Kuhnian Practical Politics: Why It’s (Epistemically) Virtuous to be (Evaluatively) Attached to a Paradigm
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.356660Keywords:
Thomas Kuhn, Evaluative Attachment, Samuel Scheffer, Paradigms, Disciplinary Matrix, Impartiality, Value-free ideal of scienceAbstract
Is it epistemically vicious to be attached to a specific scientific paradigm? Such attachment clearly violates a norm of impartiality that is associated with the value-free ideal of science. I will argue that what Samuel Scheffler (2022) calls ‘evaluative attachment’ is not always epistemically vicious. In section 1, I will present Kuhn’s account of paradigms as embodying not just theoretical positions but also a ‘constellation of group commitments’ that Kuhn came to call a ‘disciplinary matrix’ (2012/1962, postscript). Section 2 evaluates Popper’s and Davidson’s criticisms of Kuhn, drawing on the work of Pablo Melogno (2020). Section 3 evaluates the claim that impartiality is a significant source of the value we accord to science. Section 4 appeals to Samuel Scheffler’s (2022) concept of evaluative attachment to argue that partiality to a specific framework or paradigm is not an epistemic vice. I conclude with brief observations, to be elaborated in future work, on how this argument applies to science in particular.
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