From speaker to hearer. Another type of testimonial injustice
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.348560Keywords:
speaker, hearer, testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, social accuaracyAbstract
Miranda Fricker always focuses on the hearer in her account of testimonial injustice. It is the hearer who, in virtue of a prejudice, commits testimonial injustice against the speaker by giving her less credibility than she deserves. My purpose in this paper is to analyse a parallel type of testimonial injustice that runs in the opposite di- rection, from the speaker to the hearer. I characterise the inner structure of this type of injustice and sketch some of the forms it can take. Then I explore some consequences of this kind of testimonial injustice by the speaker.
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