Information as an instrument for valuation vs. accountability. Are both objectives compatible?

Authors

  • Begoña Giner University of Valencia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.rc.332815

Keywords:

objectives, financial information, valuation, accountability, IASB, conceptual framework

Abstract

The accounting information plays two main roles: being an instrument for valuation and also for accountability. In this paper the accounting literature is analyzed in order to understand the proposals made for the IASB in the last Conceptual Framework draft. Although the academic literature concludes that the information needs for both aims are different, this is not the stance of the IASB. Based on the theory of this agency, researchers associate the accountability concept with reward mechanisms, whereas the IASB links it to the assessment of the executive management, and this perspective helps to understand the differences. Even though, the accounting information cannot be useful to determine reward mechanisms, it can help to understand the prices that are actually used for this purpose.

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Author Biography

Begoña Giner, University of Valencia

Professor of Financial Economics and Accounting at the University of Valencia, PhD in Economic and Business Sciences and a Bachelor of Political, Economic and Commercial Sciences from the University of Valencia (Extraordinary award of degree and doctorate), Master of Science in Accounting and Finance from the London School of Economics. He has been a Research Scholar at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in the USA (2010-2011), and a visiting professor at Rutgers University in the USA (2017), and Universidad Nacional de Rosario in Argentina (2013 and 2000), and in Europe at the Universities of Amsterdam (2004), Glasgow and Strathclyde (1999, 1996 and 1995). She is a Certified Public Accountant Auditor. She has held management positions in the Faculty of CCEE and EE of the University of Valencia (Vice Dean, Secretary and Vice Secretary), and has been Director of the Accounting Department; She is currently the Coordinator of the Corporate Finance and Accounting Doctorate Program. In the international arena, she has held relevant positions. She has been a member of the IFRS Council (body that advises the IASB) from 2012 to 2015. She has been Chair of the EAA from 2011 to 2013, and was Chair of its Standing Scientific Committee 2007-2010. She was a member of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) (body that advises the EC) 2001-2005. At the national level, she is a member of the Board of Directors of the Spanish Association of Accounting and Business Administration (AECA). She has collaborated with the Accounting and Auditing Institute (ICAC), mainly in the area of ​​international relations. She is the author of numerous publications in prestigious magazines, such as Abacus, Accounting and Business Research, European Accounting Review, Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, Journal of Business Ethics, Applied Economics, Revista de Economía Financiera, and Revista Española de Financiación. and Accounting, as well as books and monographs. She is (and has been) principal investigator for national research projects: as well as European ones. Her intense research activity has been recognized by the CNAE with five six-year research periods.

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Published

2018-05-23

How to Cite

Giner, B. (2018). Information as an instrument for valuation vs. accountability. Are both objectives compatible?. Contaduría Universidad De Antioquia, (71), 13–29. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.rc.332815

Issue

No. 71 (2017): Julio-Diciembre

Section

Artículos

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Author’s copyright of the articles is transferred to the University of Antioquia to have abstracts and full texts available in databases that disseminate each issue’s contents. However, the authors may disseminate their work published in the Journal through their personal pages and institutional repositories.

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