Modal space and maximal structural universals

Authors

  • José Tomás Alvarado Marambio Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.11606

Keywords:

modality, possible worlds, actualism, universals, individual essences

Abstract

This work considers the validity of the theory of possible worlds as maximal structural universals in relation with the known criticisms against actualist views on possible worlds. In a first part the modal conception based on universals is summarily exposed. Then, the different dif culties are presented. Two of those appear especially relevant for the modal theory defended here: (i) the confusion of different indiscernible possibilities, and (ii) the explanation of the nature of the representation of possibilities. After the examination of these difficulties, it is shown how the modal theory based on universals can answer both problems.

|Abstract
= 142 veces | PDF (ESPAÑOL (ESPAÑA))
= 26 veces|

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

José Tomás Alvarado Marambio, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso

Viña del Mar, Chile

References

ADAMS, R. M. (1999) “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”, en J. Kim y E. Sosa (eds.), Metaphysics. An Anthology. Blackwell, Oxford, 172-183.

ALVARADO, J. T. (2007) “Mundos posibles como universales estructurales máximos. Una conjetura ontológica” Análisis losófico, 27 (2), 119-143.

ALVARADO, J. T. (2008), “Teorías modales lingüísticas refinadas” Pensamiento, 64 (240), 315-343.

ALVARADO, J. T. (por aparecer) “Universales estructurales”.

ARMSTRONG, D. M. (1978) Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume I, Nominalism and Realism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

ARMSTRONG, D. M. (1989) Universals. An Opinionated Introduction. Westview, Boulder.

ARMSTRONG, D. M. (1997) A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

ARMSTRONG, D. M. (2004) “How Do Particulars Stand to Universals?”, en: Zimmerman, D. W. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 139-154.

DIVERS, J. (2002) Possible Worlds. Routledge, London.

KrIPKE, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity. Blackwell, Oxford.

LEWIS, D. (1973) Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford.

LEWIS, D. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell, Oxford.

LEWIS D. y R. Langton, (1999) “De ning ‘Intrinsic’”, en: Lewis, D. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 116-132.

MELIA, J. (2001) “Reducing Possibilities to Language” Analysis 61, 19-29.

MELIA, J. (2003) Modality. Acumen, Chesham.

PLANTINGA, A. (1974) The Nature of Necessity. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

PLANTINGA, A. (2003) “World and Essence”, en: Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 46-71.

TORRETTI, R. (1998) El paraíso de Cantor. La tradición conjuntista en la filosofía matemática. Editorial Universitaria, Santiago.

van INWAGEN, P. (2001) “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”, en: Ontology, Identity and Modality. Essays in Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 206-242.

WIGGINS, D. (2001) Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Published

2010-04-15

How to Cite

Alvarado Marambio, J. T. (2010). Modal space and maximal structural universals. Estudios De Filosofía, (41), 111–138. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.11606

Issue

Section

Original or Research articles

Similar Articles

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 > >> 

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.