The priority of Propositional Justification


  • Erhan Demircioglu Koç University



epistemic justification, propositional justification, doxastic justification, the epistemic basing relation, John Turri


Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. Turri offers “an alternative proposal,” the definitive thesis is that the subject’s intellectual abilities explain why a given proposition, p, is justified for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this proposal leads to explaining propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification rather than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think that Turri misidentifies “the orthodox view” and his objection thereby misfires, (ii) Even if we assume that Turri’s identification of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri’s own proposal is not “an alternative” to the orthodox view but can be accommodated by it.

= 194 veces | PDF
= 188 veces| | VISOR
= 5 veces|


Download data is not yet available.


Metrics Loading ...

Author Biography

Erhan Demircioglu, Koç University

Erhan Demircioglu es docente-investigador del Departamento de Filosofía de Koç University. Realizó su doctorado en filosofía de University of Pittsburgh. Sus áreas de especialización son: la filosofía de la mente, la epistemología, la filosofía del lenguaje, la lógica, la filosofía analítica temprana, la filosofía de la ciencia. Publicaciones: “Epistemic Infinitism and the Conditional Character of Inferential Justification”, Synthese (2018); “On Understanding a Theory on Conscious Experiences”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy (2018); “Dretske on Non-Epistemic Seeing”, Theoria (2017).


Block, N. (1990). Can the mind change the world?. In G. Boolos (Ed.). Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feldman, R. (?). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River. NJ: Prentice Hall.

Firth, R. (1978). Are epistemic concepts reducible to ethical concepts? In A. Goldman & J. Kim (Eds.), Values and Morals, Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company.

Foley, R. (1984). Epistemic luck and the purely epistemic. American Philosophical Quarterly, 21 (2), 113-124.

Goldman, A. (1967). A causal theory of knowing. The Journal of Philosophy, 64 (12), 357-372.

Kim, J. (1988). Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XII, 225-239.

Klein, P. (2007). Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning. Philosophical Studies, 134 (1), 1-17.

Korcz, K. (2000). The causal-doxastic theory of the basing relation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30 (4), 525-550.

Kvanvig, J. (2003). Propositionalism and the perspectival character of justification. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40 (1), 3-18.

Leite, A. (2004). On justifying and being justified. Philosophical Issues, 14, 219-253.

Melis, G. (2017). The intertwinement of propositional and doxastic justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Online version:

Moser, P. (1984). A defense of epistemic intuitionism. Metaphilosophy, 15 (3), 196-209.

Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Pollock, J. & J. Cruz. (1999). Contemporary theories of knowledge. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Silva, P. (2015). On doxastic justification and properly basing one’s beliefs. Erkenntnis, 80 (5), 945-955.

Smithies, D. (2012). Moore’s paradox and the accessibility of justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85 (2), 273-300.

Turri, J. (2009). An infinitist account of doxastic justification. Dialectica, 63 (2), 209-218.

Turri, J. (2010). On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80 (2), 312-326.

Vahid, H. (2016). A dispositional analysis of propositional and doxastic justification. Philosophical Studies, 173 (11), 3133-3152.




How to Cite

Demircioglu, E. (2019). The priority of Propositional Justification. Estudios De Filosofía, (59), 167–182.



Original or Research articles

Similar Articles

1 2 3 4 5 > >> 

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.