Feeling the past: beyond causal content

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a09

Keywords:

memory, temporal experience, percepction, causation, time

Abstract

Memories often come with a feeling of pastness. The events we remember strike us as having occurred in our past. What accounts for this feeling of pastness? In his recent book, Memory: A self-referential account, Jordi Fernández argues that the feeling of pastness cannot be grounded in an explicit representation of the pastness of the remembered event. Instead, he argues that the feeling of pastness is grounded in the self-referential causal content of memory. In this paper, I argue that this account falls short. The representation of causal origin does not by itself ground a feeling of pastness. Instead, I argue that we can salvage the temporal localization account of the feeling of pastness by describing a form of egocentric temporal representation that avoids Fernández’s criticisms.

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Author Biography

Gerardo Viera, University of Sheffield

Is a philosopher of cognitive science, who arrived at the University of Sheffield in the Autumn of 2020. Before coming to Sheffield, he was a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology at the University of Antwerp. Prior to this, Gerardo received his PhD in philosophy from the University of British Columbia.

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Published

2021-07-30

How to Cite

Viera, G. (2021). Feeling the past: beyond causal content. Estudios De Filosofía, (64), 173–188. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a09