Prioritarianism without one-person cases. Leaving behind the relativities

Authors

  • Sebastián Pérez Mora London School of Economics & Political Science

Keywords:

priority view, separateness of persons, shift of weighting, competing claims, one-person cases, multi-person cases

Abstract

In this text the priority view will be defended from some objections proposed by Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve. The priority view highlights the importance of helping the worst off even if they are harder to help. Otsuka and Voorhoeve state that this position ignores the separateness of persons, a shift of weighting between one-person and multi-person cases and important moral facts regarding competing claims. Thomas Porter and Derek Parfit, on the other hand, establish a defence of the view keeping in mind some modifications to it or the complete rejection of a shift such as the one endorsed by Otsuka and Voorhoeve. The final proposal takes into account both of these defences and elaborates a solution that leaves behind one-person cases, arguing that the treatment of them does not involve any inherently prioritarian reasoning and does not debilitate the view.

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Author Biography

Sebastián Pérez Mora, London School of Economics & Political Science

Mg., Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics & Political Science.

References

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Otsuka, M & Voorhoeve, A. (2009). “Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off than Others: An Argument against the Priority View”. In: Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 37, No. 2. Published by: Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Parfit, D. (1991). “Equality or Priority?”In: The Lindley Lecture. November 21, 1991. Published by: University of Kansas.

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____________. (2012). “Another Defence of the Priority View”. In: Utilitas. Vol. 24, No. 3, September 2012, pp. 400-440. Published by: Cambridge University Press.

Porter, T. (2012). “In Defence of the Priority View”. In: Utilitas. Vol. 24, No.3, September 2012, pp. 349-364. Published by: Cambridge University Press.

Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Voorhoeve, A. & Fleurbaey, M. (2012). “Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons”. In: Utilitas. Vol. 24, No. 3, September 2012, p.381-398. Published by: Cambridge University Press.

Published

2016-12-26

How to Cite

Pérez Mora, S. (2016). Prioritarianism without one-person cases. Leaving behind the relativities. Versiones. Philosophy’s Journal, (10), 12–36. Retrieved from https://revistas.udea.edu.co/index.php/versiones/article/view/326845

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Section

Artículos