Attention, reference, and inscrutability
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.21137Keywords:
Quine, Campbell, inscrutability of reference, relational theory of attentionAbstract
In this paper I discuss John Campbell’s criticism of the Quinean thesis of the inscrutability of reference. First I claim that Campbell’s arguments miss the point because he overlooks the link Quine draws between reference, quantification, and ontology. Then I discuss another line of thought against inscrutability that appeals to Campbell’s relational view on attention. Finally, I suggest that this line –though insufficient and in need of a complement– brings out the fact that behind the views held by these authors on the topic of reference there are important philosophical ideals which should be discussed.
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Copyright (c) 2014 Ignacio Ávila Cañamares
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