Accuracy and epistemic agency in Descartes: an exploration of the margins of the First Meditation




Descartes, accuracy, pure enquiry, epistemic akrasia, epistemic agency, Pascal’s wager


In this paper I advance a reading of the contours of the First Meditation. I try to bring out an important dimension of Descartes’s thinking about the virtue of accuracy. I contrast the concern for the truth in daily life and in the Cartesian inquiry. I explore the way in which Descartes faces some epistemic risks in the course of his meditation and highlight some aspects of his conception of epistemic agency. And, nally, I conclude with a brief note about Pascal’s wager.

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Author Biography

Ignacio Ávila Cañamares, Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Profesor asociado del Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia. PhD in Philosophy de la University of Warwick (Reino Unido), pregrado y maestría en filosofía de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Forma parte del grupo de investigación Relativismo y racionalidad. Sus principales áreas de investigación son filosofía analítica, filosofía de la percepción, filosofía del lenguaje, y epistemología moderna y contemporánea. Ha publicado diversos ensayos en varias revistas nacionales e internacionales.


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How to Cite

Ávila Cañamares, I. (2019). Accuracy and epistemic agency in Descartes: an exploration of the margins of the First Meditation. Estudios De Filosofía, (60), 85–109.



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