Against the naturalness of skepticism about the external world: Wittgenstein and epistemic realism

Authors

  • Diego Rodríguez Téllez Universidad Icesi, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (Cali) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7507-9265
  • Mauricio Zuluaga Cardona Universidad del Valle

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.349444

Keywords:

skepticism, skeptical hypothesis, epistemological realism, doubt, Wittgenstein

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to cast doubt on the alleged intuitive or natural character of the skeptical argument about the external world. In §1, we examine a version of the skeptical argument based on the epistemic closure principle and the indifference principle. In §2, in order to deepen the view defended by Michael Williams, we offer a novel examination of the Cartesian skeptical argumentation to show that it is clear that the alleged naturalness claimed by the skeptic is nowhere to be found in two arguments which can be found in such argumentative strategy; moreover, to reach her conclusion, the skeptic needs to commit to epistemological realism, namely, the claim that each of our beliefs belongs to an epistemological hierarchy based solely on its content. In §3, based on arguments inspired by Wittgenstein, contra epistemological realism, we show how each belief has a justificatory role based on its context.

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Author Biographies

Diego Rodríguez Téllez, Universidad Icesi, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (Cali)

doctor en filosofía de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Su área de investigación es la epistemología contemporánea y actualmente investiga acerca de la responsabilidad por actitudes como la creencia.

Mauricio Zuluaga Cardona, Universidad del Valle

doctor en filosofía por la Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Actualmente es profesor titular del Departamento de filosofía de la Universidad del Valle, Colombia. Sus áreas de investigación son la epistemología, el escepticismo y la historia de la filosofía.

 

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Published

2022-12-21

How to Cite

Rodríguez Téllez, D., & Zuluaga Cardona, M. (2022). Against the naturalness of skepticism about the external world: Wittgenstein and epistemic realism. Estudios De Filosofía, (67), 65–87. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.349444

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Section

Original or Research articles

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