Wittgenstein and the method of analysis by propositional types in On Certainty


  • Víctor Hugo Chica Pérez Universidad de Antioquia




Wittgenstein, method, propositional types, on certainty, philosophical analysis


My purpose in this article is to provide a reconstruction of the mechanics of philosophical analysis that Wittgenstein carried out in “On Certainty”. I will show that this analysis is based, specifically, on an appeal to a wide propositional typology that serves to evaluate and diagnose Moore’s propositions. To this end, I shall first explain how common readings of the methodological issues in “On Certainty” fail. Secondly, I focus on the mechanics of analysis found in paragraphs 1-65, specifically the analysis of three sentences: “There are physical objects”, “I know that there is a hand here” and “here the mistake is impossible”. Thirdly, I proceed to identify different stages of the method and justify in what sense the strategic core of such research is the table of propositional typologies.

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Author Biography

Víctor Hugo Chica Pérez, Universidad de Antioquia

G.I. Conocimiento, filosofía, ciencia, historia y sociedad
Instituto de Filosofía


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How to Cite

Chica Pérez, V. H. (2015). Wittgenstein and the method of analysis by propositional types in On Certainty. Estudios De Filosofía, (52), 141–160. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n52a08



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