Time as a principle of individuation in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl

Abstract

The intention of this article is to show how  the  immanent  temporality  is  the  principle  of  individuation  by  which  the  individual  objects  that  are  presented  in  the  apprehension  are inserted in the flow of consciousness and in it  they  acquire  meaning  and  validity.  At  first  I  will  analyze  how  the  individuation  of  both  the  immanent objects and the personal identity that is given thanks to temporality unfolds as an activity.  In  the  second  moment  I  will  thematize  the way in which Husserl used the term individuation within  the Phenomenology  Lessons  of  the  internal  consciousness  of  time  (2002),  directing  the attention to its scope and importance in the understanding  of  the  temporal  phenomenon.  As  a conclusion  we  will  see  that  individuation  is what allows identifying a certain time course or an immanent object with its identity and particular  certainty  in  the  flow  of  consciousness.  Ultimately, I will show how these temporal facets constitute the individual as an absolute form under which consciousness is given, as the origin of action and reflection of the self.