Theories of translation and modernity’s anguished counterpoints: 
José María Arguedas and Walter Benjamin*

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Abstract:
In order to illuminate some of the basic terms of translation theory, I explore two essays, José María Arguedas’ “The Anguish of the Mestizo” and Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator.” I argue that the terms of translation theory can be changed by paying attention to the ‘replies’ to European modernity made from outside of Europe, especially those replies that come as theory from the colonized, in this case in the form of Arguedas’ work. In the conclusion, I juxtapose Arguedas’ work on Quechua and Spanish to explore aspects of translation and linguistic invention at another point of domination: in this case, African-American English as described by James Baldwin. Through that, we can measure the potential of a network of histories constructed from Europe’s others.

Keywords: Translation Theory, European Modernity, Quechua, Spanish, African-American English.

Resumen:
Con el fin de ilustrar algunos fundamentos de la teoría de la traducción, exploro dos ensayos: “Entre el quechua y el castellano, la angustia del mestizo” de José María Arguedas y “La tarea del traductor” de Walter Benjamin. En este trabajo, sostengo que los términos relacionados con la teoría de la traducción se pueden cambiar si se presta atención a las “respuestas” dadas desde fuera de Europa a la modernidad europea, en especial esas respuestas que vienen desde los colonizados en forma de teoría; este es el caso del trabajo de Arguedas. En la conclusión, yuxtapongo el trabajo de Arguedas en quechua y español, para explorar los aspectos de la traducción y de la invención lingüística en otro punto de la dominación; me estoy refiriendo al inglés africano-americano como lo describe James Baldwin. Así, podemos medir el potencial de una red de historias construida desde la Europa del otro.

Palabras clave: Teoría de la traducción, Modernidad europea, quechua, español, inglés africano-americano, alteridad.

Résumé:
Afin d’illustrer quelques termes fondamentaux de la théorie de la traduction, je me suis intéressée à explorer deux essais, «Entre le quechua et l’espagnol : L’angoisse du métis» de José María Arguedas et « La tâche du traducteur » de Walter Benjamin. Ma proposition consiste à changer les termes de la théorie de la traduction en prenant compte des réponses données à la modernité européenne depuis l’extérieur de l’Europe, particulièrement les réponses qui arrivent en tant que théorie de la part de ceux qui ont été colonisés, dans notre cas chez Arguedas. Dans la conclusion, je juxtapose le travail d’Arguedas en quechua et en espagnol, pour approfondir les aspects de la traduction et de l’invention linguistique dans un moment différent de la domination, avec le cas de l’anglais Africain-Américain tel qu’il est décrit par James Baldwin. Ainsi, pourrons-nous mesurer la potentialité d’un réseau d’histoires construites dès l’Europe d’autrui.

Mots clé : Théorie de la traduction, Modernité européenne, quechua, espagnol, anglais africain-américain, autrui.

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By working through two benchmark essays in translation theory, one by José María Arguedas and one by Walter Benjamin, my attempt will be to illuminate some of the basic terms of what might be translation theory that is autochthonous to the Americas, and show how the differences in Benjamin and Arguedas index their distinct insertion within European modernity. ‘Modernity’ is a global phenomenon, although its history, effects and meaning in different parts of the globe are uneven. In particular, the various histories of colonization in diverse parts of the globe have significantly conditioned the experience of ‘modernity.’¹

For translation theory, the relationships between practices of translation, colonization, and modernity is perhaps most evident when theorists take up the clash of entire languages and the traditions they embody (see, e.g. Mignolo, 1995, 2000 Chakrabarty 2007, Liu 1995).² This level of theory looks at how translations change the shape of entire languages (in translators’ terms, both the ‘source’ and ‘target’ languages of a translation). For example, Lydia Liu has painstakingly reconstructed how early twentieth century Chinese translators, when faced with new concepts generated from Europe (such as ‘democracy’ or ‘modern’) took words from classical Chinese and supplied them as ‘equivalents’ to the new concepts they wanted to translate, and in this way, transformed the Chinese (see Liu 1995). European languages and Chinese were also brought into much closer contact through this process.

Two short essays, ‘The Task of the Translator’ ([1923] 1969) by a European, Walter Benjamin, and the ‘The Anguish of the Mestizo, Between Spanish and Quechua,’ ([1939] 1992) by a Peruvian, José María Arguedas, take up languages as such and how they are transformed as they are brought into interrelation through translation. Benjamin and Arguedas are both interested in how languages develop interdependently through acts of translation. The boundaries of both languages expand, and the languages are invigorated, or at least changed.


² The philologist Walter Mignolo (1995) has done extraordinary work on the relation between modernity, colonization of the Americas, and translation in his magisterial The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization., In Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture and Translated Modernity 1900 – 1930, Lydia Liu (1995) shows how the concept of Chinese ‘modernity’ was performed through translation that she traces to specific texts and lexical items (Also see Liu 2005).In Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference Dipesh Chakrabarty registers an ambiguous debt to colonialism (2007), while suggesting some significant points for inquiry into translation theory in the analysis of colonization in South Asia.
This paper is not, however, simply a descriptive account of theories of translation from select points around the globe. I will argue that translation theory can benefit significantly from paying attention to the ‘replies’ to European modernity made from outside of Europe, especially those replies that come as theory from the colonized, in this case in the form of Arguedas’ work.

In order to motivate this investigation of translation theory, I take up a set of questions posed by Arturo Escobar (2007). Writing of the Modernity/Coloniality Group, a movement of contemporary Latin American scholars, Escobar poses a series of questions that will prove crucial for the present essay:

Could it be, however, that the power of Eurocentered modernity - as a particular local history - lays in the fact that it has produced particular global designs in such a way that it has 'subalternized' other local histories and their corresponding designs? If this is the case, could one posit the hypothesis that radical alternatives to modernity are not a historically foreclosed possibility? If so, how can we articulate a project around this possibility? Could it be that it is possible to think about, and to think differently from, an 'exteriority' to the modern world system? That one may envision alternatives to the totality imputed to modernity, and adumbrate not a different totality leading to different global designs, but as network of local/global histories constructed from the perspective of a politically enriched alterity? (2007, 183)

Is it possible to think – create theory - beyond the limits of European theory? Can translation theory be enhanced or transformed by the ‘radical’ alternatives to European modernity?

What I will argue is that the scholarship of José María Arguedas provides an alternative to a Eurocentric set of assumptions in translation theory. Theory here takes the form of a ‘reply’ to the terms of European modernism. It exceeds the terms of European modernity, it is beyond it, but it is engaged with it, the way in which my interlocutor is not wholly encompassed by me but is involved in a dialogue with me.
In taking up Escobar’s questions, then, we may follow theorists from colonized traditions and see if they change not just the contents of the theory but its very terms (cf. Mignolo 2000:11)

The aim is not to replace Western theory or epistemology because at this late date, this would be an impossible task (Escobar 2007). Instead, we will see whether we can offer a foundation and justification that can serve as a useful counterpoint to Eurocentric theory. ‘Useful’ for what? In the conclusion, by way of illustration, we will test what we learn from Arguedas’ colonized ‘reply’ by exploring aspects of translation and linguistic invention at another point of domination: in this case, African-American English (also referred to as Ebonics or Black English) as described by James Baldwin. Baldwin sees in Black English, as he calls it, a tool for survival, forged out of a dominator’s tongue. By looking at Arguedas’ work with Baldwin’s, we can measure the potential of a ‘network of local/global histories constructed from the perspective of a politically enriched alterity’ as Escobar puts it (2007).

This is not merely an epistemic exercise. At the site of colonization, translation theory becomes freighted with histories of domination. Colonization meant, among other things, the imposition of the dominator’s speech, the inculcation of the idea that the dominator’s language was of value for success and progress, and that the local languages were small, clumsy things, doomed to disappear, incapable of philosophy or science. For European Modernity, the languages with a future are the vehicular languages, the ones conceived to have universal value, the proper European tongues. At that point of the imposition of language and of value, the politics of language becomes a question of survival, including cultural survival. I would therefore argue that questions of translation theory inevitably become politically and ethically weighty, regardless of whether they are recognized as such. And, indeed, they become not just ethical inquiries but also affectively rich, marked by the colonized’s desires, grief, hopes, and anguish.

**Arguedas’ ‘Anguish of the Mestizo’**

José María Arguedas was a Peruvian novelist, often considered one of Latin America’s most important and original twentieth century authors. He wrote his novels and poetry in Spanish, the indigenous Quechua, and in a *mistura*, a mixture. Arguedas, who committed suicide in 1969, was a native Quechua speaker; though he was not ‘ethnically’ Quechua, by his own account he grew up within a thoroughly Quechua worldview (Arguedas 1992). Although he situated his own literary contribution within a long history of Peruvian writers who had absorbed both the colonizing Spanish and the native Quechua thinking, Arguedas was revolutionary – and controversial - for how he incorporated the indigenous Quechua language, sensibility and worldview into his novels and short stories. The claim is that as he ‘translated himself’ into Spanish, he was able to change the ‘expressive possibilities’ of Spanish in subtle ways. The Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano writes that Arguedas was forced to choose. He...
...had to choose between Spanish, the dominant language, and Quechua, the dominated language, to express the needs of the dominated population to communicate. He chose to write in the dominant language, contriving in the process, however, to achieve the transmission of some of the expressive possibilities of the dominated language. His was a program of linguistic subversion, really something like the creation of a new literary language. (Quijano 1995, 213)

Trained as a linguist and anthropologist, Arguedas also wrote throughout his life on translation, language, and identity. These scholarly writings, and his collection and analysis of Quechua hymns, linguistics, and folklore, are less well-known than his literary works but no less original and important (see Rama 1975). Numerous literary critics have discussed his contributions and many academic conferences have been dedicated to his legacy. Most of his major novels have been translated into English and other languages. Nonetheless, to the best of my knowledge no English translation of his folklore studies or his criticism has been published.

I began to translate him as a way to slow down my reading of him, focusing on his text, incorporating it, taking it in, and, maybe, crossing over to it. I want to think about his significance for translation theory.

In his 1939 essay ‘The Anguish of the Mestizo Between Spanish and Quechua,’ (Arguedas [1939] 1992) he begins with a description of an existential predicament of the mestizo amidst the clash of languages. He then moves to talk about the consequences for the shape of the two languages themselves. Arguedas situates a history of conflict, initiated by colonialism, between the interior world of the mestizo and the requirement, the need, the obligation, the desire to use Spanish. Arguedas sees this relation to language as an ontological question as much as a linguistic one. Quechua orients the mestizo in the world. It is the idiom that can capture the otherwise ineffable, inexpressible desires of his soul, the quality of light, the smells, textures, in short the inhabitation of the Andean world. This internal conflict between Spanish and Quechua is old, and Arguedas places its beginning in the monumental figure of Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, the itinerant indigenous author who documented in his famous sixteenth century chronicle the colonizers’ abuses of the native people, writing in a mixture of Quechua and Spanish. The internal/external conflict in the mestizo continues through the work of the great twentieth century Peruvian poet César Vallejo. But the question of linguistic anguish is not limited to the rarefied realm of high literature. Arguedas sees it as a general social condition of the mestizo throughout the Andes.

Arguedas refers to an ‘uneasy desire for a legitimate mode of expression,’ born at the anguished nexus of a linguistic contradiction. The anguish is embodied, existential. The anxiety of the mestizo is born of this need to express oneself in an idiom that one does not speak well. Arguedas sees the conflict as having no resolution; it is this unresolved conflict that marks the mestizo as mestizo. Because of the conflict, ‘pure’ Spanish cannot be the legitimate expression for the mestizo. The literature is mestizo,
and in that literature one senses the anguish of the mestizo, the anxiety for a legitimate form of expression.

That mixture has a sign: the people of the Andes have not achieved an equilibrium between their necessity for integrated expression and Spanish as an obligatory language. And there is now an anxiety, a kind of desperation in the mestizo to dominate the language. (Arguedas [1939] 1992)\(^5\)

He motivates a ‘we.’ The material of the expression is the ineffable, ‘our’ spirit, the spirit of a collectivity, of a community, of a group, a situation not merely his own. His ‘we’ are the mestizos, not of blood but of language, caught between Spanish and Quechua. This is a question that not everyone asks themselves, this question of translation. Others confront it daily.

Arguedas then takes the interesting and unusual step as a translator and anthropologist of taking himself as an example of this anguished conflict.

Permit me here to refer to my own problem. It is certainly typical. When I began to write, to tell the story of the life of my pueblo (people), I felt a sort of anguish that Spanish would not serve me well. It would not serve me either to speak of the sky or of the rain of my land, nor much less to talk of the tenderness we feel for the water of our irrigation ditches, for the trees of our gorges, nor much less to speak with all the urgency of the soul our hatreds and our loves. Because having produced in my interior the victory of that which is Indian, as a race and as a countryside, my thirst and my joys I spoke strongly and deeply in Quechua. (Arguedas [1939] 1992)

Methodologically, he provides on one level a disciplined description of the object of his study: a linguistic conflict where Spanish is imposed as obligatory. At the same time the text performs an anguished scream that comes from his own throat. His analysis of language then is anchored in his own orientation within and in relation to the object of study: the moment between Quechua and Spanish.

He is his own subject without presupposing the subject/object split. In an almost intimate vein, he discusses how he lives between languages.

To express oneself, to realize oneself, to translate oneself, to convert into a diaphanous and legitimate torrent the idiom that appears to be another’s; to communicate to the almost unfamiliar tongue the material of our spirit. That is the difficult, hard question. (Arguedas [1939] 1992)

Arguedas frames translation theory as an embodied, subjectively and spiritually present activity. The communication is not hinged on alterity but rather on the ‘almost unfamiliar tongue,’ the idiom that ‘appears’ to be another’s. Translation is not predicated on dichotomy. Yet it reveals difference. Arguedas poses translation as a question and as a problem. The question of translation is difficult and open-ended. He opens us to an uncertainty. Translation becomes an act of self-realization, of self-

\(^5\) The translations of Arguedas are my own in collaboration with Gabriela Veronelli.
expression, of moving oneself into something new. The question takes us into an ontological and epistemological state of ambiguity. As a question opens the world to inquiry, the problems loom, generate after that question mark.

Though I have a tendency to call this 'hermeneutics,' naming it this way is to assimilate what he is trying to do to a framework that we have no evidence he would endorse. So let me put it differently. Where the subject/object duality is at every moment in Western social science policed and undergirded, Arguedas describes contexts in which it does not make sense to assume the separation and independence of the knowing subject and its object. Not only does Arguedas read a different relationship to the world of things, but that relationship is spiritually and affectively rich, denoting the ominous and auspicious. In another essay, he describes how the Quechua\(^6\) conceive of the object-realm:

Indigenous people do not conceive of goods with an objective criterion like ours. Rather, that which produces a good, whether animal or inert, causes gratitude in the subject. We see a pot, a plate, an axe as an instrument. They don't see it that way. The indigenous people would raise the axe and caresses it, and they feel love because that instrument gives them well-being, serves them to change firewood into other things. Ultimately, it's a fountain of well being and feeling that way they owe it gratitude in a measure we are not able to feel. (Arguedas 1992)

This puts the Quechua speaker amidst objects that stand in relation to him or her where the well-being an object portends for the speaker is tied to his or her understanding of it.\(^7\) Nevertheless, as he argued elsewhere, he sees Quechua as without universal possibilities and without a universal future. Since Arguedas aspires to universality, to universal expression, and since this is an important aspiration for him, he is in a contradictory situation.

The contradiction is not static. It is dynamic. The mestizo will never stop at trying to dominate Spanish and, in that way, to adapt Spanish to the mestizo's drive to self-expression.

\[T\]his anxiety to dominate Spanish will carry the mestizo to full possession of the language. And his reaction when confronted with Spanish will be because he will never cease to adapt Spanish to his profound necessity to express himself in clear and absolute form. That is, to translate until the

\(^6\) Quechua refers to the language and the people.

\(^7\) Worth investigating here would be the pronoun shifts in Arguedas' text. He voices his position from between languages, but his position is not constant. For example, in this citation, he makes a divide between 'nosotros,' 'we,' and 'ellos,' 'they.' Along that divide, he occupies the side of 'nosotros' the Occidental, the Western. But in the earlier texts I cited, he clearly sees the 'we' as the Quechua. This points towards an account of translation that can encompass shifters or deixis (linguistic figures that shift their reference depending on who uses them, e.g. I, you, here, now). Arguedas shifts his place within a linguistic and racialized taxonomy so that he frames himself in different ways depending on the context. He is appropriating language to himself, at the conjunction (I thank Constanza Guzmán for giving me this formulation). This is one of the qualities of deixis: To appropriate language to oneself.

final demand made by his soul, that soul in which that which is Indian is in control and is the root. (Arguedas [1939] 1992)

This implies changes not just to the mestizo, but also to Spanish. When the mestizo does succeed in conquering Spanish, Arguedas argues, Spanish will not be the Spanish of today, a language practically untouched by Quechua. In striving to express oneself, Spanish will be transformed. Once the mestizo dominates Spanish, Arguedas writes,

Once he achieves that, when he speaks and produces literature in Spanish with the absolute appropriateness with which he now expresses himself in Quechua, that Spanish will not be the Spanish of today, with an insignificant and hardly quantitative Quechua influence, but rather there will be in it much of the genius and maybe even the intimate Quechua syntax. (Arguedas [1939] 1992)

Arguedas sees this phenomenon in himself, but he also sees this as a social phenomenon that will alter the shape of the dominator’s language.

In sum, Arguedas argues for the following (In the appendix, I have included these points opposite a corresponding set I’ve derived from Walter Benjamin’s work):

A. A particular knowledge emerges at the historical convergence of Quechua and Spanish as the colonizing tongue. The knowledge has a troubled emergence at the crux of forcing expression of the complexity of their thinking through a language that may be incapable of capturing that subtlety.

B. Embodied knowledge; an embodied relation to language. Translation is an embodied practice.

C. Writing that locates the author vis-à-vis the object of study, in this case his own linguistic practices.

D. The subjects of translation are the speakers who live in languages, and the description is of how they see and experience the worlds they inhabit and how they articulate their experiences. ‘World’ traveling (Lugones 2003) between the world of meaning of the Quechua speaker, that of the Spanish speaker, and that of the mestizo caught in-between.

E. Translation occupies a central place in the violence among languages, cultures and traditions that are transformative of the speakers and of the dominant and vanquished languages. Translation is a site of conflict (domination, annihilation, survival, mutation). Colonization involves linguistic violence, including the imposition of Spanish as both obligatory and desirable.

F. A contingent history of co-development of Spanish and Quechua.

G. An account of the existential anguish attendant upon those conditions of emergence. More generally, affect is analyzed and incorporated thoroughly as part of the process of translation, as part of the condition, as part of the motivation.

H. The basis for an examination of ethics of translation in refusing to negate the human subject at the core of linguistic clashes.
I. A focus on subjective decisions made by historical actors, especially speech communities, and in this sense a framework that upholds autonomy, or some form of collective agency or ‘active subjectivity’ (Lugones 2003).

J. Even though Quechua and Spanish are both called ‘languages,’ they may have different, even incommensurate epistemological and ontological statuses from one another. They do different things for the speaker. They relate the speaker to his/her body and to the surroundings in a different way. To use the term ‘language’ as if it marked them as equivalent is to use language in a systematically ambiguous way. It is to try to make non-alike things alike. It is to employ a pseudo-universal. (Eoyang 2007)

Arguedas interweaves the history of colonization, the world of spirits, the natural world, philosophy, his lived body, subjectivity and objectivity.

**Arguedas as the ‘Particular’: Two Cognitive Devices that Uphold Domination**

Arguedas, although well known as a novelist, is not, as I say, well known as a translation theorist. I would like to suggest that given the requirements of dominant European theory, and from that standpoint of European knowledge, Arguedas’ work is dismissible, hopelessly local and ‘particular.’ Some of those characteristics I list above, that make his work so valuable, original, and important, is ultimately what lent to his eclipse by European theory. Two cognitive devices in Western theory are obstacles to countenancing other forms of knowledge on equal terms. In a disembodied epistemology, one writes as if it does not matter what kind of body one has, how one bodily experiences the world. One negates the presence of the body in the writing and the thinking. The result is a rhetoric where the narrator is simultaneously nowhere (in no particular location) and everywhere (omniscient).  

In metonymic reason, the second obstacle, which fits very well with disembodied epistemologies, the West sees itself as the totality of reason even though it is only a part (see Sousa Santos 2004). Metonymic reason aspires to universality but also presupposes that it is universal. Consequently, it imposes its own conceptual framework universally. Western reason, rationality, cognition, paradigms, or methodologies are implicitly or explicitly used as the measuring sticks, the balance, the universal, whereas other cultures, groups, peoples, are rendered the particular, the small-scale, ignorant, residual, inferior, local (Sousa Santos 2004). They provide data for Western theory. In an essay critical of what he calls ‘lazy reason,’ Boaventura de Sousa Santos seeks not to make this universality more encompassing but rather to place Western rationality alongside others.

José María Arguedas provides a method of writing, thinking, doing research on language, language contact, and power that avoid the problems these critical

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9 On the voice from nowhere, see Nagel (1986). On the omniscient narrator, see Anderson (1991). Feminists from the United States have, among others, written powerful critiques of disembodied epistemologies, including Susan Bordo and Dorothy Smith.
sociologists and philosophers associate with disembodied epistemologies and metonymic reason. Arguedas provides an *embodied* theory and he places Western rationality in *tense conflict* with other forms of thinking rather than transcendentally above other ways of thinking. Following Havilland’s (1976) account of ‘anti-language,’ I am tempted to call this anti-theory – theory that stands in tension with dominant theory and articulates an alternative reality. Yet calling it ‘anti-theory’ may not give Arguedas’ work its due. Instead, as I will argue below, I find his work to be a trans-modern ‘reply’ (see Dussel 2002 & below). His work is a counter-example to paradigms that contribute to Western domination.

Arguedas writes of a defiant history of difference. That defiant history is marked by mixed emotions, tendencies, ambivalences, shifting dispositions and perspectives, complex and hybrid linguistic practices of the colonized. In fact, some have even gone so far as to suggest that his suicide could be attributed to the agony of that existential position between languages (see Mignolo 1995).

**Walter Benjamin’s Task of the Translator**

Walter Benjamin was a German Jew who wrote mostly between the World Wars. He also committed suicide, but in his case, it was to escape the Nazis when he was turned away at a border crossing in 1940. Benjamin starts his strange, wonderful article on translation “The Task of the Translator” (originally published in 1923 as the introduction to a German translation of Baudelaire) by saying that translation is a mode and ‘translatability’ is an essential quality of certain texts. What he wants to do by saying that translation is a ‘mode’ is to assert not merely that any text *can* be translated. He argues that certain texts lean towards translation: ‘a special significance inherent in the original manifests itself in its translatability. Translatability is intrinsic, potential – it is not a contingent quality of some texts’.

> [T]he translatability of linguistic creations ought to be considered even if men should prove unable to translate them’ (Benjamin [1923] 1969, 16).

The eventual manifestation of this ‘special significance’ is part of the structure of life and the movement of history. A literary creation achieves its necessary growth through translation. He puts this in terms of an analogy: the original is to the translation as the phenomenon of life is to manifestations of life. The connection then between an original and its translation is vital. Translating a text lends to it a new lease on life; it disseminates the original in the dual sense of spreading it and lending to it a generative ‘renewal of something living.’ The translation lends an ‘afterlife’ to the original.

Benjamin’s frame for analysis does not ultimately rest on a specific text and its fate, fortune, or fame. When he refers to translation as a mode, he has something world-historical in mind – ‘world-historical’ in Hegel’s sense. Since he argues that the true significance of certain texts can only be revealed in translation, then it follows that
languages are fundamentally reciprocal and interrelated. It is part of the nature of all languages that they are complementary.

All suprahistorical kinship of language rests in the intention underlying each language as a whole – an intention, however, which no single language can attain by itself but which is realized only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each other: pure language. (17)

Translation harmonizes the different languages as it brings them into closer relationship with one another. Having made a transition to thinking about all languages together and in terms of their mutuality, Benjamin makes clear that it is incorrect to think about languages apart from one another or in individual, particular terms:

In the individual, unsupplemented languages, meaning is never found in relative independence, as in individual words or sentences; rather, it is in a constant state of flux – until it is able to emerge as pure language from the harmony of all the various modes of intention. Until then, it remains hidden in the languages. (17)

Meaning needs translation. History drives towards translation as a way of realizing meaning. The languages come closer and closer to one another as part of their process of becoming.

A translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both the original and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part of a vessel. (21).

Meaning in the final analysis is subordinate to how a translation signals that each entire language is part of a greater whole. Or more precisely, the ‘meaning’ of a particular text gives way to the true and revealed meaning of language. Natural languages are ‘fragments,’ broken bits of a shattered bowl. As they are assembled, the unitary language is higher and greater. The unitary language is the direction and the goal. It is pure language, which I interpret to mean God’s language, the unity of logos and being. 11 ‘If there is such a thing as a language of truth, the tensionless and even silent depository of the ultimate truth which all thought strives for, then this language of truth is – the true language’ (20) The ideational purpose of translation is for true, pure language to be realized. Benjamin places translation in terms of its significance for the movement of history, where history is non-reversible and tends toward a certain end.

Benjamin emphasizes a teleological history. This ‘history’ has a metaphysical status in that it derives from extra-historical and a priori claims about the structure and

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11 Given what Benjamin says, my impression is that to signify in God’s language would be to bring something into being. Speaking would be to speak truth. An example of this unity of signifying and being: ‘And God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light.’ The word brings the thing into existence.
purpose of time and the function of events. It is a historiography that does not see history as contingent.

The relationship of languages is also metaphysical: ‘Languages are not strangers to one another, but are, a priori and apart from all historical relationships, interrelated in what they want to express.’ It is the way the universe is structured aside from all experience. Benjamin thinks of language and languages in terms of this basic intention that unites them, that defines them as languages and in that way makes them comparable.\textsuperscript{12} Reflecting on Benjamin’s essay after reading Arguedas’ work, I came up with a provisional set of characteristics present in Benjamin’s essay.

A. Translation is discussed in universal terms.
B. Negation of corporeality, of the lived body (the mind/body split).
C. The subject/object split. Omniscient knower is located meta-linguistically. No analysis of the epistemic or linguistic conditions that provide the foundation for his insight.
D. Subjectivity of speakers is evacuated or excommunicated in the name of the (Hegelian) Subject.
E. Translation occupies a central place in the encounters among languages and harmonizes those languages. No analysis of the power differentials that obtain among groups of people and how this affects language and the role of language.
F. Hegelian teleology in the movement of history – history is linear, progressive, irreversible, cohesive, and embraces totality.
G. Evacuation or excommunication of affect in analysis and in the condition of living within a language or shuttling among languages. (This follows from the reason/emotion split).
H. Submerging or suppressing the ethical context of examining translation and the co-evolution of languages.
I. The translator is made invisible in favor of an account of translation that absolves agency in the name of the Subject of History.
J. Languages are all equivalent as languages. Translation makes sense because languages are exchangeable, homologous units. (Liu 1995)

Both Arguedas and Benjamin see translation in terms of the transformation of entire languages and also see translation as bringing languages into closer interrelationship. For Arguedas, though, the relationships are precisely historical (with a lower case

\textsuperscript{12} Benjamin is interesting and unusual in part because of the way he weaves together philosophy of language, philosophy of history, and an ecumenical theological sensibility. For many Western writers since the Enlightenment, language, religion, culture, nature, literature, philosophy are all autonomous spheres. However, most societies, traditions, or cultures do not divide the world or their thinking in this way. In the West, nevertheless, these splits are one of the logical preconditions for the possibility of comparative disciplines, e.g. comparative religion, comparative literature, linguistics, anthropology, philosophy. The logic of comparison seems to necessitate, and require, homology. Unfortunately, the terms of a comparison are constituted in the West. Though I do not want to argue for it here, it does seem to me that the concept of ‘comparison’ itself is insidious.

‘h’) and in that sense contingent, idiographic, particular, a posteriori. He is present in the middle of the particular conjunction of Quechua and Spanish. His body is present; his expression is anguished, difficult.

Let me make the same point in different terms. Lydia Liu asks (1995:xvii), ‘At which moment and in what context does that equivalence or translation become meaningful?’

… The act of translation, for example, cannot but participate in the performativity of a language that circumscribes and is circumscribed by the historical contingency of that act. Any attempt to historicize above and beyond the circumstances of such performative/constative acts of speech and writing (evocation, translation, citation in and out of context, and so on) is bound to lead to the reification of the idea, concept, or theory being analyzed and consequently to the impoverishment of our understanding of historical practice. (1995:xvii)

In taking Arguedas’ particular analysis of Quechua and Spanish, ‘circumscribed by the historical contingency of that act,’ I am providing a contrast with Benjamin’s approach. Benjamin speaks of translation in general, which from Liu’s standpoint would lead to a reification, an impoverishment of the understanding of historical practice (Liu 1995). Seen from Liu’s standpoint, Benjamin’s space is oddly ideational. The creativity is in the text or in the language, but as potential, as telos, the way an oak is in an acorn.

The aseptic, rarefied atmosphere in his paper is strictly depersonalized; Benjamin’s paper ought to be called the task of translation Paul de Man once remarked. Benjamin’s view of language is absent people, even if the creativity is there. It evokes the children’s nursery rhyme, “Here is the church/Here is the steeple. Open the door, but where are the people?”

Reply from Beyond

I want to situate Arguedas, on the other hand, in terms of Dussel’s account of a ‘reply.’

…[M]odernity’s technical and economic globality is far from being a cultural globalization of everyday life that valorizes the majority of humanity. From this omitted potentiality and altering ‘exteriority’ emerges a project of ‘trans’-modernity, a ‘beyond’ that transcends Western modernity (since the West has never adopted it but, rather, has scorned it and valued it as ‘nothing’) and that will have a creative function of great significance in the twenty-first century. . . . modernity’s recent impact on the planet’s multiple cultures (Chinese, Southeast Asian, Hindu, Islamic, Bantu, Latin American) produced a varied ‘reply’ by all of them to the modern ‘challenge.’ Renewed, they are now erupting on a cultural horizon ‘beyond’ modernity. I call the reality of that fertile multicultural moment ‘trans’-modernity. (Dussel 2002: 221)
I take Arguedas' essay, "La Angustia del Mestizo," to be a 'reply' in Dussel's sense. It is a response by someone from a culture touched, deeply influenced in fact, by Europe's modernizing project, and yet Arguedas speaks in terms that are not reducible to those set up by Europe. In other words, I see his work as erupting on a cultural horizon beyond modernity. It works in its own register. Benjamin's concept of an 'afterlife,' for all its creative richness, is a text centered approach that formulates a totality that sees or imagines nothing beyond itself. This is a consequence of their respective points of insertion within European modernity. I do not see Arguedas and he certainly does not himself as an 'outsider' to the terms of Western theory. In their origin, the genres in which he writes -- novels, folklore, anthropology, linguistics -- are all products of the West taken as such. However he does not obey many of the rules of the genres. The terms of the reply exceed the hold of European categories and distinctions. The reply comes to incorporate varied spheres of life. He sees traditions, languages in relation to one another (Fabian 1983; Coronil 1996; Glissant 1997). He sees himself as intercultural. He performs his own status as teacher, and cultural worker (Giroux 1993) on to a cultural formation of mestizaje.

Arguedas qualifies that the clash of Spanish and Quechua as the clash of the universal with the particular, of European modernity and the people of the Andes. It is a condition, a scene, an inheritance from which he replies (cf. Derrida 1985:104). The inheritance conditions our activity, our ways of thinking and perceiving, in ways that are difficult, maybe impossible to account for fully. His reply is his essence, trying to communicate himself, so this spans epistemic and ontological realms. As I asserted above, he is within, the way one is within a conversation. But he also exceeds it, the way one exceeds another when they are in dialogue. Arguedas can provide us with a useful framework or vocabulary for a translation that is encarnizada, built out of the flesh and blood of translating oneself, with all of the pain, conflict, and contradictions that would imply. Translation is transformation of self and language.

In this oscillation between decision making and being determined by outside history, we have the material to make the translating subject visible (Venuti 1995) without making that subject the liberal individual. Arguedas puts in positive terms how one can think of translation work without separating the text from the body, from history, from the history that brings one to a particular text as a desirable one to translate and to another language as the desirable one to translate into -- the motivational structure not of the rational economic actor but of the historical subject. We are constrained and act out of outside impulses, forces, forces that also act
through us. On this point at least Benjamin and Arguedas are united, even if they come to that stance for different reasons.13

Arguedas’ work invites us to think about a specific speaker speaking to take the act in its active, gerundive form, where we cannot fail but notice the speaker speaking. On the level of ontology, the speaking, the signifying, implicates a process of being in the world, of becoming, or of changing who one is, of a shift in how one is in the world. The elaboration of this process, not only as a cognitive affair only but as lived experience – a phenomenologically embodied experience of language – a way of inserting oneself in social reality in a new way, is tenuous, difficult, and basic.14 This is key, because the interactive nature of his exercise is conducted without presupposing a hypothesized equivalency on the level of the languages themselves: they are not equivalent as languages. This provides a different framework for understanding not just translation, but language itself, or more accurately, languages themselves. Languages, like religion, like the body, do not have a transcendent life and are not necessarily realms autonomous from other parts of human activity as they are imagined to be in the West.

In bringing attention to a speaking subject, Arguedas changes the way in which theory normally differentiates between ‘theory’ and ‘data,’ or ‘theorists’ and ‘subjects of study.’ As an anthropologist educated in the United States, I was implicitly trained to treat other people’s texts in one of two ways. On the one hand are the subjects, or objects, of my ethnography. They are the people whose cultures, ways of thinking and acting I came to know through interacting with them, listening to them, through participant-observation, through interviewing them, and so on. They produce data. I produce ethnography. On the other are the scholars, theorists, and traditions in which and with which I am in dialogue as a scholar and as an intellectual. I was formed in these latter traditions, the logic goes, and I am drawing upon the canon of thought that provides the foundation of my discipline. According to this logic, the subjects of ethnography and the scholars with whom I am in conversation are of different orders. The conversations themselves are of a different order. The scholars form my virtual community. They form the background for my thinking.15 Walter Mignolo puts the point this way:

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13 James Baldwin, of whom we will have more to say below, provides a trenchant critique of the liberal individual’s understanding of choice and willpower in his early novel Giovanni’s Room. “For I am – or I was – one of those people who pride themselves on their willpower, on their ability to make a decision and carry it through. This virtue, like most virtues, is ambiguity itself. People who believe they are strong-willed and masters of their own destiny can only continue to believe this by becoming specialists in self-deception. Their decisions are not really decisions at all – a real decision makes one humble, one knows that it is at the mercy of more things than can be named – but elaborate systems of evasion, of illusion, designed to make themselves and the world appear to be what they and the world are not. (Baldwin 1956:30)

14 Nevertheless, the epistemic break in the meaning of the sign-system is total, irreparable, and indeed, quite shocking. (Guha 1982)

15 Peter Winch (1958, 85) provides an example of this distinction.
Indian ways of thinking have been “authorized” by Western epistemology as something to be studied (by anthropologists) but not as a source, an energy and a way of thinking. That is, Indian ways of thinking have been de-legitimized by the colonial difference; particularly by the coloniality of knowledge (e.g., Indian knowledge is non-sustainable for the progress of an ideal of civilization that was put in place during the European Renaissance and the first colonial expansion of the modern world). Indian ways of thinking have also been de-legitimized by the coloniality of being: Indians are not rational beings to be taken seriously in their way of thinking and in their thoughts. (Mignolo, 2010, 34)

Arguedas violates normative guidelines within Western social science by exploring his own linguistic anguish within a text. Although I would not put it this way, he is, to put it in the language of anthropology, his own ethnographic informant, text and critic, analyst and analysand. His words embody, speak within even as they speak about linguistic violence.

Conclusion

In taking up Arguedas, I do not want to fall into classifying him according to the dichotomy informant/theorist that forms the basis of most ethnographic writing. I respond to Arguedas’ text on both levels at once without reducing him to either. I have opted for a paradigm of dialogue, and I want to put this restructured relationship in ethical terms. Rather than see the man as reduced to his written text, as scholarship, or rather than treat him as receptacle of data, as informant, I see him as dialogical other, someone who escapes my grasp, who is not reducible to who I see or what I make of him. Here the ethical question comes out of a refusal to negate the human subject at the core of the linguistic clashes.

I began by arguing that attention to the theory of translation in Arguedas’ work could make a significant contribution to Translation Studies. As a trans-modern reply, it could change the terms of analysis in significant ways. In this sense, I am not merely contrasting Benjamin’s universalist account with a particular account of Quechua-Spanish. Instead, I am proposing a modification to the shape of theory. ‘Border thinking’ Arturo Escobar cites Walter Mignolo,

Border thinking points towards a different kind of hegemony, a multiple one. As a universal project, diversity allows us to imagine alternatives to universalism (we could say that the

“In the course of his investigation the scientist applies and develops the concepts germane to his particular field of study. This application and modification are ‘influenced’ both by the phenomena to which they are applied and also by the fellow-workers in participation with whom they are applied. But the two kinds of ‘influence’ are different. Whereas it is on the basis of his observation of the phenomena (in the course of his experiments) that he develops his concepts as he does, he is able to do this only in virtue of his participation in an established form of activity with his fellow-scientists. When I speak of ‘participation’ here I do not necessarily imply any direct physical conjunction or even any direct communication between fellow-participants. What is important is that they are all taking part in the same general kind of activity, which they have all learned in similar ways; that they are, therefore, capable of communicating with each other about what they are doing; that what any one of them is doing is in principle intelligible to the others.”

alternative to universalism in this view is not particularism but multiplicity). (Mignolo 1995, 310; cited in Escobar 200)

The proof is in the pudding. Let’s see if Arguedas’ account of translation can elucidate other locals, towards a theory housed not in the universality-particularity binary but instead in multiplicity For the counterpoint to Peru, we may turn to James Baldwin’s powerful account of Black English (now often referred to as Ebonics).

Not long before his death, Baldwin wrote a short polemical piece for the New York Times, ‘If Black English Isn’t a Language, Then Tell Me What Is?” (reprinted in Baldwin 1998). Baldwin finds fault with the scorn and hostility shown to Black English. He argues that in part, the derision is dishonest and subterfuge:

The argument concerning the use, or the status, or the reality, of Black English is rooted in American history and has absolutely nothing to do with the question the argument supposes itself to be posing. The argument has nothing to do with language itself but with the role of language. (1998, 67)

Instead, Baldwin sees the contempt as contempt for African Americans. The language of African Americans arose through the exigencies imposed by the Middle Passage and the subsequent experience of slavery. “People evolve a language in order to describe and thus control their circumstances or in order not to be submerged by a situation they cannot articulate.” (649) Baldwin pointedly differentiates the crucible that formed Black English from European tongues:

This was not, merely, as in the European example, the adoption of a foreign tongue, but an alchemy that transformed ancient elements into a new language: A language comes into existence by means of brutal necessity, and the rules of the language are dictated by what the language must convey. (1998, 69; emphasis in the original).

Baldwin honors the origins of resistance and commitment to survival implicit in Black English (Ebonics), even as he similarly argues the brilliance and ingenuity of it as an idiom.

If this passion, this skill this (to quote Toni Morrison) ‘sheer intelligence,’ this incredible music, the mighty achievement of having brought a people utterly unknown to, or despised by 'history' – to have brought this people to their present, troubled, troubling, and unassailable and unanswerable place – if this absolutely unprecedented journey does not indicate that Black English is a language, I am curious to know what definition of language is to be trusted.

A people at the center of the Western world, and in the midst of so hostile a population, has not endured and transcended by means of what is patronizingly called a ‘dialect.’ We, the Blacks, are in trouble, certainly, but we are not doomed, and we are not inarticulate because we are not compelled to defend a morality that we know to be a lie. (1998,69-70)
Baldwin continues by seeing the African-American child as negotiating the bitter terrain of linguistic domination. He honors the child’s resistance to those forces.

The brutal truth is that the bulk of the white people in America never had any interest in educating Black people, except as this could serve white purposes. It is not the Black child’s language that is in question, it is not his language that is despised: It is his experience. A child cannot be taught by anyone who despises him, and a child cannot afford to be fooled. A child cannot be taught by anyone whose demand, essentially, is that the child repudiate his experience, and all that gives him sustenance, and enter a limbo in which he will no longer be Black, and in which he knows that he can never become white. Black people have lost too many Black children that way.

And, after all, finally, in a country with standards so untrustworthy, a country that makes heroes of so many criminal mediocrities, a country unable to face why so many of the nonwhite are in prison, or on the needle, or standing, futureless, in the streets – it may very well be that both the child, and his elder, have concluded that they have nothing whatever to learn from the people of a country that has managed to learn so little. (1998,70)

Both Baldwin and Arguedas see and honor young students as they transform the dominant language to their needs, and through it express the genius of their communities.

Earlier in this paper, I cited Arguedas on how he sees these translations, born of conflict, change the nature of Spanish. He wrote that after the Quechua learn to speak the dominant Spanish, through this process of translating themselves, ‘Spanish will not be the Spanish of today, with an insignificant and hardly quantitative Quechua influence, but rather there will be in it much of the genius and maybe even the intimate Quechua syntax.’

Baldwin makes something of an analogous claim to the transformation of the dominator’s language through the tongue forged by the subordinate Black English. Referring to the contributions of Black English to the English everyone speaks, Baldwin writes,

Now, I do not know what white Americans would sound like if there had never been any Black people in the United States, but they would not sound the way they sound. (68)

Both see the dominant language transformed through the long process of linguistic conquest. One element of the trans-modern ‘replies’ to modernity is that it can even change one’s perspective on the dominator’s language, and how it is enriched – or at least changed – by the subordinate’s struggle for linguistic expression. This is one way in which the terms of a discussion of translation theory could change (Escobar 2007).
For Arguedas and Baldwin, whatever their differences, the fused language of the subordinate is a question of enormous urgency and importance. They see the resourcefulness of their people at work, as their people scrabble for survival amidst the unequal battles of language. As I take Arguedas into the bitter, cold land that Baldwin describes, I see a different framework emerge through which to evaluate research on translation, how and why one translates, what that does to a language, and how one understands oneself as a ‘translator,’ researcher, theorist, or teacher when one is involved in the perilous, vital, riddling, high stakes project of thinking about, writing or speaking about tongues.

In both cases, Arguedas and Baldwin are trying to take seriously the language fashioned by a subject people, where the subject people are agents, inventing, innovating, in the midst of a linguistic contradiction they are forced to live.

In traditional accounts of translation, one looks for an equivalent word when one is translating. Here, however, it is not the equivalence, the correspondence of words, or their accuracy that counts, since that would bring us back to a standard of truth and falsity, where truth approximates some original, some ideal, some plan, some external equal. Instead, we are set with the stern ethical and political task of trying to take inventory of where we inhabit language, how we situate ourselves as we evaluate a translation or undertake to perform one, and what this might reveal about our investments (financial, affective, linguistic, political, and historical), especially if we take seriously Baldwin’s blunt claim that language is a political instrument, a means, and proof of power.

I want to return to the anguish in the title of Arguedas’ essay. I want to end on an anguished note. The anguish is not mere consequence. It is part of the condition. The anguish may be indispensable: It teaches.

I suspect, though I certainly cannot prove it, that every life moves full circle – toward revelation: You begin to see, and even rejoice to see, what you always saw. You can even tell anguish to sit down, and shut up, you’re busy right now – and anguish, as you should certainly know by now, ain’t to go nowhere. It might go around the corner, on a particularly bright day, and there are those days: but anguish has your number, knows, to paraphrase the song, where you live. It’s a difficult relationship, but mysteriously indispensable. It teaches you. (Baldwin 1977, 74)

If one excludes the affect, then one loses the teaching.

The methodology locates the knowing subject in his or her situation, subordinated by the depredations of European domination, in this case exercised in part through language. The methodology notices the profound shifts in perceiving social reality, that social reality is different from how it had appeared, and often those shifts are irreversible. This is a consequence of a methodology that cuts to affective and even ontological dimensions.
I have tried in the above to give some evidence for the tacit frameworks that many occupy as translators. I want to follow Arguedas and now Baldwin in embracing a set of motivations, self-understandings, and set of terms that seem anathema to much translation theory and to social science. Ariel Dorfman has remarked, ‘You cannot talk about this use of language without also talking about two simultaneous conditions: one is the evolution of one’s own identity as a dual person, very much related to the political and geographic place you occupy, and the other is the intervention of history. You don’t just switch languages, you don’t just switch countries. Behind it is the rush of history and, unfortunately, a great deal of pain.’ (Dorfman 2002, 57).

As a translator placing oneself within this account of translation, I can conclude that translating Arguedas’ work can erode one’s certainty at a deep level of one’s being (Becker 1991). This is not intrinsic to translation, but rather follows from the approach one takes to translation. Boaventura de Sousa Santos has commented that all cultures are incomplete (2004). Instead of taking this in the teleological sense that they are all shards to be united, I want to interpret Sousa Santos to say that even given the manifest deep differences in languages and the corresponding differences in how we live in the world and the sense we make of it, different languages, cultures, histories, can, at the crossroads, point to important truths. We would not then take each language as sui generis and apart from others because this would woefully misrecognize the linguistic reality in which we live: we live with different languages imposed on one another, such that multilinguality and translation structures the lives of so many of us, maybe all of us.

I started with a set of questions from Arturo Escobar. The point of this essay has not been merely to launch a quixotic battle against universalism in the name of a subalternized particularism, in this case Quechua-Spanish. Instead, the proposal implicit in Arguedas is to take up alternatives to modernity’s possibilities for doing theory. By looking at James Baldwin and José María Arguedas together, the hope is that through that parallax, we can illuminate some of the power, and dissimulation, as languages come into their forced contacts, and we can see, at the margins, and in ways we could not see from the seat of European theory, the possibilities for networks built from the theoretical proposals of Europe’s others.
Appendix
A Comparison of Benjamin and Arguedas

Walter Benjamin “The Task of the Translator” (1923)

A. Translation is discussed in universal terms.

B. Negation of corporeality, of the lived body (the mind/body split)

C. The subject/object split. Omniscient knower is located meta-linguistically. No analysis of the epistemic or linguistic conditions that provide the foundation for his insight

D. Subjectivity of speakers is evacuated or excommunicated in the name of the (Hegelian) Subject.

E. Translation occupies a central place in the encounters among languages and harmonizes those languages. No analysis of the power differentials that obtain among groups of people and how this affects language and the role of language

José María Arguedas “The Anguish of the Mestizo” (1923)

A. A particular knowledge emerges at the historical convergence of Quechua and Spanish as the colonizing tongue. The knowledge has a troubled emergence at the crux of forcing expression of the complexity of their thinking through a language that may be incapable of capturing that subtlety

B. Embodied knowledge; an embodied relation to language. Translation an embodied practice

C. Writing that locates himself vis-à-vis the object of study, in this case his own linguistic practices

D. The subjects of translation are the speakers who live in languages, and the description is of how they see and experience the worlds they inhabit and how they articulate their experiences. ‘World’ traveling (Lugones) between the world of meaning of the Quechua speaker, that of the Spanish speaker, and that of the mestizo caught in-between.

E. Translation occupies a central place in the violence among languages, cultures and traditions that are transformative of the speakers and of the dominant and vanquished languages. Translation as a site of conflict (domination, annihilation, survival, mutation). Colonization involves linguistic violence, including the imposition of Spanish as both obligatory and desirable
F. Hegelian teleology in the movement of history – history is linear, progressive, irreversible, cohesive, and embraces totality.

G. Evacuation or excommunication of affect in analysis and in the condition of living within a language or shuttling among languages. (This follows from the reason/emotion split).

H. Submerging or suppressing the ethical context of examining translation and the co-evolution of languages

I. The translator is made invisible in favor of an account of translation that absolves agency in the name of the Subject of History

J. Languages are all equivalent as languages. Translation makes sense because languages are exchangeable, homologous units. (Liu)

F. A contingent history of co-development of Spanish and Quechua

G. An account of the existential anguish attendant upon those conditions of emergence. More generally, affect is analyzed and incorporated thoroughly as part of the process of translation, as part of the condition, as part of the motivation.

H. The basis for an examination of ethics of translation in refusing to negate the human subject at the core of linguistic clashes.

I. A focus on subjective decisions made by historical actors, especially speech communities, and in this sense a framework that upholds autonomy, or some form of collective agency or ‘active subjectivity’ (Lugones 2003).

J. Even though Quechua and Spanish are both called ‘languages,’ they may have different, even incommensurate epistemological and ontological statuses from one another. They do different things for the speaker. They relate the speaker to his/her body and to the surroundings in a different way. To use the term ‘language’ as if it marked them as equivalent is to use language in a systematically ambiguous way. It is to try to make non-alike things alike. It is to employ a pseudo-universal (Eoyang 2007).
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