Contemporary naturalism and moral decisión
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.rp.326894Keywords:
Naturalism, Moral decision, Automatic response, Deliberate response, Ethics, Moral, Moral principlesAbstract
Naturalistic ethics has explored through observation and experience the natural foundations of moral behavior. Contemporary naturalism inherited such a claim and updates the philosophical discussion from sciencie. This text aims to describe how contemporary naturalism explains the moral decision. For this, the naturalist ethics that begins with the moral sentiment in the Scottish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and then undergoes a transformation with contemporary science is introduced. The text then presents the tension between the automatic response and deliberate response to make a moral decision. Finally, I show how it is possible to explain the moral decision with emphasis on automatic response.
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