Is there a Political Economic Cycle of Public Spending in Colombia? Empirical Evidence for the Period 1960-2016
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.espo.n63a09Keywords:
economic politics, public spending, opportunistic political economic cycles, partisan political economic cycles, ColombiaAbstract
The purpose of this work was to verify the existence of economic political cycles for public spending in Colombia in the period between 1960 and 2016. To verify this, the presence of the economic political cycles proposed in the theory, the partisan cycles and the opportunist cycles, were evaluated. This was carried out through various econometric techniques, more specifically, those related to the analysis of cycles in time series. It was found that there is no conclusive evidence that suggests the existence of opportunistic or partisan economic political cycles, but at a confidence level of 90%, there is evidence that suggests that public spending in Colombia tends to have a partisan cycle; however, this result is not in accordance with what the ideological theory of Colombian political parties suggests.
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