The Objective Conception of Substance in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.12634

Keywords:

Kant, transcendental philosophy, substance, duality, transcendental schema

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine a duality in the objective conception of substance in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. With this purpose in mind, I analyze the transcendental schema of the category of substance and accident. My hypothesis is that two different conceptions of substance can be distinguished in the Kantian text. On the one hand, substances1 are the relatively permanent objects of everyday experience. On the other hand, substance2 is the absolutely permanent matter of which substances1 are made. Since substances1 are accidents or ways of existing of substance2, both conceptions are part of a coherent theory.

|Abstract
= 397 veces | PDF (ESPAÑOL (ESPAÑA))
= 110 veces|

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Martín Arias-Albisu, Universidad Nacional de Rosario

Facultad de Humanidades y Artes
Universidad Nacional de Rosario
Rosario, Argentina
E-mail: arias.martin@gmail.com

References

ALLISON, H. E. (1983) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense, New Haven/London, Yale University Press.

ALLISON, H. E. (1992) El idealismo trascendental de Kant: una interpretación y defensa, Trad. de D. M. Granja Castro, Barcelona, Anthropos.

ARIAS ALBISU, M. (2010) Los esquemas trascendentales como procedimientos y productos, Revista de filosofía, Madrid, vol. 35 (2), pp. 27-42.

BENNETT, J. (1966) Kant´s Analytic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CAIMI, M. (2000) Einige Bemerkungen über die Metaphysische Deduktion in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant Studien, Berlin, vol. 91 (3), pp. 257-292. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.2000.91.3.257

CAIMI, M. (2004) Consideraciones sobre la función de los «juicios infinitos», Ágora, Santiago de Compostela, vol. 23 (1), pp. 29-38.

DETEL, W. (1978) Zur Funktion des Schematismuskapitels in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant Studien, Berlin, vol. 69 (1), pp. 17-45. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.1978.69.1-4.17

DÜSING, K. (1995) Schema und Einbildungskraft in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. En: Kreimendahl, L. (ed.). Aufklärung und Skepsis. Studien zur Philosophie und Geistesgeschichte des 17. und Jahrhunderts. Günter Gawlick zum 65. Geburtstag, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, pp. 47-71.

FRIEDMAN, M. (2001) Matter and Motion in the Metaphysical Foundations and the First Critique: The Empirical Concept of Matter and the Categories. En: Watkins, E. (ed.). Kant and the Sciences, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 53-69 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0195133056.003.0004

HEIDEGGER, M. (1962) Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den Transzendentalen Grundsätzen, Gesamtausgabe 41, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.

KANT, I. (1902 ss.) Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Berlin, hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (AA).

KANT, I. (2007) Crítica de la razón pura, Trad. de M. Caimi, Buenos Aires, Colihue.

LOCKE, J. (1894) An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Oxford, ed. A. C. Fraser.

LONGUENESSE, B. (2000) Kant and the Capacity to Judge, Trad. de C. T. Wolfe, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Martín Arias-Albisu

PATON, H. J. (1970) Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience. A Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

ROSALES, A. (1993) Una pregunta sobre el tiempo. En: Rosales, A. Siete ensayos sobre Kant, Mérida, Universidad de los Andes, 1993, pp. 225-250.

STRAWSON, P. F. (1966) The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, London/New York, Methuen.

VAN CLEVE, J. (1979) Substance, Matter, and Kant’s First Analogy, Kant Studien Berlin, vol. 70 (2), pp. 149-161. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.1979.70.1-4.149

WALKER, R. C. S. (1971) The Status of Kant’s Theory of Matter, Synthese, Dordrecht, vol. 23 (1) pp. 121-126. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414148

WARD, A. (2001) Kant’s First Analogy of Experience, Kant Studien, Berlin, vol. 92 (4), pp. 387-406. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.2001.001

WOLFF, M. (1995) Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel. Mit einem Essay über Freges “Begriffsschrift”, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3196/9783465028116

Published

2011-08-24

How to Cite

Arias-Albisu, M. (2011). The Objective Conception of Substance in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Estudios De Filosofía, (44), 39–60. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.12634

Issue

Section

Original or Research articles

Categories