False Assumptions of the Problem of Personal Identity. From Personal to Narrative Identity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.12853Keywords:
self, personal identity, substance, self-consciousness, mind, cosification, dualismAbstract
This paper takes up again the problem of “personal identity” in order to show that the way it has been put leads to a dead end or to an insoluble antinomy: whether the “self” is accepted as a metaphysical entity, a permanent substance, a thing, a conscious substance or an immaterial “self” lodged in the body, or, on the contrary, an entity like this is denied and rejected as a metaphysical phantom. Another intention of the work to demonstrate that the dilemma originates in a wrong exposition of the problem, supported on false assumptions deeply rooted in philosophy and accepted since Modernity. Such assumptions are: substantialism and cosification, psychophysic parallelism and the egocentric perspective. Finally, we present and analyze the solution offered by Ricoeur through “narrative identity”.
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References
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Copyright (c) 2005 Marta Cecilia Betancur
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