía
Samuel Cépedes Cárdenas

¿Qué es alienación? Perspectivas para la actualización de un concepto del pensamiento social crítico
Fernando Forero Pineda

Le sujet chez Foucault : du corps-pouvoir à la vie-gouvernement
Monica Loyola Stival

Departamento de Filosofía | ISSN 0120-4688 | ISSN digital 2389-9387