Attitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination




memory, imagination, continuism, discontinuism, causal theory, simulation theory


The current dispute between causalists and simulationists in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the relationship between memory and imagination. In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian (2017) have suggested that the dispute over the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead be viewed as a dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining. The focus on attitudes, rather than on causal connections, suggests a new way of conceiving of the relationship between memory and imagination that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of memory.

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Author Biography

André Sant'Anna, Washington University in St. Louis

Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Philosophy and the Philosophy-Neuro- science-Psychology Program at Washington University in St. Louis.


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How to Cite

Sant’Anna, A. (2021). Attitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination. Estudios De Filosofía, (64), 73–93.



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