Extending Thomas Kuhn’s genealogy of semantics. A view into the Lowell Lectures and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.358023

Keywords:

Thomas Kuhn, semantics, meaning, scientific revolutions, conceptual change, formalism

Abstract

In the article “Towards a Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn's Semantics” (2023), Pablo Melogno, along with Leandro Giri, undertakes the task of reconstructing the path followed by Thomas Kuhn in the development of a semantics capable of accounting for scientific change. In particular, the authors examine the connections between the Lowell Lectures of 1951 and the Notre Dame Lectures of 1980, asserting that both respond to the same program of semantic concerns, which supports a continuist reading of Kuhnian thought about semantic issues. The present article seeks to extend this analysis to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), emphasizing the parallels that can be drawn between this work and the Lowell Lectures concerning certain linguistic aspects involved in scientific change through the analysis of the parts concerning this subject matter present in both writings.

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Author Biography

Paula-Luz Atencia-Conde-Pumpido, SEK-Ciudalcampo

Doctora en filosofía en 2018 por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, con una tesis titulada “Un análisis de la posición filosófica de Thomas Kuhn a la luz de su tesis de la inconmensurabilidad”, que desarrolló gracias a una beca FPU concedida por el Ministerio de Educación, Formación Profesional y Deporte del gobierno de España. Ha asistido a numerosos congresos, tanto nacionales como internacionales, y publicado diversos artículos de investigación sobre temas relacionados con la filosofía de la ciencia y del lenguaje de Thomas Kuhn, entre ellos, “A pluralist interpretation of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science” (2020) y “Kuhn, Putnam and the Reference” (2021).

References

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Published

2024-12-02

How to Cite

Atencia-Conde-Pumpido, P.-L. (2024). Extending Thomas Kuhn’s genealogy of semantics. A view into the Lowell Lectures and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Estudios De Filosofía. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.358023

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Section

Science, Theory Change and Incommensurability

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