Estudios de Filosofía

Review of Giri, L., Melogno, P., Miguel, H. (2023) Perspectives on Kuhn. Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn – Springer

Rolando Núñez-Pradenas — 2024-12-05

This work is a critical review of the book Perspectives on Kuhn. Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn by Giri, L., Melogno, P., Miguel, H. (2023)

Pablo Melogno and Thomas Kuhn

Paul Hoyningen-Huene — 2024-09-11

This paper discusses seven of Melogno’s papers on Kuhn from 2019 to 2024. It analyzes Melogno’s arguments about the relationship between Kuhn’s early and late historiography, his rejection of the discovery-justification distinction, and his move towards questions of meaning and semantics in the 1980s. This paper argues that Melogno made vital contributions to “Kuhn studies,” carefully tracing developments in Kuhn’s thought over time. However, it also engages critically with some of Melogno’s central claims, like his argument that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions represented a sharp break from Kuhn’s earlier historiographical work. Overall, the paper concludes that Melogno’s research significantly advanced understanding of Kuhn’s philosophy and deserves to substantially influence future scholarships on Kuhn.

Theoretical change and historical semantics

Bruno Borge — 2024-11-05

In several academic studies, Pablo Melogno lays the groundwork for formulating election rational criteria between incommensurable theories, seeking to reconcile the Kuhnian notion of incommensurability with rationalist reconstructions of the processes of theoretical change. One of the axes of this project focuses on the semantic aspects of incommensurability. Particularly in the development of historical semantics that relativizes the scope of semantic holism. In this analysis, I deepen and extend Melogno’s project by considering various aspects of hybrid theories of reference.

Extending Thomas Kuhn’s genealogy of semantics. A view into the Lowell Lectures and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Paula-Luz Atencia-Conde-Pumpido — 2024-12-02

In the article “Towards a Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn's Semantics” (2023), Pablo Melogno, along with Leandro Giri, undertakes the task of reconstructing the path followed by Thomas Kuhn in the development of a semantics capable of accounting for scientific change. In particular, the authors examine the connections between the Lowell Lectures of 1951 and the Notre Dame Lectures of 1980, asserting that both respond to the same program of semantic concerns, which supports a continuist reading of Kuhnian thought about semantic issues. The present article seeks to extend this analysis to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), emphasizing the parallels that can be drawn between this work and the Lowell Lectures concerning certain linguistic aspects involved in scientific change through the analysis of the parts concerning this subject matter present in both writings.

A discussion with Pablo Melogno on Kuhn’s semantic commitments: an inflationary or deflationary interpretation?

Daian-Tatiana Florez-Quintero — 2024-11-20

Pablo Melogno's thought has profoundly influenced scholars of Kuhnian philosophy in Latin America, thanks to his meticulous archaeological analysis of Kuhn's unpublished works. From this analysis, he aims to unveil the semantic commitments of the author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Among the abundant literature that Melogno leaves us as an intellectual legacy, one work stands out not only for its rigor but also for the provocative nature of its arguments. I refer to “Towards a Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics” (2023), co-authored with Giri. In this work, the authors argue that Kuhn, in his early texts, defends a semantic commitment to the descriptive theory of the cluster. Since I believe this is an inflationary interpretation, in this article I will propose a deflationary interpretation. I argue that, while Kuhn may have anticipated some of the claims of the cluster theory, the true purpose of the Lowell Lectures has a destructive semantic character, focusing on formal—or prescriptive—theories of meaning.

The good old discovery-justification distinction: Remarks on Melogno’s analysis of a Kuhnian account

Andrés A. Ilcic — 2024-12-20

The discovery-justification distinction stands as a pivotal issue within 20th-century philosophy of science. It subtly underpins many foundational topics and concepts pertinent to our comprehension of knowledge. Thomas Kuhn's contributions are indispensable in this regard, with his critiques playing a pivotal role in shaping both his initial model of scientific progress and its subsequent revisions. Kuhn addressed this dichotomy head-on in the first of his Thalheimer Lectures, presented in 1984. In this paper, we revisit Pablo Melogno's (2019) examination of Kuhn's engagement with this theme. Concurring with Melogno, our analysis extends his interpretation by exploring Larry Laudan's objections to certain research programs focused on a logic of discovery. We further scrutinize specific assumptions about discovery heuristics that have been misinterpreted within Laudan's methodological framework, particularly the one stemming from Herbert Simon's pioneering work. By synthesizing these perspectives, we aim to set up a preliminary framework for a more refined understanding of how history and philosophy of science inform the epistemic practices of agents operating with bounded rationality.

On anomalies and scientific revolutions: the collapse of paradigms

Jorge Rasner — 2024-11-06

In The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research (1979), Thomas Kuhn emphasizes the need for mature sciences to train their human resources by promoting a strong adherence to the ontological and epistemological foundations that support their paradigmatic conception. This strong thesis, which in some way removes perspective from scientists, raises the question of how such strong dogmatic adherence allows criticism and, ultimately, the scientific revolution. In “Normal Science, Dogmatism and Progress” (2023), Pablo Melogno critically reviews this Kuhnian proposal as well as several analyses of his work. He concludes that Kuhn's proposal is accurate in that he contemplates how the tension between conservation and criticism allows, in certain circumstances, to sustain the strong built-in adhesion and, in other circumstances, to exercise informed criticism in the face of an overwhelming accumulation of anomalies. In this paper, I suggest that not only rational factors lead a group to decide on continuity or paradigmatic change but also cultural and ideological factors, often naturalized and difficult to objectify.

Kuhnian Practical Politics: Why It’s (Epistemically) Virtuous to be (Evaluatively) Attached to a Paradigm

Lydia Patton — 2024-09-11

Is it epistemically vicious to be attached to a specific scientific paradigm? Such attachment clearly violates a norm of impartiality that is associated with the value-free ideal of science. I will argue that what Samuel Scheffler (2022) calls ‘evaluative attachment’ is not always epistemically vicious. In section 1, I will present Kuhn’s account of paradigms as embodying not just theoretical positions but also a ‘constellation of group commitments’ that Kuhn came to call a ‘disciplinary matrix’ (2012/1962, postscript). Section 2 evaluates Popper’s and Davidson’s criticisms of Kuhn, drawing on the work of Pablo Melogno (2020). Section 3 evaluates the claim that impartiality is a significant source of the value we accord to science. Section 4 appeals to Samuel Scheffler’s (2022) concept of evaluative attachment to argue that partiality to a specific framework or paradigm is not an epistemic vice. I conclude with brief observations, to be elaborated in future work, on how this argument applies to science in particular.

Information science and paradigms: a review from Kuhnian philosophy

Ignacio Saraiva — 2024-10-11

Information science has tried to consolidate its scientific status on the basis of Kuhnian conceptions of science. Thus, the notion of paradigm is central to analyze its epistemological problems. Several authors have postulated different paradigms for the area, with the understanding that the attainment of a paradigm will allow its consolidation and unification. The main developments of paradigms within the discipline are analyzed, as well as other elements of the Kuhnian perspective. A critical review of the application of the notions present in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to the epistemological and historical reconstruction of the field is made. It is concluded that the Kuhnian philosophy provides propositional elements when thinking about epistemological problems, since the ability to articulate and generate consensus is found in the community and the assumption of a successful tradition of problem solving.

Pablo Melogno’s legacy: interpreting Kuhn’s work on science education

Deivide Garcia-da-Silva-Oliveira — 2024-09-26

As this paper coincides with the first anniversary of Pablo Melognos passing, it delves into his profound contributions as a distinguished philosopher of science to the field of science education. Focused on his unique perspective shaped by an extensive exploration of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy, the paper aims to elucidate Melogno’s distinctive insights into science education. The methodology employed involves a theoretical and exploratory analysis of Melogno’s limited but qualitatively rich works on science education. Melogno’s perspective on science education emerges in a deep engagement with Kuhn’s philosophy. Despite shifts in his assessment of Kuhn’s ideas, Melogno’s core vision about science education remains steadfast throughout all his texts. By advocating a holistic understanding of the history of science, Melogno emphasizes the importance of cultivating critical thinking skills in students, while not forgetting to teach scientific concepts, methods, and theories. His stance rejects the notion of total ruptures in scientific paradigms as a way to avoid indoctrination. Furthermore, the paper proposes investigations into the relationship between Melogno’s defense of partial ruptures, fostering a more nuanced historical perspective and promoting critical thinking in science education. In essence, Melogno’s legacy extends beyond the footsteps of Kuhn, as he carved his own philosophical path, leaving indelible marks on the landscape of scientific thought.

Challenging the Experimentalist Dogma: Empirical Incommensurability in early Neuroscience

Sergio Daniel Barberis — 2025-02-27

In this article we scrutinize what can be called an "experimentalist dogma" presupposed in Pablo Melogno's analysis of empirical incommensurability in the chemical revolution. According to Melogno, the fact that experimental methods were preserved throughout the chemical revolution was an indication that there were no relevant perceptual differences between Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier. In order to refine Melogno's general analysis, we will present a taxonomy of varieties of empirical incommensurability and discuss their relationships. To exemplify this categorization, and to show its metatheoretical adequacy, we will apply it to the neuronist revolution, that is, to the process of discovery of the neuron in the late 19th and early 20th centuries within neuroanatomy, taking as our main case study the controversy between Camillo Golgi and Santiago Ramón y Cajal. From the analysis of the controversies regarding dendritic spines and stellate cells of the cerebellum, in particular, we question the experimentalist dogma, highlighting how, in these controversies, the conservation of experimental practices does not guarantee the similarity of perceptual contents. Moreover, we will argue that, all other experimental conditions being equal, differences in experiential content between Golgi and Cajal are best explained by differences in their commitments to incompatible conceptual schemes.

How Melogno prevented Hall from interfering with the use of Lewis's theory: Double prevention under debate.

Leandro Giri — 2024-09-11

In this paper we discuss Ned Hall's critique of David Lewis's counterfactual theory of causation, in particular for its alleged inability to account for cases of double prevention. To do so, we focus on Pablo Melogno's response to Hall, where he claims that Hall's proposed tension between the concept of dependence and the locality thesis in cases of double prevention is the effect of the omission of essential details to complete the causal chain in the examples used by Hall. Here we propose to take a further step in the defense of the counterfactual theory begun by Melogno, by reviewing the examples proposed by Hall, the modifications complexified by Melogno and the corollaries that follow from them, and proposing some relevant conceptual extensions to the ideas of the three authors.

The philosophical mark of Pablo Melogno: Science, Theory Change, and Incommensurability

Bruno Borge — 2025-01-13

Presentación del número especial.

Pablo Melogno: Thomas Kuhn as the Ariadne’s Thread of His Intellectual Journey

Marina Camejo — 2025-02-20

Este artículo es disonante con el resto de las colaboraciones que componen este volumen denominado Ciencia, cambio téorico e inconmensurabilidad. Homenaje a Pablo Melogno. Es disonante por varias razones. La primera de ellas es que en este texto no se presentarán discusiones conceptuales o interpretativas aunque puede aludirse a ellas como mojones para dar cuenta de la trayectoria intelectual de Pablo. La segunda razón es que esta colaboración ha sido escrita desde el recuerdo de quién fue durante sus últimos 20 años de vida compañera intelectual, amiga, esposa y madre de su hijo e hijas. Por lo anterior esta contribución no tiene en principio la intención de aportar a la discusión teórica en torno a Thomas Kuhn ni a las diversas disquisiciones interpretativas que su teoría posibilitó y que incluso fueron abordadas por Pablo. Sin embargo, puede ocurrir que encontremos al leer estas páginas elementos que permitan comprender por donde se inició el interés intelectual e identificar el hilo de la madeja argumental que construyó Pablo. Por lo anterior desde ya disculpen si el tono con el que está escrito no es el esperado.

Así que lo que leerán de aquí en más es desde el recuerdo amoroso que busca rescatar para nuestra memoria académica y en particular para la memoria familiar los caminos recorridos por Pablo quien tuvo pasiones variopintas entre ellas la filosofía, el fútbol, el heavy metal y la política aunque no siempre en el orden aquí propuesto.

También me interesa detenerme un momento en cómo he dado en llamar a esta contribución. De ninguna manera quiero dar a entender con la alusión al hilo de Ariadna que Pablo se encontraba perdido. Nunca estuvo perdido en cuestiones intelectuales o en relación a sus ambiciones académicas. Solo quiero destacar que Thomas Kuhn en particular aunque podría incluir a los problemas de la racionalidad científica en general, pueden concebirse como el hilo conductor de su despliegue académico. Es así que Kuhn se tornó en el hilo que le hizo avanzar, en el hilo que marcó el camino para aventurarse en nuevas lecturas y en la entrada en contacto con referentes de la filosofía de la ciencia como Godfrey Guillaumin, Paul Hoyningen- Huene, Juan Vicente Mayoral por mencionar algunos nombres. Incluso, considero que Kuhn se convirtió para y con Pablo en el factor estratégico en la resolución de problemas vinculados a la inconmensurabilidad, a la racionalidad científica, al cambio teórico entre otros.