Political Budget Cycles in Latin America. A Dynamic Panel Analysis

Authors

  • Erick Álvarez Barreno University of the Hemispheres

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.espo.n62a11

Keywords:

Elections, Political Economy, Political Budget Cycles, Latin America

Abstract

The article examines the correlation between government spending and election cycles in 19 Latin American countries during 1990 to 2017. The results obtained through the generalized method of moments (GMM) suggest that current expenditure increases by about 0.44% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during election years compared to non-election years. Although the election year does not have an effect on capital expenditure, this component decreases by about 0.27% of GDP during post-election years. These results demonstrate the existence of different dynamics of the impact of elections on the components of government spending. The level of presidential approval seems not to affect the incentives of politicians to manipulate economic outcomes for electoral purposes.

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Author Biography

Erick Álvarez Barreno, University of the Hemispheres

Political scientist and internationalist. Master in Political Analysis and Institutional Evaluation. Assistant Professor in Political Science, University of the Hemispheres, Ecuador.

References

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Published

2021-09-28

How to Cite

Álvarez Barreno, E. (2021). Political Budget Cycles in Latin America. A Dynamic Panel Analysis. Estudios Políticos, (62), 267–292. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.espo.n62a11

Issue

Section

General Section Articles