Attention, reference, and inscrutability

Authors

  • Ignacio Ávila Cañamares Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Keywords:

Quine, Campbell, inscrutability of reference, relational theory of attention

Abstract


In this paper I discuss John Campbell’s criticism of the Quinean thesis of the inscrutability of reference. First I claim that Campbell’s arguments miss the point because he overlooks the link Quine draws between reference, quantification, and ontology. Then I discuss another line of thought against inscrutability that appeals to Campbell’s relational view on attention. Finally, I suggest that this line –though insufficient and in need of a complement– brings out the fact that behind the views held by these authors on the topic of reference there are important philosophical ideals which should be discussed.

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Author Biography

Ignacio Ávila Cañamares, Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Grupo de Investigación Relativismo y racionalidad, Departamento de Filosofía, 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia

References

Campbell, J. (2002a). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_________ (2002b). Berkeley’s Puzzle. En T. S. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, (pp. 127–143). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_________. (2009). Consciousness and Reference. En B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann & S. Walter (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, (pp. 648–662). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hylton, P. (2000). Reference, Ontological Relativity, and Realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volumen suplementario 74, 281–299.

_________. (2004). Quine on Reference and Ontology. En R. F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine, (pp. 115–150). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

_________. (1969). Ontological Relativity. En Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (pp. 26–68). New York: Columbia University Press.

_________. (1974). The Roots of Reference. La Salle: Open Court.

_________. (1983). Ontology and Ideology Revisited. Journal of Philosophy 80, 499–502.

_________. (1992). Pursuit of Truth. Revised Edition. Cambridge Mass. / London: Harvard University Press.

_________. (1993). In Praise of Observation Sentences. Journal of Philosophy 90, 107–116.

_________. (1995a). From Stimulus to Science. Cambridge Mass. / London: Harvard University Press.

_________. (1995b). Reactions. En P. Leonard & M. Santambrogio (Eds.), On Quine: New Essays (pp. 347–61). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_________. (1999). Where do we disagree? En L. E. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, (pp. 73–80). Chicago y La Salle: Open Court.

Williams, B. (1978). Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Published

2014-11-01

How to Cite

Ávila Cañamares, I. (2014). Attention, reference, and inscrutability. Estudios De Filosofía, (50), 31–51. Retrieved from https://revistas.udea.edu.co/index.php/estudios_de_filosofia/article/view/21137

Issue

Section

Original or Research articles

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