Microphysicalism and the scope of the zombie argument

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n59a03

Keywords:

philosophy of mind, zombie argument, phenomenal consciousness, physicalism, emergence

Abstract


Chalmers’ (1996) zombie argument against physicalism (or ‘materialism’) about (phenomenal) consciousness supposes that every property of a composed physical system supervenes (logically) on the system’s fundamental constituents. In this paper, I discuss the significance of this supposition and I show that the philosophy of physics provides good grounds to resist it. As a result, I conclude that the zombie argument does not rule out a physicalist view of consciousness that conceives it as emergent in the sense of S-emergence (Howard, 2007). I finish by discussing some objections.

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Author Biography

Reinaldo José Bernal Velásquez, Universidad Javeriana

Reinaldo Bernal hizo dos pregrados, en física y en filosofía, en la Universidad de los Andes (2000). Luego, cursó el Magister en Filosofía en la Universidad Nacional de Colombia (2005). A continuación, cursó un 'Master of Science' en filosofía e historia de la ciencia en el London School of Economics, en Londres. Finalmente, hizo un doctorado en filosofía (CNRS/ENS/Paris 1 - Panthéon Sorbonne) y el Instituto Jean-Nicod (CNRS/ENS/EHESS), en París. Obtuvo el título correspondiente en diciembre del año 2011. En 2015, en el grupo "conciencia e individualidad" dirigido por el Dr. Uriah Kriegel, y en 2016 en el grupo "dividnorm" dirigido por la Dra. Joëlle Proust. Actualmente se desempeña como profesor asistente (de planta y tiempo completo) de la Facultad de Filosofía de la Universidad Javeriana, en Bogotá. Trabaja en filosofía de la mente y en filosofía de la ciencia.

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Published

2019-01-18

How to Cite

Bernal Velásquez, R. J. (2019). Microphysicalism and the scope of the zombie argument. Estudios De Filosofía, (59), 45–64. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n59a03

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Original or Research articles

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