Memory and perception, insights at the interface: editors’ introduction




Memory, perception, Philosophy of mind


The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.

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Author Biographies

Christopher McCarroll, Grenoble Alpes University

Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Grenoble Alpes University, France.

Kourken Michaelian, Grenoble Alpes University

Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Grenoble Alpes University, France.

Santiago Arango Muñoz, Universidad de Antioquia

Institute of Philosophy, University of Antioquia


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How to Cite

McCarroll, C., Michaelian, K. ., & Arango Muñoz, S. (2021). Memory and perception, insights at the interface: editors’ introduction. Estudios De Filosofía, (64), 5–19.

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