The immorality of the Pyrrhonists

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/10.17533/udea.ef.n60a04

Keywords:

Pyrrhonism, Aristocles of Messene, immorality objection, apraxia objection, Aristotelian theory of virtue

Abstract


In this paper I revisit Aristocles’ formulation of the objection of immorality addressed to the Pyrrhonists (apud Eusebio Praep. Ev. 14.18.18-19), as well as a possible skeptical answer transmitted by the same source (14.18.20). Concerning the objection, I will try to show that it is an ethical and not a practical charge, which should not therefore be confused with the objection of apraxia. Concerning the answer, I will argue that it is necessarily a de ationary solution, which leaves part of the accusation intact, simply because the Pyrrhonist cannot and should not admit the terms in which it has been raised.

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Author Biography

Alfonso Correa Motta, Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Doctor en filosofía de la Universidad Paris X-Nanterre. Profesor asociado del Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Director de “Peiras: Grupo de estudios en filosofía antigua y medieval” (UNAL/Uniandes). Investiga y enseña filosofía antigua, en particular escepticismo, metafísica y ética.

 

References

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Published

2019-07-25

How to Cite

Correa Motta, A. (2019). The immorality of the Pyrrhonists. Estudios De Filosofía, (60), 63–83. https://doi.org/10.17533/10.17533/udea.ef.n60a04

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Original or Research articles

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