Competence in R&D Among Asymmetric Universities: An Approach from Game Theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.le.n104a357462Keywords:
concursos tipo Tullock, transferencia de conocimiento, cooperación en competencia, evaluación institucional, asimetría de capacidades, políticas de ciencia e innovación, teoría de juegosAbstract
This article develops a theoretical model to analyze the interaction between competitions and cooperation in public competitions for the allocation of research and development (R&D) resources, with an emphasis on universities with asymmetric capabilities. Using a Tullock-type framework, a strategic game is modeled in which universities decide how much effort to invest to increase their probability of success and how much knowledge to transfer to their competitor. The institutional proponent's evaluation of performance includes not only individual outcomes but also attributes such as cooperation and prior experience. The model shows that cooperation can emerge endogenously if it is institutionally incentivized, and that knowledge transfer acts as a strategic externality that modifies the marginal costs of effort. Through numerical simulations, the effects of explicit incentives, structural asymmetries, and mandatory cooperation policies on equilibrium are analyzed. The results reveal strategies for designing public policies that seek to balance efficiency, equity, and collaboration in science and technology systems
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Copyright (c) 2025 Daniel Ricardo Torralba Barreto

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