False Assumptions of the Problem of Personal Identity. From Personal to Narrative Identity

Authors

  • Marta Cecilia Betancur Universidad de Caldas

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.12853

Keywords:

self, personal identity, substance, self-consciousness, mind, cosification, dualism

Abstract

This paper takes up again the problem of “personal identity” in order to show that the way it has been put leads to a dead end or to an insoluble antinomy: whether the “self” is accepted as a metaphysical entity, a permanent substance, a thing, a conscious substance or an immaterial “self” lodged in the body, or, on the contrary, an entity like this is denied and rejected as a metaphysical phantom. Another intention of the work to demonstrate that the dilemma originates in a wrong exposition of the problem, supported on false assumptions deeply rooted in philosophy and accepted since Modernity. Such assumptions are: substantialism and cosification, psychophysic parallelism and the egocentric perspective. Finally, we present and analyze the solution offered by Ricoeur through “narrative identity”.

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References

Frondizi, Rosieri. Substancia y función en el problema del yo. Argentina: Losada, 1952.

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Kenny, Anthony. La metafísica de la mente. Barcelona: Paidós, 2000.

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Manser, Anthony. “Dolor y lenguaje privado”, en: Estudios sobre la filosofía de Wittgenstein. Buenos Aires: Editorial universitaria, 1971.

Ricoeur, Paul. Sí mismo como otro. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1996. Ryle. El concepto de lo mental. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1967.

Vicente Arregui, Jorge; Ambrosio, Manuel A. “Identidad personal e identidad narrativa”, en: Revista de filosofía: Themata, No 22, 1999, pp. 17-32.

____________ Acción y sentido en Wittgenstein. Pamplona, España: Eunsa, 1984. Wittgenstein. Ludwig. Los Cuadernos azul y marrón. Madrid: Tecnos, 1998.

Published

2005-01-04

How to Cite

Betancur, M. C. (2005). False Assumptions of the Problem of Personal Identity. From Personal to Narrative Identity. Estudios De Filosofía, (31), 83–103. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.12853

Issue

Section

Original or Research articles