Pritchard, D. (2016). Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17533/10.17533/udea.ef.n60a14Keywords:
skepticism, epistemology, philosophyAbstract
El libro Epistemic Angst (2016a) de Duncan Pritchard pretende, de acuerdo con una lectura predominante del pensamiento de Wittgenstein, curarnos de la angustia epistémica que producen las variedades más relevantes del escepticismo contemporáneo (Pritchard, 2016a). El libro tiene un interés innegable tanto para los que cultivan dicho campo de investigación como para los estudiosos del pensamiento tardío de Wittgenstein o para los que se sientan atraídos por una de las variantes más significativas de la teoría del conocimiento y la percepción actuales, el disyuntivismo epistémico, auspiciada de manera destacada por John McDowell (1995, por ejemplo). Adicionalmente, y de manera central, el volumen que reseñamos supone un gran aporte al vigente, y muy activo en los últimos tiempos, campo de la conocida como “epistemología de goznes”, que desarrolla los supuestos epistémicos tan sólo esbozados en Sobre la certeza, obra póstuma compuesta a partir de los últimos cuadernos del ya mencionado Ludwig Wittgenstein. Finalmente, el libro tiene un gran atractivo por el modo en que dialoga críticamente con otros proponentes de dicha epistemología, así como con los defensores de respuestas alternativas al reto escéptico, bien sean internistas o externistas.
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