La bureaucratie et l’efficacité dans la provision de biens publics : un modèle spatial de concurrence politique
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.le.n73a7865Mots-clés :
Concurrence politique, efficience gouvernementale, taille du gouvernementRésumé
Cet article présent un modèle spatial de concurrence politique pour analyser l’effet de la concurrence politique sur les décisions prises par un gouvernement en ce qui concerne l’efficacité du niveau d’emploi bureaucratique et la provision des biens publics. Nous montrons que tout équilibre politique-économique issu de la concurrence politique se traduit dans un niveau d’emploi bureaucratique excessif et une provision de biens publics tout à fait inefficace. Ce résultat est contraire à d’autres études que soulignent un lien positif entre la concurrence politique et la performance du gouvernement.
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