Non-Evidential Belief and Vital Certainty


  • Rafael Miranda Rojas Universidad Católica del Maule



Vital certainty, doubt, normative role, hinge proposition, anti-intellectualism, skeptical


This paper argues that the notion of explicit belief in Ortega y Gasset (1946) and Wittgenstein (1969) requires a non-intellectualist understanding of certainty, what is called vital certainty. It is argued that the normative role of the hinge propositions prevents skeptic doubt and, in turn, enables epistemology. This normative role is understood as a-epistemic, even if we can affirm a sui generis use of ''I know''. Finally, skeptical reading is discussed as a possible case of loss of certainty, and how vital certainty responds to these cases.

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Author Biography

Rafael Miranda Rojas, Universidad Católica del Maule

Departamento de Filosofía Facultad de Ciencias Religiosas y Filosóficas Universidad Católica del Maule Talca, Chile


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How to Cite

Miranda Rojas, R. (2016). Non-Evidential Belief and Vital Certainty. Estudios De Filosofía, (54), 71–85.



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