Microphysicalism and the scope of the zombie argument





philosophy of mind, zombie argument, phenomenal consciousness, physicalism, emergence


Chalmers’ (1996) zombie argument against physicalism (or ‘materialism’) about (phenomenal) consciousness supposes that every property of a composed physical system supervenes (logically) on the system’s fundamental constituents. In this paper, I discuss the significance of this supposition and I show that the philosophy of physics provides good grounds to resist it. As a result, I conclude that the zombie argument does not rule out a physicalist view of consciousness that conceives it as emergent in the sense of S-emergence (Howard, 2007). I finish by discussing some objections.

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Author Biography

Reinaldo José Bernal Velásquez, Universidad Javeriana

Reinaldo Bernal hizo dos pregrados, en física y en filosofía, en la Universidad de los Andes (2000). Luego, cursó el Magister en Filosofía en la Universidad Nacional de Colombia (2005). A continuación, cursó un 'Master of Science' en filosofía e historia de la ciencia en el London School of Economics, en Londres. Finalmente, hizo un doctorado en filosofía (CNRS/ENS/Paris 1 - Panthéon Sorbonne) y el Instituto Jean-Nicod (CNRS/ENS/EHESS), en París. Obtuvo el título correspondiente en diciembre del año 2011. En 2015, en el grupo "conciencia e individualidad" dirigido por el Dr. Uriah Kriegel, y en 2016 en el grupo "dividnorm" dirigido por la Dra. Joëlle Proust. Actualmente se desempeña como profesor asistente (de planta y tiempo completo) de la Facultad de Filosofía de la Universidad Javeriana, en Bogotá. Trabaja en filosofía de la mente y en filosofía de la ciencia.


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How to Cite

Bernal Velásquez, R. J. (2019). Microphysicalism and the scope of the zombie argument. Estudios De Filosofía, (59), 45–64. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n59a03



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