The disorder of things and the problem of demarcation

Authors

  • Carlos Emilio García Duque Universidad de Caldas

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.14760

Keywords:

Unity of science, methodological unity, demarcation, falsifi ability, Popper, Dupré.

Abstract

In this paper, I analyze John Dupré’s criticisms of the methodological unity of science. As it is known, from the premise of the disorder of things, Dupré rejects both strong and weak variants of unifification, but his best arguments against the latter suppose that there is no satisfactory solution to the problem of demarcation. After examining Dupré’s arguments for the implausibility of any weak formulation of the thesis of the unity of science (including those focused on methodological unity), I shall explain his formulation of the problem of demarcation, examine his characterization of Popper’s theory of falsifi ability, and answer his arguments against Popper’s view on empirical science. My arguments shall show the inadequacy of Dupré’s treatment of this problem and suggest a way to see how Popper’s solution to the problem of demarcation, by way of the criterion of falsifi ability, supports a defense of a non-reductionist version of the unity of science.

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Author Biography

Carlos Emilio García Duque, Universidad de Caldas

Grupo de investigación Tántalo Departamento de Filosofía y Letras Manizales, Caldas – Colombia E-mail: carlos.garcia_d@ucaldas.edu.co

References

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Published

2012-07-07

How to Cite

García Duque, C. E. (2012). The disorder of things and the problem of demarcation. Estudios De Filosofía, (46), 61–88. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.14760

Issue

Section

Original or Research articles

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