Fernández, J. (2019). Memory: a self-referential account. Oxford University Press

Authors

  • Juan Fernando Álvarez Céspedes Grenoble Alpes University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a13

Keywords:

Memory, Perception, Philosophy of mind, Jordi Fern´andez

Abstract


Fernández’ most recent book constitutes an articulated development of several philosophical considerations on memory displayed in previous, and forthcoming publications. The result of such articulated development ends up being a consistent account that provides an innovative and thought-provoking perspective on episodic remembering. This volume not only gathers and articulates the author’s previous ideas, but also provides new reflections, and objections that encompasses four significant domains in the philosophy of memory. In the first part of the book (Chapters 1, 2, and 3), Fernández offers an account of both the metaphysics and the intentionality of episodic memory; in the second part (Chapters 4 and 5), the author deals with certain phenomenological aspects involved in remembering; in the third part (Chapters 6 and 7), two important debates in the epistemology of memory are discussed.

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Author Biography

Juan Fernando Álvarez Céspedes, Grenoble Alpes University

MA Student, Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Grenoble Alpes University.

References

Bernecker, S. (2020). Review of the book Memory: a self-referential account, by J. Fernández. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. An Electronic Journal. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/memory-a-self-referential-account/

Fernández, J. (2006). The intentionality of memory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84(1), 39-57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400600571695

Fernández, J. (2018). The functional character of memory. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, & D. Perrin (Eds.), New directions in the philosophy of memory (pp. 52-72). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591

Fernández, J. (2019). Memory: a self-referential account. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190073008.001.0001

Michaelian, K. (2020). Episodic memory is not immune to error through misidentification: against Fernández. Synthese. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02652-w

Michaelian, K. & Robins, S. K. (2018). Beyond the causal theory? Fifty years after Martin and Deutscher. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus & D. Perrin (Eds.), New directions in the philosophy of memory (pp. 13-32). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591

Perrin, D., Michaelian, K. & Sant’Anna, A. (2020). The phenomenology of remembering is an epistemic feeling. Frontiers in Psychology, 11:1531. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01531

Sant’Anna, A. & Michaelian, K. (2019). Teorías sobre o lembrar: causalismo, simulacionismo e funcionalismo. Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 10(3), 8-36. https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378640445

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Published

2021-07-30

How to Cite

Álvarez Céspedes, J. F. (2021). Fernández, J. (2019). Memory: a self-referential account. Oxford University Press. Estudios De Filosofía, (64), 237–243. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a13

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