From bodily self-awareness to the experience of otherness in one's own body: the case of somatoparaphrenia.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.355336Keywords:
intercorporeality, sense of bodily ownership, Somatoparaphrenia, Style , familiarityAbstract
Patients with somatoparaphrenia articulate a disavowal of ownership over a extremity. In philosophy somatoparaphrenia serves as a focal point for discussions concerning the intricacies of self-awareness, specifically the sense of ownership inherent in all mental experiences. Additionally, this disorder prompts reflections on bodily self-awareness, namely, the perception of a body part as an integral component of bodily spatiality. I extend beyond conventional discussions, positing that somatoparaphrenia introduces an anomalous intercorporeal dimension. Diverging from other pathologies associated with bodily spatiality, in somatoparaphrenia the subject establishes a sense of otherness beyond the confines of their organic body: the alien extremity becomes ascribed to another. The exposition is done in two parts. First, I engage in philosophical discourse on bodily awareness, utilizing somatoparaphrenia as an illustrative example. Subsequently, I discuss the issue of otherness within somatoparaphrenia, elucidating the rationale behind conceptualizing this disorder as an intercorporeal experience.
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