À prendre ou à laisser! Des preuves expérimentales concernant la rationalité, les préférences sociales et la négociation
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.le.n82a3Mots-clés :
jeu de l’ultimatum, altruisme, réciprocité, menacesRésumé
Le jeu de l’ultimatum a permis de mieux comprendre le pouvoir de la négociation associé à une menace, jeu dans lequel l’information et la communication jouent un rôle central. Cet article fait une révision sélective de la littérature concernant aux expériences économiques autour des jeux de l’ultimatum, pour ensuite mieux organiser les principaux développements de la théorie. Les résultats de ces expériences ont montré que les individus contournement ystématique de la prédiction théorique. En fait, nous avons constaté, d’une part, que les promoteurs du jeu font des offres très près de la répartition équitable et, d’autre part, que les bénéficiaires souvent rejettent des offres qu’ils jugent injustes. Incontestablement, ce jeu a gagné une place centrale dans l’économie comportementale, raison pour laquelle cet article est utile pour les chercheurs travaillant à la fois dans la théorie de la négociation et l’économie expérimentale.
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