A critical analysis on the relation between democracy and corruption: the case of Mexico
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.esde.v76n167a02Keywords:
corruption, democracy, extractive institutions, inclusive institutionsAbstract
This paper argues that democracy and corruption are endogenous variables, that is, variables that are reciprocally conditioned. Furthermore, their behavior is determined by other systemic variables usually difficult to observe and quantify. Corrupt practices hamper the consolidation of democracy and a poorly consolidated democracy generates corruption. This endogenous character is the reason why the specialized literature is not conclusive as to whether there is or not a negative linear correlation between democracy and corruption. To illustrate this thesis, I analyze the representative case of Mexico. While both impunity and corruption have been constant in the history of the development of this country, both have had an exponential and uncontrolled rise after the beginning of the democratization process in 2000 when the single-party regime of State ended. In the case of Mexico, there is no doubt that greater democracy has meant much more corruption, while corruption has impeded democratic consolidation. I will analyze the causal mechanisms that explain this, concluding that, notwithstanding the foregoing, the only viable solution to this problem is the strengthening of the rule of law and democratic institutions.
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