From speaker to hearer. Another type of testimonial injustice


  • Ignacio Ávila Universidad Nacional de Colombia



speaker, hearer, testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, social accuaracy


Miranda Fricker always focuses on the hearer in her account of testimonial injustice. It is the hearer who, in virtue of a prejudice, commits testimonial injustice against the speaker by giving her less credibility than she deserves. My purpose in this paper is to analyse a parallel type of testimonial injustice that runs in the opposite di- rection, from the speaker to the hearer. I characterise the inner structure of this type of injustice and sketch some of the forms it can take. Then I explore some consequences of this kind of testimonial injustice by the speaker.

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Author Biography

Ignacio Ávila, Universidad Nacional de Colombia

(PhD in Philosophy, University of Warwick, Reino Unido) es profesor asociado del Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia en Bogotá. Sus principales áreas de investigación son filosofía analítica, filosofía de la percepción, filosofía del lenguaje, y epistemología moderna y contemporánea.

 ORCID: 0000-0003-0984-3285


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How to Cite

Ávila, I. (2022). From speaker to hearer. Another type of testimonial injustice. Estudios De Filosofía, (66), 57–77.

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