¡Tómelo o déjelo! Evidencia experimental sobre racionalidad, preferencias sociales y negociación
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https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.le.n82a3Palabras clave:
Juego del ultimátum, altruismo, reciprocidad, amenazasResumen
El juego del ultimátum ha permitido entender mejor el poder de negociación asociado a una amenaza, tema en el cual la información y la comunicación son centrales. Este artículo presenta una revisión selectiva de la literatura sobre experimentos económicos en el juego del ultimátum, organizando los principales avances de la teoría al incorporar la evidencia empírica en este contexto. Los resultados de estos experimentos han mostrado que las personas se desvían sistemáticamente de la predicción teórica; de hecho, se encontró que los proponentes hacen ofertas cercanas a la repartición equitativa y los receptores suelen rechazar las ofertas que consideran injustas. Indiscutiblemente, este juego se ha ganado un espacio central en la economía del comportamiento, por lo que la revisión aquí realizada será de gran utilidad para los investigadores que estén trabajando tanto en negociación como en economía experimental.
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