El reemplazo constitucional en cinco países de América del Sur. Un análisis empírico comparativo
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.esde.v74n164a04Keywords:
constitution, constitutional amendment, democracy, constitutional durability, constitutional mortality, south americaAbstract
Almost all constitutions have a beginning and an end; enactment supposes its birth, while replacement entails its death. Like all living beings, written constitutions can pass away because of many causes. Among other factors, political, economic and social conditions, but also constitutional design features are called to be the leading causes of what is hereby denoted as constitutional replacement. Why do some written constitutions survive longer than others? To what extent are political, economic, and legal factors, the determinants of constitutional replacement? To answer these questions, this article presents an empirical study of risk and protective factors of constitutional mortality, among five South American countries, namely Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, in the period 1946 - 2016. This time period is especially interesting due to its variability. Previous literature insights are confirmed insofar evidence suggests that bicameralism tends to live longer, despite adverse political and economic conditions.
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