Phenomenal contrast arguments for cognitive phenomenology

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n57a09

Keywords:

Cognition, phenomenology, phenomenal contrast, Strawson, Kriegel

Abstract

According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson’s Jack/Jacques argument —hypothetical— represented by Kriegel’s Zoe argument —and glossed— first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology.

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Author Biographies

Elijah Chudnoff, University of Miami

Licenciado en filosofía por la Universidad de Florida y Doctorado en filosofía por la Universidad de Harvard. Profesor asociado de la Universidad de Miami. Sus áreas de investigación son la epistemología y la filosofía de la mente. Entre sus publicaciones se destacan dos libros: Intuition (Oxford University Press, 2013); Cognitive Phenomenology. (Routledge, 2015). Igualmente, ha publicado numerosos artículos en revistas como Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Inquiry, Philosophical Issues y Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

Elizabeth Cardona Muñoz, Universidad de Antioquia

Estudiante del último año del pregrado en filosofía de la Universidad de Antioquia. Actualmente, es becaria del DAAD para llevar a cabo parte de sus estudios de pregrado en la Universidad de Giessen (Alemania). Entre sus áreas de interés se encuentran la filosofía de la mente, la filosofía analítica, la filosofía del lenguaje y de la ciencia. Publicaciones: El Sylva sylvarum y la Historia vitae et mortis de Francis Bacon. Trad. Revista Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia, Vol. 2, Núm. 1, 2017.

Juan Fernando Álvarez Céspedes, Universidad de Antioquia

Estudiante del último semestre del pregrado en filosofía de la Universidad de Antioquia. Es miembro del comité editorial de la revista de estudiantes del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad de Antioquia, Versiones. Sus áreas de interés son la filosofía de la mente, la epistemología, y la historia y filosofía de la ciencia. Publicaciones: Francis  Bacon: mitología y ciencia. Interpretar mitos para explicar cómo conocer la naturaleza. Versiones No. 12, segunda época, 2017; Aboliendo las fronteras entre la historia natural y la magia natural. El Sylva sylvarum y la Historia vitae et mortis de Francis Bacon. Trad. Revista Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia, Vol. 2, Núm. 1, 2017; La “teoría” del significado como uso de Ludwig Wittgenstein. Denis Sauvé versus Warren D. Goldfarb. Légein, No 21, 2015.

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Published

2018-04-10

How to Cite

Chudnoff, E., Cardona Muñoz, E., & Álvarez Céspedes, J. F. (2018). Phenomenal contrast arguments for cognitive phenomenology. Estudios De Filosofía, (57), 175–203. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n57a09

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Translation

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