Theoretical change and historical semantics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.357228Keywords:
Incommensurability, Pablo Melogno, Theoretical Change, Hybrid Theories of Reference, Historical SemanticsAbstract
In several academic studies, Pablo Melogno lays the groundwork for formulating election rational criteria between incommensurable theories, seeking to reconcile the Kuhnian notion of incommensurability with rationalist reconstructions of the processes of theoretical change. One of the axes of this project focuses on the semantic aspects of incommensurability. Particularly in the development of historical semantics that relativizes the scope of semantic holism. In this analysis, I deepen and extend Melogno’s project by considering various aspects of hybrid theories of reference.
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