TEORÍA DE LA AGENCIA DESDE LA PERSPECTIVA DEL CONTROL
Keywords:
Contabilidad, control, agente, principal, contratosAbstract
This essay explains the agency theory, the contractual relationship between the agents, the different interests of each agent and identify problems that arise in the relationship between principal and agent (agents known like manager and investor), such as: information asymmetry between the agent and the principal, the discrepancy between the objectives of the principal and agent, and the economic impact of the control from the principal over the agent to lower his/her risk. These problems are analyzed and I show solutions since a control perspective with the functions of the accounting like a tool. Each accounting’s functions will be addressed individually and I will explain how it is useful like a control which reduces the impact of the problems that may cause the relationship between principal and agent.
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References
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