The Persistence of Doubt after Descartes

Authors

  • José María Sánchez de León Serrano Freie Universität de Berlin

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.16646

Keywords:

Cogito, discourse, doubt, ground, image, infinite, representation.

Abstract

How it is to be understood that one of the most epoch-defining innovations of Cartesian thought, i. e., methodic doubt, has not been adopted by Descartes’ immediate philosophical posterity? This paper investigates the reasons for this supposed disappearance of doubt in the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz by means of a reexamination of the role of doubt in Descartes’ Meditations. Starting from a characterization of the Cartesian project as a search for the ground, the paper shows that Descartes’ interpretation of immediate reality in terms of representation is actually the apotheosis of a more ancient view that conceives the totality of being as contingent and vain. Thus, doubt is not a free suspension of judgement, but the inevitable irresolution that results from the lack of ontological solidity that is a feature of immediate reality when interpreted as image or representation. It is then shown that postcartesian thought actually does not dismiss doubt, but incorporates it as a basic assumption, which explains why there is no definite place for it in discourse. The further development of modern thought can, in crucial ways, be explained by means of this implicit assimilation of doubt and its consequences.

|Abstract
= 577 veces | PDF (ESPAÑOL (ESPAÑA))
= 142 veces|

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

José María Sánchez de León Serrano, Freie Universität de Berlin

Profesor invitado Intituto de Filosofía
Berlin, Alemania
E-mail: eiusmodi@yahoo.es

References

CATON, H. (1973) The Origin of Subjectivity. An Essay on Descartes, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

COUTURAT, L. (1961) La logique de Leibniz, Hildesheim: Olms.

DESCARTES, R. (1964-1974) Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Ch. Adam y P. Tannery, 11 vol., Paris: Vrin/C. N. R. S.

DÜTTMANN. A. G. (2000) “Lifeline and self-portrait”, en: Gill, C. B. (ed.), Time and the image, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

GUEROULT, M. (1953) Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, 2 vol., Paris: Aubier.

GUEROULT, M. (1968) Spinoza I: Dieu, Paris: Aubier.

GUEROULT, M. (1974) Spinoza II: L’âme, Paris: Aubier.

GUEROULT, M. (1970) Etudes sur Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche et Leibniz, Hildesheim: Olms.

KOPPER, J. (2004) Das Unbezügliche als Offenbarsein. Besinnung auf das philosophische Denken, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

KRÄMER, S. (1991) Berechenbare Vernunft. Kalkül und Rationalismus im 17. Jahrhundert, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110847079

LEIBNIZ, G. W. (1960-1961) Die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, reimpresión Hildesheim: Olms.

LEIBNIZ, G. W. (1903) Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz. Extraits de manuscripts de la Bibliothèque royale de Hanovre, ed. L. Couturat, Paris: Alcan.

MARION, J.-L. (1975) Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes. Savoir aristotélicien et science cartésienne dans les Regulae, Paris: Vrin.

MARION, J.-L. (1981) Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, Paris: PUF.

MARTÍNEZ MARZOA, F. (1991) Cálculo y ser (Aproximación a Leibniz), Madrid: Visor.

MARTÍNEZ MARZOA, F. (1994) Historia de la filosofía, 2 vol., Madrid: Istmo.

MARTÍNEZ MARZOA, F. (1999) Heidegger y su tiempo, Madrid: Akal.

MARTÍNEZ MARZOA, F. (2009) Pasión tranquila. Ensayo sobre la filosofía de Hume, Madrid: A. Machado Libros.

MASON, R. (1997) The God of Spinoza: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511583230

MICRAELIUS, J. (1966) Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum, Düsseldorf: Stern/Verlag Janssen & Co.

SCHELLING, F. W. J. (1976 ss.) Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, im Auftrag der Schelling-Kommission der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, hrsg. v. H. M. Baumgartner, W. J. Jacobs, H. Krings u. H. Zeltner, Stuttgart: Fromann Holzboog.

SEPPER, D. L. (1996) Descartes’s Imagination. Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

SERRES, M. (1968) Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques, Paris: P.U.F.

SEVERINO, E. (1980) Destino della necessità, Milano: Adelphi.

SPINOZA, B. (1925) Opera, im Auftrag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften hrsg. v. C. Gebhardt, Heidelberg: Winter.

WILLIAMS, M. (1986) “Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt”, en: Rorty, A. O. (ed.) Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, Los Angeles: University of California Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520907836-008

WILSON, M. D. (1986) “Can I Be the Cause of My Idea of the World? (Descartes on the In nite and Inde nite)”, en: Rorty, A. O. (ed.) Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, Los Angeles: University of California Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520907836-017

Published

2013-01-13

How to Cite

Sánchez de León Serrano, J. M. (2013). The Persistence of Doubt after Descartes. Estudios De Filosofía, (47), 59–82. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.16646

Issue

Section

Original or Research articles

Categories

Most read articles by the same author(s)