Must our judges be philosophers? Can they be philosophers?

Authors

  • Ronald Dworkin Universidad de New York, University College de Londres
  • Leonardo García Jaramillo Universidad de Eafit

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.esde.2523

Keywords:

judges, philosophers, ordinary concepts - juridical concepts, intuitionism, pragmatism, new formalism

Abstract

This essay analyzes a solution to the dilemma of whether judges must or should be philosophers. Based on an assessment of the dramatic issues that judges have to resolve and which inevitably lead them to consideration of philosophical issues, this essay supports the conclusion that it is reasonable to believe that judges can be philosophical enough to relieve the dilemma’s sting. In the decision-making process, especially in the more public areas of law, judges confront problems that require judgments concerning polarizing moral issues that involve profound and continuous philosophical study and division. This essay concludes with the following advice to judges: Come clean about the role that philosophical concepts actually play both in the grand design and in the exquisite details of our legal structure, and get real about the hard work that it takes to redeem the promise of those concepts.

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Published

2007-07-08

How to Cite

Dworkin, R., & García Jaramillo, L. (2007). Must our judges be philosophers? Can they be philosophers?. Estudios De Derecho, 64(144), 15–30. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.esde.2523